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1 Introduction	  	  This	  essay	  centres	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  European	  Union’s	  (EU)	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  in	  respect	  of	  national	  regulatory	  schemes	  promoting	  renewable	  electricity	  and	  core	  internal	  market	  provisions.	  More	  specifically,	  it	  explores	  and	  seeks	  to	  delimit	  the	  principal	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  regard	  from	  the	  perspectives	  of	  how	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  energy	  trinity	  –	  security	  of	  supply,	  sustainability,	  and	  competitiveness	  –	  are	  balanced,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interplay	  between	  negative	  and	  positive	  integration.	  Assuming	  that	  state	  discretion	  cannot	  be	  properly	  conceptualised	  by	  way	  of	  analysing	  hard	  law	  solely,	  significant	  soft	  law	  elements	  that	  govern	  –	  if	  not	  strictly	  regulate	  –	  the	  internal	  market	  are	  methodologically	  embraced.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter,	  the	  immediate	  context	  and	  significant	  concepts	  are	  outlined,	  the	  problem	  is	  stated	  and	  the	  method	  elaborated.	  	  
1.1 Setting	  the	  context:	  energy	  security	  	  The	  significance	  of	  conventional	  primary	  energy	  sources	  in	  the	  course	  of	  history	  –	  whether	  fossil	  such	  as	  oil,	  gas,	  and	  coal	  or	  infinite	  such	  as	  nuclear/uranium	  –	  can	  hardly	  be	  exaggerated.1	  Energy	  ultimately	  satisfies	  certain	  human	  needs.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  best	  illustrated	  by	  its	  end	  usage,	  following	  conversion	  of	  the	  primary	  sources	  into	  secondary	  energy	  sources	  such	  as	  electricity	  and	  petrol,	  which	  are	  generally	  concentrated	  to	  three	  major	  sectors	  of	  which	  each	  roughly	  accounts	  for	  30	  per	  cent:	  buildings,	  manufacturing	  industry,	  and	  transportation.2	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  energy	  consumption	  and	  energy	  demand	  are	  predicted	  to	  grow	  steadily	  over	  the	  next	  decades.3	  	  Well	  functioning	  energy	  markets	  ensuring	  security	  of	  supply	  are	  thus	  of	  fundamental	  importance	  for	  modern	  societies.	  Moreover,	  perceptions	  of	  cross-­‐border	  interdependency	  and	  the	  beneficial	  case	  of	  economic	  integration	  necessitate	  co-­‐ordination	  at	  an	  international	  level.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  energy	  sector	  is	  highly	  characterized	  by	  governmental	  intervention.4	  Even	  the	  petroleum	  industry,	  historically	  exposed	  to	  (more)	  international	  competition	  and	  accordingly	  widely	  considered	  as	  a	  notable	  exception	  to	  the	  view	  put	  forth,5	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  characterized	  by	  governmental	  intervention,	  both	  by	  way	  of	  the	  concession	  systems	  employed	  by	  producing	  states6	  and	  the	  eagerness	  of	  the	  importing	  states	  to	  maintain	  the	  advantageous	  relationships	  established	  in	  previous	  decades	  with	  the	  former	  states.7	  	  At	  a	  general	  level,	  the	  rationale	  for	  intervention	  and	  state	  control	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  sovereignty	  considerations	  related	  to	  the	  availability,	  reliability	  and	  affordability	  of	  energy	  services	  of	  which	  all	  ultimately	  refer	  to	  the	  broader	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  a	  general	  and	  brief	  account,	  see	  Smil	  1994:chapter	  1,	  5	  and	  6	  and	  Zillman	  et	  al	  2012:3-­‐6	  2	  Blok	  2007:45.	  These	  estimates	  on	  end	  use	  sector	  shares	  are	  not	  universal,	  not	  least	  since	  some	  2-­‐3	  billion	  people	  lack	  access	  to	  secondary	  energy	  sources,	  see	  for	  instance	  Cherp	  and	  Jewell	  2011:7.	  	  	  3	  See	  for	  instance	  Davide	  Farah	  and	  Rossi	  2011:232f.	  4	  See	  for	  instance	  Cameron	  2002:5,	  Lundgren	  et	  al	  2013:15.	  	  5	  See	  for	  instance	  Cross,	  Hancher	  and	  Slot	  2001:295.	  6	  Such	  as	  exploration	  and	  production	  agreements	  or	  licences.	  See	  Parra	  2004:8f	  to	  that	  effect	  and	  Flanagan	  2012:278ff	  on	  the	  characteristics	  and	  functions	  of	  governmental	  licensing.	  	  7	  Haghigi	  2008:478.	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and	  traditional	  concept	  of	  energy	  security.8	  Although	  the	  broadness	  of	  the	  concept	  also	  makes	  it	  notoriously	  nebulous	  and	  subject	  to	  divergent	  usage,9	  the	  mainstream	  definition	  of	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  (IAE)	  of	  energy	  security	  as	  the	  uninterrupted	  availability	  of	  energy	  sources	  at	  an	  affordable	  price	  seems	  commonly	  accepted.10	  At	  the	  bottom	  of	  all	  these	  considerations,	  however,	  lies	  the	  strategic	  role	  of	  energy	  pertaining	  to	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  a	  state:	  military	  capacity	  and	  economic	  development.11	  	  The	  tension	  between	  the	  desire	  of	  functioning	  energy	  markets	  as	  well	  as	  international	  regulation12	  and	  state	  intervention	  is	  not	  least	  illustrated	  by	  the	  EU.	  While	  the	  very	  origin	  of	  the	  EU,	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community	  (ECSC)13	  1951	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  the	  European	  Atomic	  Energy	  Community	  	  (EUROATOM)14	  1957,	  explicitly	  recognized	  the	  significance	  of	  integrating	  approaches	  towards	  certain	  energy	  sources,	  “the	  integration	  process	  has	  never	  developed	  so	  far	  as	  to	  lay	  the	  foundations	  for	  a	  fully	  fledged	  and	  coherent	  common	  energy	  policy,	  which	  has	  instead	  become	  one	  of	  the	  weakest	  policy	  areas	  to	  date.”15	  	  On	  the	  European	  level	  as	  in	  most	  member	  states,	  the	  energy	  policy	  nowadays	  is	  formulated	  so	  as	  to	  achieve	  the	  “energy	  trinity”16	  the	  substance	  of	  which	  is	  roughly	  illustrated	  by	  the	  title	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  Green	  Paper	  from	  2006:	  A	  European	  Strategy	  for	  Sustainable,	  Competitive	  and	  Secure	  Energy.17	  With	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  this	  policy	  was	  formalized	  and	  the	  trinity	  for	  the	  first	  time	  elevated	  to	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  secondary	  legislation.18	  Apart	  from	  promoting	  the	  interconnection	  of	  energy	  networks,	  EU	  energy	  policy	  shall	  pursuant	  to	  article	  194(1)	  TFEU	  aim	  to	  1)	  ensure	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  energy	  market,	  2)	  ensure	  security	  of	  energy	  supply	  in	  the	  Union,	  and	  3)	  promote	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  energy	  saving	  and	  the	  development	  of	  new	  and	  renewable	  forms	  of	  energy.	  	  In	  line	  with	  the	  general	  observations	  above,	  neither	  the	  Treaties	  nor	  secondary	  legislation	  provide	  for	  an	  adequate	  definition	  of	  security	  of	  energy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	  for	  instance	  Elkind	  2010:121-­‐128,	  Cameron	  2001:5ff,	  Delvaux	  2013:3,	  Buchan	  2009:209.	  	  9	  See	  for	  instance	  Cherp	  and	  Jewell	  2011	  and	  2014.	  One	  may	  therefore	  argue,	  as	  noted	  for	  instance	  by	  Larsson	  2006:13,	  that	  apart	  from	  encompassing	  the	  narrower	  concept	  of	  security	  of	  supply,	  the	  actual	  meaning	  of	  energy	  security	  depend	  upon	  the	  actor	  perspective	  –	  the	  producer,	  importer	  or	  consumer	  –	  deployed,	  which	  corresponds	  to	  the	  example	  of	  producing	  and	  importing	  states	  above.	  Moreover,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  Cherp	  and	  Jewell	  2011,	  different	  academic	  disciplines	  with	  appurtenant	  ontologies	  that	  evolved	  from	  different	  empirical	  events	  emphasize	  different	  threads	  within	  the	  concept,	  such	  as	  sovereignty,	  robustness	  and	  resilience.	  	  10	  At	  least	  for	  introductory	  and	  practical	  reasons,	  see	  Haghigi	  2008:461	  who	  though	  replaces	  uninterrupted	  availability	  for	  adequacy	  and	  affordable	  for	  reasonable.	  	  11	  This	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  a	  fact	  but	  rather	  a	  question	  of	  perspective	  and	  ontology.	  An	  emphasis	  on	  ultimately	  sovereignty	  and	  resilience,	  when	  related	  to	  view	  put	  forth	  by	  Cherp	  and	  Jewell	  2011,	  are	  ontologies	  pertaining	  to	  the	  fields	  of	  political	  science	  and	  economics,	  respectively.	  	  12	  See	  for	  instance	  Krieger,	  de	  Boer	  and	  Steeg	  2001:98f	  paras	  3.02	  and	  3.05.	  	  	  13	  See	  for	  instance	  Krieger,	  de	  Boer	  and	  Steeg	  2001:149f.	  14	  See	  for	  instance	  Krämer	  2011:381	  para	  11-­‐23,	  Krieger,	  de	  Boer	  and	  Steeg	  2001:150f.	  	  15	  Morata	  and	  Solorio	  Sandoval	  2012:1.	  See	  also	  Delvaux	  2013:44	  paras	  134-­‐135,	  137	  and	  Krieger,	  de	  Boer	  and	  Steeg	  2001:141	  para	  3.98.	  	  16	  Ringel	  2006:4.	  See	  also	  Morata	  and	  Solorio	  Sandoval	  2012:2,	  Van	  Hende	  2011:67.	  17	  Commission	  2006.	  See	  also	  Delvaux	  2012:15ff,	  30ff	  para	  86.	  	  18	  Van	  Hende	  2011:56,	  Morata	  and	  Solorio	  Sandoval	  2012:2f.	  Compare	  Delvaux	  2013:343	  para	  975	  according	  to	  which	  the	  objectives	  only	  partly	  are	  inserted	  into	  article	  194	  TFEU.	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supply.19	  In	  the	  context	  of	  electricity,	  Directive	  2005/89	  concerning	  measures	  to	  safeguard	  security	  of	  electricity	  supply	  and	  infrastructure	  investment	  defines	  under	  article	  2(b)	  security	  of	  electricity	  supply	  as	  “the	  ability	  of	  an	  electricity	  system	  to	  supply	  final	  customers	  with	  electricity”.	  Clearly,	  this	  definition	  lacks	  guidance	  on	  the	  crucial	  question	  of	  whether	  supply	  is	  sufficient	  at	  any	  price	  or	  whether	  it	  must	  be	  affordable.20	  In	  this	  regard,	  though	  on	  a	  general	  non-­‐binding	  European	  level,	  the	  Commission	  has	  opted	  for	  a	  broader	  concept	  of	  security	  of	  supply	  aimed	  to	  ensure	  “the	  uninterrupted	  physical	  availability	  of	  energy	  products	  on	  the	  market,	  at	  a	  price	  which	  is	  affordable	  for	  all	  consumers	  (private	  and	  industrial).”21	  However,	  under	  the	  second	  subparagraph	  of	  article	  194(2)	  TFEU,	  member	  states	  are	  entitled	  to	  three	  highly	  interrelated	  prerogatives,	  namely	  the	  right	  to	  “determine	  the	  conditions	  for	  exploiting	  its	  energy	  resources,	  its	  choice	  between	  different	  energy	  sources	  and	  the	  general	  structure	  of	  its	  energy	  supply,	  without	  prejudice	  to	  Article	  192(2)(c).”	  The	  first	  right	  comprises	  national	  policies	  regarding	  the	  exploitation	  of	  primary	  conventional	  energy	  sources	  that	  are	  important	  for	  the	  production	  of	  energy	  in	  most	  member	  states,	  such	  as	  oil,	  natural	  gas	  and	  uranium,22	  but	  does	  not	  in	  my	  view	  preclude	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  (RES).23	  The	  second	  right	  refers	  to	  the	  power	  of	  a	  member	  state	  to	  unilaterally	  determine	  which	  kind	  of	  energy	  sources	  it	  will	  use	  to	  cover	  its	  demand	  for	  energy,24	  which	  reinforces	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  responsibility	  for	  energy	  security	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  –	  if	  not	  de	  facto	  exclusively	  –	  remains	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  state	  discretion.25	  The	  third	  right	  refers	  to	  the	  power	  of	  a	  member	  state	  to	  organise	  the	  system	  of	  its	  energy	  supply	  and	  comprises	  the	  right	  to	  decide	  both	  which	  energy	  mix	  or	  sources	  it	  will	  use	  and	  which	  energy	  infrastructure	  it	  will	  employ.	  A	  further	  and	  highly	  significant	  example	  in	  this	  context	  is	  a	  member	  states’	  option	  to	  set	  a	  target	  for	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  (RES).26	  	  The	  rights	  enshrined	  in	  article	  194(2),	  both	  in	  themselves	  and	  –	  as	  will	  be	  illustrated	  below	  –	  together	  with	  article	  192(2)(c),	  set	  potentially	  far-­‐reaching	  constraints	  on	  EU’s	  ability	  to	  exercise	  legislating	  competence	  in	  the	  matters	  concerned.27	  They	  illustrate	  at	  the	  very	  least	  the	  continuing	  conflation	  of	  energy	  security	  into	  traditional	  sovereignty	  concerns,	  which	  constitutes	  the	  legal	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  any	  explanation	  of	  why	  EU	  energy	  policy	  is	  destined	  to	  be	  weak.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Delvaux	  2013:337	  para	  961.	  	  20	  See	  for	  instance	  Delvaux	  2013:337.	  	  21	  COM	  2000:executive	  summary.	  See	  also	  Delvaux	  2013:338	  para	  963.	  	  22	  Delvaux	  2013:259	  and	  345,	  para	  739	  and	  983	  respectively.	  	  23	  See	  for	  instance	  AG	  opinion	  para	  109	  in	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  according	  to	  which	  the	  provision	  in	  article	  191(1)	  TFEU	  on	  the	  “prudent	  and	  rational	  utilisation	  of	  natural	  resources”	  is	  relevant	  for	  RES.	  	  24	  Delvaux	  2013:345	  para	  984.	  25	  This	  is	  also	  illustrated	  by	  the	  current	  applicable	  Directives	  concerning	  common	  rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  natural	  gas	  and	  electricity	  which	  in	  the	  face	  of	  crisis	  situations	  provide	  the	  possibility	  of	  unilateral	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  obligations	  aimed	  to	  improve	  and	  integrate	  the	  energy	  markets	  within	  the	  Union	  pursuant	  to	  article	  42	  and	  46	  respectively.	  See	  also	  Delvaux	  2013:335	  para	  955.	  	  26	  Delvaux	  2013:345	  para	  985.	  	  27	  Johnston	  and	  van	  der	  Marel	  2013:198.	  See	  also	  van	  Hende	  2011:57-­‐59.	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1.2 Updating	  the	  context:	  climate	  change	  	  Emissions	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  (GHG),	  especially	  carbon	  dioxide	  (CO2),	  are	  inevitable	  at	  both	  the	  extraction	  and	  consumption	  phase	  of	  fossil	  energy	  sources.28	  Increasing	  concentrations	  of	  GHG	  and	  particularly	  of	  CO2	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  due	  to	  human-­‐induced	  activities	  is	  by	  an	  almost	  unanimous	  international	  community	  considered	  as	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  global	  warming	  and	  climate	  changes.29	  Globally,	  finite	  energy	  sources	  account	  for	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  GHG-­‐emissions.30	  Within	  EU	  almost	  80	  %	  of	  the	  GHG-­‐emissions	  stem	  from	  the	  energy	  sector.31	  	  	   Climate	  change	  raises	  several	  critical	  questions,	  inter	  alia,	  on	  intergenerational	  equity,	  global	  justice,	  international	  security,	  and	  –	  being	  described	  as	  “the	  greatest	  and	  widest-­‐ranging	  market	  failure	  ever	  seen”32	  –	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  free	  trade.33	  First	  and	  foremost,	  however,	  climate	  change	  targets	  the	  energy	  sector	  “both	  as	  a	  source	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  as	  a	  part	  of	  solutions	  for	  adaption	  and	  mitigation”.34	  The	  traditional	  notion	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  thus	  being	  redefined,	  at	  least	  academically.	  States	  do	  no	  longer	  only	  have	  immediate	  sovereignty	  interests	  in	  the	  availability,	  reliability	  and	  affordability	  of	  energy	  services,	  but	  also	  in	  their	  sustainability,	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  both	  mitigating	  climate	  change	  by	  decreasing	  GHG-­‐emissions	  and	  adapting	  to	  it	  by	  protecting	  energy	  systems	  from	  severe	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change.35	  Secondly,	  the	  international	  and	  strategic	  regulatory	  approach	  often	  needed	  but	  seldom	  agreed	  upon	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  successful	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  due	  to	  its	  delocalized	  and	  long-­‐term	  effects	  as	  well	  as	  its	  character	  of	  being	  a	  market	  failure	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  free	  rider	  problem.36	  	  The	  international	  climate	  change	  regime	  –	  based	  on	  the	  United	  Nation’s	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  and	  the	  subsequently	  adopted	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  –	  respond	  in	  a	  differentiated	  manner	  to	  the	  demands	  and	  questions	  raised.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,37	  which	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  pursues,38	  is	  to	  stabilize	  GHG-­‐concentrations	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  at	  a	  level	  preventing	  dangerous	  anthropogenic	  interference	  with	  the	  climate	  system.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  sets	  legally	  binding	  GHG-­‐emission	  targets.39	  	  EU	  and	  its	  member	  states	  have	  acceded	  to	  UNFCCC	  and	  the	  Kyoto	  protocol40	  and	  are	  committed	  to	  reduce	  GHG-­‐emissions	  with	  21	  %	  (compared	  to	  the	  base	  year	  1990)	  during	  the	  second	  commitment	  period	  2013-­‐2020.41	  Externally,	  EU	  has	  indeed	  repeatedly	  pursued	  the	  role	  of	  international	  leadership	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  for	  instance	  Redgwell	  2007:120	  para	  1.191,	  Olsen	  Lundh	  2010:86-­‐88.	  	  29	  See	  for	  instance	  IPCC	  2007,	  Olsen	  Lundh	  2010:91ff,	  Massai	  2012:10f,	  Sands,	  Peel,	  Fabra	  and	  Ruth	  2012:274f,	  Hackett	  2011:266f.	  	  30	  See	  for	  instance	  European	  Parliament	  2008:1-­‐2.	  	  31	  Commission	  2010:2.	  See	  also	  Nielsen	  and	  Jeppessen	  2003:3.	  	  32	  Kaur	  2009:270.	  	  33	  Epps	  and	  Green	  2010:3ff,	  18-­‐26.	  	  34	  Redgwell	  2007:120.	  	  35	  Elkind	  2012:120-­‐122,	  128f	  	  36	  Wiener	  2007:1964,	  1967,	  Olsen	  Lundh	  2010:171.	  See	  also	  Lord,	  Goldberg,	  Rajamani	  and	  Brunnée	  2012:26f.	  	  37	  Article	  2.	  	  38	  Preamble.	  	  39	  Article	  3.	  	  40	  See	  for	  instance	  Krämer	  2011:84	  para	  2-­‐90.	  41	  Danish	  Presidency	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  2012.	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in	  the	  context	  of	  climate	  change	  policies.42	  Internally,	  several	  directives	  related	  to	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  have	  been	  adopted.	  The	  current	  EU	  climate	  and	  energy	  package	  set	  three	  key	  objectives	  for	  2020,	  known	  as	  the	  20-­‐20-­‐20	  targets,	  namely	  1)	  a	  20%	  reduction	  in	  EU	  GHG	  emissions	  from	  1990	  levels,	  2)	  raising	  the	  share	  of	  EU	  energy	  consumption	  from	  RES	  to	  20%,	  and	  3)	  a	  20%	  improvement	  in	  the	  EU’s	  energy	  efficiency.43	  The	  two	  instruments	  related	  to	  the	  second	  objective,	  historically	  as	  well	  as	  currently,	  are	  the	  directives	  on	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  energy	  from	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  (RES),	  setting	  primarily	  an	  indicative	  and	  subsequently	  binding	  target	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  RES	  in	  the	  gross	  final	  national	  consumption	  of	  energy	  and	  electricity,	  respectively:	  Directive	  2001/77	  (RED	  2001)	  which	  has	  been	  repealed	  by	  Directive	  2009/28	  (RED	  2009)	  currently	  in	  force.44	  Apart	  from	  pursuing	  technological	  innovation	  with	  the	  associated	  benefits	  on	  economy	  and	  employment,	  both	  RED	  directives	  are	  underpinned	  by	  two	  policy	  considerations.45	  Firstly,	  as	  established	  above,	  renewable	  energy	  production	  displaces	  fossil	  based	  energy	  and	  thus	  contributes	  directly	  to	  the	  reductions	  of	  GHG.	  Secondly,	  as	  the	  reduced	  consumption	  of	  fossil	  energy	  improves	  the	  trade	  balance	  and	  diversifies	  Europe’s	  energy	  supplies	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  energy	  developed	  and	  the	  sources	  used,	  energy	  security	  concerns	  are	  pursued,	  especially	  when	  –	  which	  is	  often	  the	  case	  –	  the	  RES	  are	  domestic.46	  These	  two	  policy	  considerations	  on	  a	  secondary	  law	  level	  are	  clearly	  interrelated	  with	  the	  primary	  legal	  basis	  for	  EU	  energy	  legislation	  under	  article	  194(1)(b-­‐c)	  TFEU	  and	  crucial	  aspects	  of	  the	  energy	  trinity	  contained	  therein.	  	  The	  adherence	  to	  the	  UNFCC	  and	  the	  subsequent	  Kyoto	  Protocol47	  as	  well	  as	  the	  adoption	  of	  both	  RED’s	  was,	  however,	  based	  on	  article	  192(1).48	  This	  provision	  prescribes	  the	  ordinary	  legislative	  procedure	  (OLP)	  based	  on	  qualified	  majority	  voting	  (QMV)	  under	  article	  294	  TFEU	  when	  measures	  are	  taken	  to	  achieve	  any	  of	  the	  four	  specific49	  EU	  environmental	  policy	  objectives	  under	  article	  191	  TFEU.	  Those	  are	  1)	  preserving,	  protecting	  and	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  environment,	  2)	  protecting	  human	  health,	  3)	  prudent	  and	  rational	  utilisation	  of	  natural	  resources,	  and	  4)	  promoting	  measures	  at	  an	  international	  level	  to	  deal	  with	  regional	  or	  worldwide	  environmental	  problems,	  and	  –	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  See	  for	  instance	  Kingston	  2013:966f,	  Jordan	  and	  Rainer	  2010:77.	  	  43	  For	  an	  overview,	  see	  http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm.	  See	  also	  Kulovesi,	  Morgera	  and	  Munoz	  2011:832.	  44	  Article	  1,	  Directive	  2009/28.	  Compare	  article	  1	  to	  the	  repealed	  directive	  that	  focuses	  on	  RES	  of	  ”the	  electricity	  production”.	  However,	  since	  the	  end	  use	  of	  energy	  –	  that	  is,	  final	  consumption	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  new	  directive	  –	  comprises	  electricity	  use,	  the	  difference,	  for	  my	  purpose,	  is	  of	  small	  relevance.	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  different	  wording	  is	  rather	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  biofuels,	  under	  the	  immediate	  category	  of	  final	  consumption	  or	  end	  use,	  are	  comprised	  in	  the	  new	  directive	  and	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  in	  the	  repealed	  directive.	  	  	  45	  See	  recital	  1	  RED	  2009,	  Hildingsson,	  Stripple	  and	  Jordan	  2010:103,	  108.	  Compare	  Nielsen	  and	  Jeppesen	  2003:3	  who	  omit	  the	  technology	  innovation	  objective.	  	  46	  See	  for	  instance	  Kulovesi,	  Morgera	  and	  Munoz	  2011:974,	  Hildingsson	  2009:113.	  	  47	  Krämer	  2011:84	  para	  2-­‐90.	  	  48	  Some	  of	  the	  provisions	  in	  the	  latter	  RED	  directive,	  namely	  those	  concerning	  biofuels	  under	  articles	  17,	  18,	  and	  19,	  were	  however	  based	  on	  article	  114	  as	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  adopting	  measures	  pertaining	  to	  the	  field	  of	  internal	  market.	  See	  the	  preamble	  of	  RED	  2009.	  See	  also	  Peeters	  2014:46.	  	  49	  The	  specificity	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  general	  environmental	  objectives	  enshrined	  under	  article	  3	  TEU.	  See	  Krämer	  2011:8	  and	  13,	  para	  1-­‐10	  and	  1-­‐15	  respectively.	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following	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty50	  –	  in	  particular	  combating	  climate	  change.	  The	  procedural	  requirements	  in	  the	  OLP	  are	  also	  applicable	  in	  regard	  of	  the	  EU	  energy	  policy	  objectives	  pursuant	  to	  article	  194(2)	  subparagraph	  1,	  provided	  however	  that	  the	  proposed	  measure	  does	  not	  interfere	  with	  any	  of	  the	  three	  member	  state	  prerogatives	  previously	  described.	  	  Given	  the	  immediate	  interrelationship	  between	  in	  particular	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  environmental	  objective,	  at	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  at	  least	  the	  sustainability	  and	  perhaps	  also	  the	  energy	  security	  objective	  within	  the	  energy	  trinity,51	  at	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  might	  at	  first	  sight	  seem	  that	  the	  former	  provides	  a	  loophole	  circumventing	  the	  member	  states	  immediate	  sovereignty	  and	  energy	  security	  interest	  recognized	  under	  article	  194(2)	  second	  subparagraph.52	  However,	  as	  follows	  from	  the	  latter	  provision,	  the	  member	  state	  energy	  prerogatives	  are	  “without	  prejudice	  to	  Article	  192(2)(c).”	  This	  provision	  prescribes,	  by	  way	  of	  derogation	  from	  the	  OLP,	  unanimity	  under	  a	  special	  legislative	  procedure	  (SLP)	  in	  respect	  of	  legislating	  “measures	  significantly	  affecting	  a	  Member	  State’s	  choice	  between	  different	  energy	  sources	  and	  the	  general	  structure	  of	  its	  energy	  supply.”	  Conceptually,	  both	  of	  these	  choices	  correspond	  to	  two	  of	  the	  energy	  prerogatives	  under	  article	  194(2).	  Substantially,	  a	  threshold	  is	  indicated	  insofar	  that	  unanimity	  is	  required	  only	  when	  either	  choice	  is	  significantly	  affected.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  being	  highly	  significant,	  the	  interrelationship	  between	  article	  194(2)	  and	  192(2)(c)	  TFEU	  is	  not	  settled.53	  In	  particular,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  whether	  all	  renewable	  energy	  matters	  are	  now	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  article	  194	  or	  192	  TFEU.54	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  essay,	  however,	  there	  is	  no	  (direct)	  need	  to	  settle	  the	  relationship.	  The	  point	  to	  be	  made	  is	  rather	  that	  any	  attempt	  on	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  directly	  regulate	  energy	  produced	  from	  RES,	  such	  as	  the	  RED	  directives,	  can	  more	  (article	  194)	  or	  less	  (article	  192)	  be	  easily	  obstructed	  by	  the	  member	  states.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  latter	  RED	  directive	  actually	  was	  adopted	  largely	  on	  basis	  of	  the	  then	  existing	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  recently	  inserted	  article	  194	  TFEU	  –	  article	  192(1)	  TFEU	  under	  the	  OLP	  does	  not	  invalidate	  the	  point	  made,	  since	  all	  Member	  States	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  adoption	  and	  the	  Council	  practically	  adopted	  the	  directive	  unanimously	  whereby	  no	  formal	  objection	  rose	  as	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  OLP	  instead	  of	  SLP.55	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  See	  for	  instance	  Peeters	  2014:42.	  	  51	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  again,	  that	  albeit	  being	  an	  unclear	  concept,	  energy	  security	  is	  increasingly	  defined	  so	  as	  to	  include	  some	  environmental	  criteria.	  Thus,	  the	  definition	  provided	  by	  the	  Commission	  above,	  though	  non-­‐binding,	  goes	  on	  and	  include	  the	  compliance	  of	  environmental	  requirements.	  	  52	  Given	  the	  market	  failure	  triggered	  by	  the	  energy	  sector	  under	  the	  traditional	  state-­‐centred	  approach	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  is	  partly	  recognized	  under	  article	  194(2),	  one	  could	  for	  instance	  question	  whether	  the	  traditional	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  practically	  compatible	  with	  the	  prudent	  and	  rational	  utilisation	  of	  natural	  resources	  at	  all.	  	  	  53	  See	  for	  instance	  Delvaux	  2013:346f	  paras	  987-­‐994	  and	  Johnston	  and	  van	  der	  Marel	  2013:	  197f.	  	  54	  See	  for	  instance	  Calliess	  and	  Hey	  2013:95	  and	  Peeters	  2014:46.	  The	  former	  argue	  that	  instead	  of	  holding	  that	  article	  194	  is	  lex	  specialis,	  which	  most	  authors	  are	  considered	  to	  hold,	  the	  better	  view	  is	  that	  article	  194	  “solely	  empowers	  [EU]	  to	  promote	  the	  technological	  development	  of	  renewable	  energies,	  whereby	  any	  economically	  or	  ecologically	  motivated	  support	  henceforth	  is	  governed	  by	  environmental	  regulations”	  i.e.	  article	  192.	  	  55	  Peeters	  2014:43.	  On	  the	  reasons	  why	  UNFCC/KP	  was	  adopted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  192(1),	  see	  Krämer	  2011:84	  para	  2-­‐90.	  See	  also	  Hannon	  2010:7	  and	  Delvaux	  2013:275	  para	  786	  who	  concludes	  that	  RED	  2009	  should	  have	  been	  adopted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unanimity	  under	  the	  special	  legislative	  procedure.	  It	  seems	  that	  at	  least	  Hannon,	  compare	  Delvaux	  2013:275	  para	  787,	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The	  concept	  of	  glocalisation,	  defined	  as	  the	  oscillation	  of	  regulatory	  forces	  between	  the	  global	  and	  local	  level,	  56	  is	  a	  telling	  description	  of	  the	  interests	  involved.	  Global,	  at	  the	  one	  hand,	  due	  to	  the	  delocalised	  and	  market	  failure	  features	  of	  climate	  change	  which	  calls	  for	  solutions	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  national	  sovereignty.	  Local,	  at	  the	  other	  hand,	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  locality	  of	  the	  installations	  giving	  rise	  to	  GHG-­‐emissions	  the	  regulation	  of	  which	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  are	  dependent	  upon	  states	  (formal)	  approval.	  	  
1.3 Specifying	  the	  context:	  national	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  	  
1.3.1 RES-­‐E	  	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  RED	  2009	  primarily	  establish	  a	  mandatory	  target	  of	  20%	  in	  respect	  of	  energy	  from	  renewable	  sources	  in	  the	  overall	  Community	  gross	  energy	  consumption	  by	  2020.57	  Renewable	  energy	  sources	  –	  RES	  –	  are	  defined	  as	  “energy	  from	  renewable	  non-­‐fossil	  sources,	  namely	  wind,	  solar,	  aerothermal,	  geothermal,	  hydrothermal	  and	  ocean	  energy,	  hydropower,	  biomass,	  landfill	  gas,	  sewage	  treatment	  plant	  gas	  and	  biogases”.58	  Such	  a	  definition	  clearly	  suggests	  that	  RES	  are	  indigenous	  energy	  resources	  and	  potentially	  available	  for	  exploitation	  in	  any	  region,	  which	  also	  have	  been	  confirmed	  by	  the	  Commission.59	  However,	  due	  to	  national	  variations	  in	  respect	  of	  both	  renewable	  energy	  potential	  and	  energy	  mix,	  the	  Community	  target	  is	  translated	  into	  individual	  targets	  for	  each	  Member	  State.60	  Moreover,	  the	  target	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  sectorial	  differentiation	  where	  the	  gross	  final	  consumption	  of	  energy	  is	  calculated	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  1)	  electricity	  from	  RES	  (RES-­‐E),	  heating	  and	  cooling	  from	  RES	  (RES-­‐H	  and	  RES-­‐C,	  respectively),	  and	  3)	  energy	  from	  RES	  in	  transport	  (RES-­‐T).61	  	  In	  spite	  of	  recent	  policy	  developments	  in	  support	  of	  RES-­‐T,	  member	  states	  have	  so	  far	  primarily	  directed	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  development	  of	  RES-­‐E.62	  In	  the	  context	  of	  RES-­‐E,	  the	  sectorial	  breakdown	  implies	  that	  EU	  need	  to	  more	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  presupposes	  that	  the	  material	  provisions	  leading	  to	  the	  SLP	  should	  be	  automatically	  upheld	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  explicit	  state	  action	  to	  that	  effect,	  which	  in	  my	  opinion	  is	  somewhat	  strange	  given	  the	  background	  of	  bargaining	  and	  compromising	  that	  assumingly	  is	  inherent	  in	  any	  attempt	  to	  adopt	  secondary	  legislation	  and	  where	  states	  submit	  their	  interests.	  For	  examples	  of	  actual	  conflicts	  and	  considerable	  intergovernmental	  bargaining	  surrounding	  the	  adoption	  of	  RED	  2009,	  see	  for	  instance	  Toke	  2008:3006,	  Calliess	  and	  Hey	  2013:115.	  For	  tensions	  preceding	  the	  adoption	  of	  RED	  2001,	  see	  for	  instance	  Lauber	  2004:1405f,	  Jansen	  and	  Uyterlinde	  2004:97f,	  and	  Rowlands	  2005.	  	  	  56	  Neuwirth	  2010:3.	  	  57	  Recital	  9	  and	  13	  RED	  2009.	  Under	  article	  2(f)	  gross	  final	  consumption	  of	  energy	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  energy	  commodities	  delivered	  for	  energy	  purposes	  to	  industry,	  transport,	  households,	  services	  including	  public	  services,	  agriculture,	  forestry	  and	  fisheries,	  including	  the	  consumption	  of	  electricity	  and	  heat	  be	  the	  energy	  branch	  for	  electricity	  and	  heat	  production	  and	  including	  losses	  of	  electricity	  and	  heat	  in	  distribution	  and	  transmission.	  	  58	  Article	  2(a)	  RED	  2009.	  A	  few	  of	  those	  are	  defined	  in	  the	  same	  article.	  This	  definition	  corresponds	  largely	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  RES	  under	  article	  2(30)	  of	  the	  Electricity	  Market	  Directive	  2009.	  	  59	  Commission	  2008:13.	  See	  also	  Fouquet	  2013:16.	  	  60	  Recital	  15	  and	  article	  3	  RED	  2009.	  	  61	  Article	  5	  RED	  2009.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  pursuant	  to	  article	  3(4)	  RES-­‐T	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  specific	  regionally	  non-­‐differentiated	  target	  according	  to	  which	  each	  member	  state	  shall	  ensure	  at	  least	  10%	  of	  the	  final	  consumption	  of	  energy	  by	  2020.	  For	  the	  rationale,	  see	  recital	  16.	  	  	  62	  van	  Hende	  2011:55.	  See	  also	  Kitzing,	  Mitchell	  and	  Morthorst	  2012:193.	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double	  the	  share	  of	  16%	  in	  2006	  to	  over	  30%	  by	  2020	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  its	  overall	  target.63	  Indeed,	  the	  share	  of	  RES-­‐E	  accounted	  for	  14.1%	  in	  2007,	  seemingly	  providing	  only	  a	  marginal	  increase	  from	  12.8%	  in	  1997.	  However,	  this	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  gratitude	  of	  the	  overall	  challenge	  to	  increase	  the	  share	  of	  RES-­‐E	  –	  has	  to	  take	  into	  consideration,	  firstly,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  electricity	  consumption	  has	  increased	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  increase,	  and,	  secondly,	  that	  climatic	  conditions	  change	  and	  interfere	  with	  RES-­‐E	  generation,	  such	  as	  the	  actual	  decrease	  of	  rainfall	  highly	  relevant	  for	  hydropower	  based	  generation.64	  Since	  many	  RES	  technologies	  are	  in	  fact	  electricity-­‐producing	  generators,	  the	  electricity	  sector	  is	  the	  prime	  contributor	  to	  the	  production	  of	  renewable	  energy.65	  For	  those	  reasons	  this	  essay	  focuses	  on	  RES-­‐E.	  	  
1.3.2 The	  national	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  	  Neither	  RED	  2001	  nor	  RED	  2009	  prescribe	  explicitly	  for	  directly	  supportive	  measures	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  targets.	  Some	  kinds	  of	  measures	  are	  however	  presupposed	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  targets	  set.	  According	  to	  recital	  27	  to	  RED	  2009,	  public	  support	  is	  necessary	  to	  reach	  the	  objectives	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  RES-­‐E,	  “in	  particular	  for	  as	  long	  as	  electricity	  prices	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  full	  environmental	  and	  social	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  energy	  sources	  used.”	  In	  respect	  of	  the	  form	  and	  substance	  of	  the	  support	  rendered,	  member	  states	  are	  at	  first	  sight	  granted	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  discretion.	  This	  is	  not	  least	  illustrated	  by	  the	  open-­‐ended	  definition	  of	  a	  support	  scheme	  under	  article	  2(2)(k),	  which	  comprises:	  	  	   [A]ny	  instrument,	  scheme	  or	  mechanism	  applied	  by	  a	  Member	  State	  or	  a	  group	  of	  Member	  States,	  that	  promotes	  the	  use	  of	  energy	  from	  renewable	  sources	  by	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  that	  energy,	  increasing	  the	  price	  at	  which	  it	  can	  be	  sold,	  or	  increasing,	  by	  means	  of	  a	  renewable	  energy	  obligation	  or	  otherwise,	  the	  volume	  of	  such	  energy	  purchased.	  This	  includes,	  but	  is	  not	  restricted	  to,	  investment	  aid,	  tax	  exemptions	  or	  reductions,	  tax	  refunds,	  renewable	  energy	  obligation	  support	  schemes	  including	  those	  using	  green	  certificates,	  and	  direct	  price	  support	  schemes	  including	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs	  and	  premium	  payments.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  RED	  2009	  provides	  for	  an	  open	  ended	  definition	  of	  support	  schemes,	  hence	  leaving	  it	  seemingly	  open	  for	  substantial	  state	  discretion,	  was	  preceded	  by	  fierce	  conflict	  over	  which	  support	  schemes	  are	  appropriate	  in	  the	  first	  place	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  policy	  objectives	  surrounding	  this	  area	  of	  law.66	  Basically,	  the	  conflict	  centred	  on	  the	  level	  and	  substance	  of	  harmonisation	  preferred	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  and	  where	  the	  member	  states,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  outcome,	  succeeded	  to	  safeguard	  their	  national	  support	  schemes.67	  Significantly,	  these	  issues	  were	  also	  highly	  contentious	  in	  the	  course	  of	  adopting	  RED	  2001.68	  	  Indeed,	  even	  prior	  to	  international	  (i.e.	  UNFCCC)	  and	  also	  supranational	  (i.e.	  EU	  secondary	  legislation)	  to	  that	  effect,	  several	  European	  states	  by	  own	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Jäger-­‐Waldau,	  Scarlat	  and	  Monforti-­‐Ferrario	  2011:3705.	  	  	  64	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1005.	  65	  See	  for	  instance	  Fagiani	  2014:3.	  	  66	  Calliess	  and	  Hey	  2013:115.	  	  67	  See	  for	  instance	  Fouquet	  and	  Johansson	  2008:4079,	  Lauber	  2011:125.	  	  68	  See	  for	  instance	  Dupont	  2013:110.	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means	  –	  unilaterally	  –	  adopted	  support	  schemes	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  promoting	  RES-­‐E.	  In	  general	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  two	  step	  context	  previously	  outlined,	  the	  early	  development	  of	  policy	  support	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  mainly	  aimed	  to	  improve	  the	  secure	  supply	  by	  the	  substitution	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  while	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  saw	  environmental	  targets	  as	  being	  equally	  important.69	  Some	  of	  the	  adopted	  support	  policies	  has	  subsequently	  been	  abandoned	  in	  favour	  of	  new	  promoting	  policies	  and	  regulatory	  designs,	  while	  other	  have	  been	  furthered	  in	  view	  of	  the	  learning	  process	  associated	  with	  the	  multifaceted	  and	  complex	  objectives	  and	  technologies	  underlying	  these	  schemes.	  	  The	  network	  infrastructure	  linking	  electricity	  producers	  and	  consumers	  together	  and	  in	  which	  all	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  operate,	  though	  in	  a	  different	  and	  more	  or	  less	  industrially	  embedded	  manner,	  is	  commonly	  subdivided	  into	  at	  least	  three	  sectorial	  categories	  or	  phases:	  generation,	  transmission,	  distribution.70	  At	  a	  first	  stage,	  often	  called	  upstream,	  the	  producer/generator	  connect	  the	  electricity	  generated	  to	  the	  grid.	  In	  essence,	  the	  grid	  consists	  of	  two	  infrastructures:	  the	  transmission	  system	  and	  the	  distribution	  system.71	  The	  former,	  managed	  by	  the	  transmission	  system	  operator	  (TSO)72	  and	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  midstream	  by	  virtue	  of	  carrying	  electricity	  to	  the	  distribution	  system,	  consist	  of	  transmission	  lines	  of	  extra	  high-­‐voltage	  networks	  designed	  to	  transmit	  over	  a	  long	  distance	  and	  to	  cover	  the	  entire	  territory	  of	  a	  state.73	  As	  such,	  they	  can	  be	  described	  as	  national	  energy	  highways.74	  In	  contrast,	  the	  distribution	  system	  managed	  by	  the	  distribution	  system	  operator	  (DSO)	  and	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  downstream,	  is	  constituted	  of	  high-­‐voltage,	  medium-­‐voltage	  and	  low-­‐voltage	  lines	  with	  a	  view	  to	  local	  delivery	  of	  the	  electricity	  to	  customers.75	  Traditionally,	  transportation	  of	  electricity	  usually	  went	  trough	  all	  these	  systems	  due	  to	  large-­‐scale	  and	  centralised	  generation.	  However,	  the	  characteristics	  of	  RES-­‐E	  such	  as	  small-­‐scale	  generation	  installations	  (up	  to	  10	  mega	  watt,	  MW)	  make	  it,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  suitable	  for	  direct	  connection	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1014.	  	  70	  See	  for	  instance	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacoval	  2010:xxii,	  29,	  Zillman	  et	  al	  2012:9,	  Hancher,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:852.	  	  	  71	  L’Abbate	  et	  al	  2008:17.	  	  72	  The	  Electricity	  Market	  Directive	  2009/72	  defines	  under	  article	  2(4)	  a	  TSO	  as	  “a	  natural	  or	  legal	  person	  responsible	  for	  operating,	  ensuring	  the	  maintenance	  of	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  developing	  the	  transmission	  system	  in	  a	  given	  area	  and,	  where	  applicable,	  its	  interconnections	  with	  other	  systems,	  and	  for	  ensuring	  the	  long-­‐term	  ability	  of	  the	  system	  to	  meet	  reasonable	  demands	  for	  the	  transmission	  of	  electricity.”	  Under	  article	  2(3)	  transmission	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  transport	  of	  electricity	  on	  the	  extra	  high-­‐voltage	  and	  high-­‐voltage	  interconnected	  system	  with	  a	  view	  to	  its	  delivery	  to	  final	  customers	  or	  to	  distributors,	  but	  does	  not	  include	  supply.”	  73	  See	  for	  instance	  Zillman	  et	  al	  2012:10	  and	  L’Abbate,	  Fulli,	  Starr	  and	  Peteves	  2008:17.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  is	  a	  somewhat	  simplified	  description.	  Pursuant	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  transmission	  in	  Electricity	  Market	  Directive	  article	  2(3),	  it	  comprises	  delivery	  to	  both	  distributors	  and	  final	  customers	  the	  latter	  of	  which,	  according	  to	  article	  2(9)	  compared	  with	  2(10),	  purchases	  electricity	  for	  own	  commercial	  use.	  	  74	  Zillman	  et	  al	  2012:10.	  	  75	  The	  Electricity	  Directive	  2009	  defines	  under	  article	  2(6)	  a	  DSO	  as	  ”a	  natural	  or	  legal	  person	  responsible	  for	  operating,	  ensuring	  the	  maintenance	  of	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  developing	  the	  distribution	  system	  in	  a	  given	  area	  and,	  where	  applicable,	  its	  interconnections	  with	  other	  systems	  and	  for	  ensuring	  the	  long-­‐term	  ability	  of	  the	  system	  to	  meet	  reasonable	  demands	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  electricity.”	  Article	  2(5)	  defines	  distribution	  as	  “the	  transport	  of	  electricity	  on	  high-­‐voltage,	  medium-­‐voltage	  and	  low-­‐voltage	  distribution	  systems	  with	  a	  view	  to	  its	  delivery	  to	  customers,	  but	  does	  not	  include	  supply.”	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distribution	  system,	  omitting	  the	  interconnection	  to	  the	  intermediate	  transmission	  midstream	  system.76	  This	  decentralised	  feature	  of	  RES-­‐E	  transportation	  also	  makes	  the	  economy	  less	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  volatility	  of	  energy	  supply.77	  Currently,	  four	  principal	  regulatory	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  are	  employed	  in	  the	  EU	  27	  member	  states:	  the	  feed-­‐in	  system	  (REFIT)	  consisting	  of	  either	  a	  1)	  tariff	  (FIT)	  or	  2)	  market	  premium	  (FIP)	  mechanism,	  the	  3)	  tendering/bidding/auction	  system	  for	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  (TENFIT)	  and	  4)	  the	  tradable	  green	  certificate	  system	  (TGC).78	  The	  reason	  for	  characterizing	  these	  schemes	  as	  principal	  is	  that	  every	  member	  state	  employ	  at	  least	  one	  of	  them	  as	  the	  main	  economic	  incentive	  provided	  for	  RES-­‐E	  deployment.	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  investment	  focused	  schemes	  that	  provide	  awards	  for	  the	  initial	  investment	  on	  the	  supply	  side	  regardless	  of	  how	  much	  electricity	  is	  generated,	  these	  four	  support	  instruments	  are	  largely79	  generation	  based	  insofar	  that	  the	  awards	  rendered	  are	  proportional	  to	  the	  actual	  electricity	  generated.80	  Hence,	  albeit	  applying	  different	  mechanisms,	  they	  directly	  aim	  to	  increase	  the	  production	  of	  RES-­‐E	  and	  encourage	  market	  creation	  (i.e.	  supply	  and	  demand).	  The	  main	  dividing	  line	  between	  these	  support	  systems	  relates	  to	  whether	  the	  price	  or	  the	  quantity	  of	  RES-­‐E	  is	  to	  be	  set	  by	  the	  regulator	  or	  decided	  by	  the	  market.81	  	  
1.3.2.1 REFIT	  	  The	  basic	  elements	  of	  REFIT	  typically	  comprise	  1)	  guaranteed	  or	  prioritized	  	  access	  to	  the	  grid	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  RES-­‐E	  generated	  and	  2)	  long-­‐term	  framework	  conditions	  providing	  for	  3)	  more	  or	  less	  guaranteed	  electricity	  purchase	  prices.82	  As	  a	  result,	  investment	  security	  is	  sought	  assured.	  Taking	  into	  account	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  See	  for	  instance	  L’Abbate	  et	  al	  2008:14,	  Delgado	  Piqueras	  2012:673,	  Glachand	  and	  Ruester	  2014:4.	  Under	  article	  2(31)	  of	  the	  Electricity	  Directive	  2009	  this	  is	  described	  as	  distributed	  generation	  (DG).	  	  77	  Commission	  2008b:3.	  	  78	  Kitzing,	  Mitchell	  and	  Morthorst	  2012:194,	  del	  Rio	  and	  Mir-­‐Artigues	  2014:288,	  Rowlands	  2005:971,	  Gunst	  2005:102f,	  Jansen	  and	  Uyterlinde	  2004:100fand.	  Compare	  Reiche	  and	  Bechberger	  2005:28,	  Reiche	  2003:19,	  Fouqouet	  and	  Johansson	  2008:4080,	  Munoz,	  Oschmann	  and	  Tabara	  2007:3105,	  Ringel	  2006:6,	  Hass	  et	  al	  2004:834,	  Couture	  and	  Gagnon	  2010:956	  who	  often	  omit	  to	  mention	  TENFIT,	  perhaps	  for	  reasons	  of	  similarity	  with	  REFIT.	  It	  should	  perhaps	  also	  be	  mentioned	  that	  TGC	  schemes	  are	  commonly	  described	  as	  renewable	  portfolio	  standards	  (RPS)	  in	  U.S	  and	  Japan,	  see	  e.g.	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1011f,	  Abolhosseini	  and	  Heshmati	  2014:881,	  Lauber	  2004:1407f.	  79	  As	  illustrated	  by	  de	  Jager	  et	  al	  2011:224-­‐226	  and	  in	  particular	  Thieffry	  2014:287,	  the	  line	  between	  investment	  and	  operating	  costs	  is	  a	  fine	  one	  and	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  business	  operators	  whose	  business	  plans	  integrate	  both	  variables.	  Analytically,	  however,	  they	  are	  easily	  distinguished.	  	  80	  See	  for	  instance	  Poullikkas,	  Kourtis	  and	  Hadjupaschalis	  2012:558,	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1012,	  Abolhosseini	  and	  Heshmati	  2014:877.	  For	  an	  easily	  accessible	  overview	  over	  renewable	  schemes	  in	  general,	  see	  http://www.greenrhinoenergy.com/renewable/context/incentives.php.	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  below,	  the	  distinction	  between	  investment	  and	  generation/operation	  support	  is	  highly	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  state	  aid	  regulation.	  See	  for	  instance	  Kaur	  2009:283.	  	  81	  See	  for	  instance	  Menanteau,	  Finon	  and	  Lamy	  2003,	  Hass	  et	  al	  2004:834,	  Abolhosseini	  and	  Heshmati	  2014:881,	  884,	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1011f.	  	  82	  See	  for	  instance	  Hart	  2010:57,	  Kitzing	  ,	  Mitchell	  and	  Morthorst	  2012:194,	  Wilke	  2011:1;	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:xxi,	  Fouquet	  and	  Johansson	  2008:4080.	  In	  respect	  of	  prioritized	  access,	  see	  Cameron	  2002:148	  para	  4.14	  and	  Heine	  2001:95	  on	  the	  mandate	  in	  the	  first	  Electricity	  Directive.	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natural	  conditions	  and	  availability	  of	  different	  RES’s	  differ	  widely	  among	  member	  states,	  the	  national	  regulator	  may	  be	  inclined	  to	  limit	  the	  support	  towards	  certain	  eligible	  RES-­‐E	  technologies.83	  In	  spite	  of	  some	  small-­‐scale	  efforts	  to	  incorporate	  foreign	  RES-­‐E	  under	  the	  support	  concerned,	  REFIT	  schemes	  are	  almost	  exclusively	  national	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  they	  support	  domestic	  RES-­‐E	  generation	  only.84	  	  Commonly,	  the	  national	  regulator	  differentiates	  the	  fixed	  prices	  according	  to	  the	  generation	  costs	  involved	  in	  different	  RES-­‐E	  technologies	  (e.g.	  less	  mature	  technologies	  can	  be	  more	  expensive)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  size	  of	  a	  given	  technology	  (e.g.	  larger	  plants	  are	  generally	  less	  expensive).85	  In	  particular,	  the	  price	  is	  determined	  according	  to	  market-­‐independent	  tariff	  mechanisms	  (feed	  in	  tariffs,	  FIT)	  and/or	  market-­‐dependent	  premium	  mechanism	  (feed	  in	  premiums;	  FIP).	  Under	  the	  former	  design,	  the	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  are	  typically	  exempt	  from	  market	  participation	  and	  receive	  the	  guaranteed	  price	  upon	  the	  delivery	  to	  the	  grid-­‐operator	  who	  in	  turn	  will	  market	  the	  electricity.	  Legally,	  this	  is	  achieved	  by	  imposing	  a	  purchase	  obligation	  upon	  the	  nearest	  grid	  operator,	  either	  the	  TSO	  or	  DSO,86	  but	  even	  other	  actors	  can	  be	  obliged.	  Under	  a	  FIP	  in	  contrast,	  the	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  compete	  with	  other	  (RES	  as	  well	  as	  grey/non-­‐RES)	  producers	  to	  meet	  market	  demand	  whereby	  the	  remuneration	  received	  consists	  of	  a	  guaranteed	  premium	  added	  to	  the	  market	  price.87	  Since	  the	  market	  price	  fluctuates,	  FIP	  mechanisms	  expose	  producers	  to	  a	  higher	  market	  risk	  and	  a	  lower	  investment	  security.88	  	  REFIT	  policies	  are	  financed	  either	  by	  governmental	  resources	  (through	  taxes	  or	  the	  general	  state	  budget)	  or,	  and	  to	  a	  significantly	  higher	  and	  increasingly	  degree,	  by	  way	  of	  passing	  on	  the	  additional	  costs	  directly	  to	  the	  consumer	  base.89	  For	  the	  latter	  purpose,	  the	  national	  TSO	  is	  typically	  designated	  to	  aggregate	  all	  additional	  costs	  involved	  and	  to	  divide	  the	  sum	  by	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  RES-­‐E	  produced.	  Consequently,	  the	  additional	  costs	  are	  passed	  on	  to	  final	  consumers,	  either	  depending	  or	  not	  depending	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  electricity	  consumed.90	  	  In	  summary,	  REFIT	  schemes	  are	  price-­‐driven	  insofar	  that	  the	  price	  is	  regulated	  but	  the	  quantity	  decided	  by	  the	  market.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  See	  for	  instance	  Reiche	  and	  Bechberger	  2004:844,	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:16f.	  	  84	  See	  for	  instance	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:17f	  and	  Jansen	  and	  Uyterlinde	  2004:100.	  	  85	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:26f.	  	  86	  Kitzing	  2012:194.	  See	  also	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:26f	  and	  Couture	  and	  and	  Gagnon	  2010:956.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  is	  just	  one,	  though	  original,	  pricing	  design	  and	  several	  other	  exists	  under	  the	  FIT	  classification.	  	  87	  See	  for	  instance	  Couture	  and	  Gagnon	  2010:956,	  Kitzing,	  Mitchell	  and	  Morthorst	  2012:194f,	  Fouquet	  and	  Johansson	  2008:4080,	  Ringel	  2006:6,	  Munoz,	  Oschmann	  and	  Tabara	  2007:3105.	  As	  in	  particular	  Couture	  and	  Gagnon	  points	  out,	  there	  are	  several	  different	  implementations	  of	  FIP	  designs.	  	  88	  See	  for	  instance	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:40.	  	  89	  See	  for	  instance	  Held	  et	  al	  2013:12f,	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:28f,	  61	  and	  Ringel	  2006:6.	  Financing	  through	  government	  resources	  can	  however	  be	  seen	  as	  passing	  on	  the	  costs	  indirectly,	  e.g.	  through	  taxes.	  	  90	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:29,	  van	  der	  Linden	  2004:26,	  Jansen	  and	  Uyterlinde	  2004:100.	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1.3.2.2 TGC	  	  The	  basic	  elements	  of	  TGC	  systems	  are	  1)	  that	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  receive	  tradable	  certificates	  corresponding	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  eligible	  RES-­‐E	  supplied	  to	  the	  grid	  (e.g.	  1	  certificate	  for	  1	  MVH	  of	  the	  eligible	  RES-­‐E	  technology),	  and	  2)	  an	  obligation	  upon	  certain	  actor	  categories	  within	  the	  electricity	  supply	  chain	  –	  typically	  the	  suppliers,	  occasionally	  the	  producers	  and/or	  large	  consumers	  (e.g.	  electro-­‐intensive	  industries)	  –	  to	  regularly	  surrender	  a	  certain	  quantity	  of	  certificates	  i.e.	  quota	  obligation	  corresponding	  to	  their	  total	  consumption/supply.91	  TGC	  schemes	  almost	  exclusively	  impose	  non-­‐compliance	  penalties	  upon	  those	  not	  holding	  the	  correct	  amount	  of	  certificates	  at	  the	  date	  of	  disposal.92	  Under	  the	  first	  step	  the	  national	  regulator	  defines	  the	  amount	  of	  RES-­‐E	  generation	  that	  must	  be	  developed	  at	  a	  certain	  date	  (e.g.	  20	  TWH	  in	  10	  years),	  which	  is	  then	  broken	  down	  to	  periodical	  (e.g.	  annual)	  compliance	  targets	  for	  the	  obliged	  parties	  to	  fulfil	  corresponding	  to	  their	  consumption.93	  Once	  the	  target	  is	  defined,	  a	  distinct	  parallel	  market	  for	  environmental	  value	  is	  created	  on	  which	  the	  certificates	  become	  tradable	  financial	  assets.94	  As	  a	  result,	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  will	  have	  two	  different	  sources	  of	  income:	  one	  consisting	  of	  the	  standard	  market	  price	  accruing	  from	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  market	  where	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  compete	  with	  producers	  of	  non-­‐RES-­‐E/grey	  electricity	  and	  therefore	  are	  likely	  to	  incur	  losses	  due	  to	  cost	  disadvantage,	  the	  other	  accruing	  from	  the	  eco-­‐service	  market	  at	  which	  the	  certificates	  are	  traded	  at	  a	  price	  (possibly)	  recovering	  the	  loss.95	  	  TGC	  schemes	  are	  financed	  off-­‐budget	  i.e.	  by	  the	  obliged	  parties	  passing	  on	  the	  additional	  costs	  to	  the	  consumers.96	  TGC	  schemes	  are	  almost	  without	  exception	  national	  i.e.	  the	  promotion	  aim	  to	  increase	  the	  RES-­‐E	  generation	  within	  the	  national	  territory	  concerned	  whereby	  the	  certificates	  are	  issued	  for	  domestic,	  not	  foreign,	  RES-­‐E	  generation	  and	  only	  domestic	  certificates	  can	  met	  the	  quota	  obligation.	  A	  notable	  exception	  consists	  of	  the	  joint	  Swedish	  and	  Norwegian	  TGC	  scheme	  where	  certificates	  issued	  in	  one	  country	  can	  be	  used	  to	  fulfil	  the	  quota	  obligation	  in	  the	  other	  country.97	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  See	  for	  instance	  Jacobsson	  et	  al	  2009:2144,	  Poullikkas,	  Kourtis	  and	  Hadjupaschalis	  2012:564,	  Verhaegen,	  Meeus	  and	  Belmans	  2009:209,	  Amundsen	  and	  Nese	  2009:904,	  917f,	  Lind	  and	  Rosenberg	  2014:10,	  Fouquet	  and	  Johansson	  2008:4080,	  Nielsen	  and	  Jeppessen	  2003:4,	  Ringel	  2006:8,	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1012	  and	  1022	  Kitzing,	  Mitchell	  and	  Morthorst	  2012:	  195.	  Rarely,	  see	  for	  instance	  Jansen	  and	  Uyterlinde	  2004:101	  and	  106,	  the	  quota	  obligation	  is	  set	  upon	  electricity	  generators.	  	  92	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1021,	  Kitzing,	  Mitchell	  and	  Morthorst	  2012:195.	  93	  See	  for	  instance	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1014,	  Munoz,	  Oschmann	  and	  Tabara	  2007:3105,	  and	  Swedish	  Ministry	  of	  Sustainable	  Development	  2006.	  	  94	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1014,	  Verhaegen,	  Meeus	  and	  Belmans	  2009:209,	  Nielsen	  and	  Jeppesen	  2003:4.	  	  95	  Ringel	  2006:8.	  	  96	  Held	  et	  al	  2013:12f,	  though	  pointing	  out	  that	  Belgium,	  a	  TGC	  deploying	  country	  at	  both	  the	  federal	  and	  the	  regional	  level,	  partly	  use	  state	  budget	  resources	  for	  bearing	  the	  additional	  costs	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support.	  However,	  as	  follows	  from	  the	  account	  in	  respect	  of	  Belgium	  by	  Verhaegen,	  Meeus	  and	  Belmans	  2009:214,	  the	  federal	  state	  budget	  provides	  funding	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  only	  and	  it	  has	  to	  be	  decided	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis	  whether	  it	  is	  triggered	  at	  all.	  	  97	  See	  for	  instance	  Norwegian	  Ministry	  of	  Petroleum	  and	  Energy	  2010	  and	  SÖ	  2012:5	  which	  is	  the	  Treaty	  between	  Sweden	  and	  Norway	  in	  this	  regard.	  A	  similar	  TGC	  structure	  was	  also	  enabled	  in	  Italy	  until	  2013	  when	  a	  double	  system	  of	  REFIT	  and	  auction	  mechanisms	  was	  established.	  It	  is	  however	  uncertain	  to	  what	  extent	  foreign	  RES-­‐E	  under	  the	  new	  system	  is	  counted	  of	  towards	  the	  target	  under	  RED	  2009,	  see	  for	  instance	  Ragwitz	  et	  al	  2012:53f.	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TGC	  schemes	  are	  capacity-­‐driven	  insofar	  that	  the	  quantity	  is	  regulated	  but	  the	  price	  largely	  decided	  by	  the	  market.	  However,	  since	  the	  quota	  obligation	  only	  guarantees	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  RES-­‐E	  share	  in	  relation	  to	  total	  electricity	  consumption	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  fulfilled	  by	  way	  of	  decreasing	  non-­‐RES-­‐E	  consumption,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  very	  precise	  capacity	  controlling	  policy	  measure.	  Other	  support	  schemes,	  such	  as	  TENFIT,	  may	  work	  better	  in	  this	  regard.98	  	  	  
1.3.2.3 TENFIT	  	  The	  third	  major99	  support	  scheme	  –	  TENFIT	  –	  is	  characterised	  by	  an	  initial	  competitive	  bidding	  procedure,	  often	  called	  either	  auctioning	  or	  tendering.100	  The	  designated	  authority,	  firstly,	  defines	  an	  amount	  of	  RES-­‐E	  to	  be	  generated	  nationally	  during	  a	  specific	  period,	  and,	  secondly,	  organises	  a	  competitive	  bidding	  process	  in	  order	  to	  find	  the	  least	  costly	  and	  most	  attractive	  offer	  from	  RES-­‐E	  producers.101	  The	  most	  attractive	  bid,	  determined	  by	  a	  low	  requested	  support	  level	  (i.e.	  the	  lowest	  kWh	  ask	  price)	  and	  other	  favourable	  predefined	  specifications	  (e.g.	  specific	  timing,	  grid	  positioning,	  impact	  on	  local	  R&D	  and	  industry,	  environmental	  impacts),	  wins	  the	  tender	  and	  is	  awarded	  a	  favourable	  long-­‐term	  contract.102	  This	  contract,	  provided	  through	  regulation,	  is	  basically	  a	  tailored	  REFIT	  scheme	  with	  its	  internal	  differentiations	  in	  respect	  of	  both	  how	  the	  prices	  are	  set	  and	  how	  the	  overall	  support	  scheme	  is	  financed.	  Accordingly,	  as	  outlined	  above,	  the	  price	  is	  set	  according	  to	  either	  a	  FIT	  or	  a	  FIP	  mechanism.103	  Although	  the	  politically	  predetermined	  RES-­‐E	  amount	  sought	  generated	  can	  be	  neutrally	  defined	  with	  regard	  to	  RES-­‐E	  technology	  and	  capacity104,	  tenders	  are	  typically	  used	  for	  large-­‐scale	  projects	  and	  most	  commonly	  offshore	  wind.105	  	  Thus,	  TENFIT	  schemes	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  initial	  procedures	  for	  the	  competitive	  determination	  of	  support	  levels	  in	  respect	  of	  REFIT	  pricing	  mechanisms,	  which	  otherwise	  are	  set	  administratively.106	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Amundsen	  and	  Nese	  2009:917.	  	  99	  For	  accounts	  that	  does	  not	  classify	  tender	  schemes	  as	  a	  distinct	  and/or	  primary	  support	  mechanism,	  see	  Klessman	  et	  al	  2011:7642,	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1016,	  Held	  et	  al	  2013:34.	  Taking	  these	  considerations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  intimate	  relationship	  with	  REFIT	  pricing,	  a	  description	  of	  TENFIT	  could	  alternatively	  be	  made	  under	  the	  REFIT	  heading	  i.e.	  as	  a	  third	  subcategory.	  	  100	  From	  a	  public	  procurement	  perspective	  auction	  typically	  refers	  to	  price	  as	  the	  sole	  award	  criterion	  whereas	  tender	  may	  include	  other	  criteria.	  However,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  essay	  and	  in	  line	  with	  Held	  et	  al	  2013:44,	  I	  will	  not	  uphold	  this	  distinction	  at	  a	  conceptual	  level.	  Rather,	  the	  substantial	  difference	  is	  treated	  as	  subcategories	  under	  the	  overall	  auction/tender/bidding	  procedure.	  	  	  101	  See	  for	  instance	  Batlle,	  Perez-­‐Arriaga	  and	  Zambrano-­‐Barragan	  2011:7,	  Menanteau,	  Finon	  and	  Lamy	  2003:800,	  802,	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1011,	  115f,	  Rowlands	  2005:971.	  	  102	  Kitzing,	  Mitchell	  and	  Morthorst	  2012:195,	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:174,	  Haas	  et	  al	  2011:1011,	  Batlle,	  Perez-­‐Arriaga	  and	  Zambrano-­‐Barragan	  2011:7,	  Held	  et	  al	  2013:44.	  	  103	  Kitzing,	  Mitchell	  and	  Morthorst	  2012:195,	  198.	  In	  their	  account	  the	  two	  main	  implementations	  of	  TENFIT	  end	  up	  in	  two	  subcategories	  of	  FIT,	  not	  FIP,	  albeit	  they	  also	  point	  out	  that	  one	  of	  these	  implementations	  in	  other	  studies	  are	  described	  as	  FIP.	  See	  also	  See	  for	  instance	  Mendonca,	  Jacobs	  and	  Sovacool	  2010:174,	  Brick	  and	  Wisser	  2009:3,	  Resch	  et	  al	  2014:10f,	  Menanteau,	  Finon	  and	  Lamy	  2003:804	  and	  808,	  del	  Rio	  and	  Mir-­‐Artigues	  2014:295.	  104	  Resch	  et	  al	  2014:10,	  Brick	  and	  Wisser	  2009:3.	  	  105	  De	  Jager	  et	  al	  2011:32,	  See	  also	  del	  Rio	  and	  Mir-­‐Artigues	  2014:293.	  	  106	  Held	  et	  al	  2013:3,	  25,	  44f.	  Latvia	  provides	  an	  exception	  as	  tenders	  are	  employed	  in	  FIT	  schemes	  to	  allocate	  procurement	  rights	  rather	  than	  setting	  the	  support	  levels,	  see	  del	  Rio	  and	  Mir	  Artigues	  2014:289.	  The	  latter	  also	  suggest	  that	  TENFIT	  only	  sometimes	  are	  used	  to	  determine	  support	  levels,	  though	  not	  clarifying	  what	  the	  function	  of	  generations	  based	  TENFIT	  schemes	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Accordingly,	  albeit	  TENFIT	  schemes	  are	  highly	  quantity	  driven	  support	  schemes	  where	  indeed	  the	  output	  is	  more	  controllable	  than	  in	  TGC	  schemes,107	  they	  also	  enable	  the	  national	  regulator	  to	  maintain	  indirect	  price	  control	  and	  to	  anticipate	  the	  level	  of	  subsidies.108	  
1.3.3 Sovereignty	  revisited	  once	  again	  	  As	  indicated,	  the	  geographical	  conditions	  for	  exploiting	  RES	  as	  well	  as	  the	  starting	  points	  in	  respect	  of	  energy	  policy	  differ	  widely	  among	  the	  EU	  member	  states.109	  A	  case	  in	  point	  of	  the	  former	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  solar	  energy	  is	  most	  successfully	  utilised	  in	  southern	  Europe.	  Different	  state	  priorities	  in	  respect	  of	  energy	  policy	  may	  for	  instance	  depend	  on	  the	  financial	  situation,	  the	  availability	  of	  indigenous	  fossil	  resources,	  long-­‐term	  decisions	  to	  phase	  out	  nuclear	  power	  or	  the	  influence	  of	  domestic	  energy	  intensive	  industries.110	  As	  a	  result	  the	  energy	  mix	  of	  each	  member	  state	  varies.	  This	  is	  also	  recognised	  in	  recital	  15	  of	  RED	  2009	  according	  to	  which	  “[t]he	  starting	  point,	  the	  renewable	  energy	  potential	  and	  the	  energy	  mix	  of	  each	  Member	  State	  vary”.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  various	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  outlined	  above	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  suitable	  depending	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  RES-­‐E	  technologies	  considered	  eligible	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  in	  turn	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  geographical	  conditions,	  more	  or	  less	  strategic	  decisions	  etc.,	  member	  states	  can	  arguably	  defend	  their	  principal	  scope	  of	  discretion	  by	  two	  further	  constitutional	  arguments.	  	  	  	   Firstly,	  since	  both	  energy	  and	  environment	  are	  shared	  competences	  pursuant	  to	  TFEU	  article	  4(2)	  letter	  e	  and	  i	  respectively,	  the	  possibility	  to	  invoke	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  is	  evoked.	  According	  to	  this	  principle,	  contained	  in	  TEU	  article	  5(3),	  “the	  Union	  shall	  act	  only	  if	  and	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  proposed	  action	  cannot	  be	  sufficiently	  achieved	  by	  the	  Member	  States,	  either	  at	  central	  level	  or	  at	  a	  regional	  and	  local	  level,	  but	  can	  rather,	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  scale	  of	  effects	  of	  the	  proposed	  action,	  be	  better	  achieved	  at	  Union	  level.”	  The	  test	  to	  be	  conducted	  is	  highly	  elastic	  and	  the	  application	  needs	  to	  be	  determined	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.111	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  immediate	  context	  of	  the	  bottom	  up	  approach	  discussed,	  one	  can	  pursue	  the	  argument	  that	  subsidiarity	  is	  complied	  with	  by	  way	  of	  retaining	  wide	  state	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  in	  a	  way	  that	  suits	  the	  state	  specific	  renewable	  potential	  and	  circumstances	  best.	  This	  is	  indeed	  one	  of	  the	  arguments	  put	  forth	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  the	  proposal	  of	  RED	  2009	  for	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  subsidiarity	  principle.112	  Furthermore,	  one	  could	  add	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  minimum	  harmonization	  –	  as	  established	  by	  RED	  2009	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  –	  fits	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  otherwise	  would	  be.	  Assumingly,	  they	  conflate	  investment	  based	  and	  generation	  based	  tendering	  schemes.	  107	  Amundsen	  and	  Nese	  2009:917.	  	  108	  Menanteau,	  Finon	  and	  Lamy	  2003:804.	  	  109	  See	  for	  instance	  Reiche	  and	  Bechberger	  2004:844.	  	  110	  See	  for	  instance	  Reiche	  and	  Bechberger	  2004:844,	  Delgado	  Piqueras	  2012:670.	  	  111	  Delvaux	  2013:123	  para	  369.	  	  112	  Commission	  2008b:9.	  See	  also	  Delvaux	  2010:122	  para	  365.	  Oschmann	  2008:26	  concludes	  that	  the	  Union	  is	  essentially	  restricted	  by	  the	  subsidiarity	  principle	  to	  prescribe	  binding	  targets,	  to	  monitor	  the	  achievement	  and	  to	  impose	  sanctions	  upon	  failure	  to	  do	  so.	  See	  also	  Calliess	  and	  Hey	  2013:117f	  and	  Ringel	  2006:13.	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well	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity,	  generally	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  context	  of	  renewable	  energy	  deployment.113	  	   Secondly,	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  may	  be	  submitted.	  According	  to	  this	  principle	  contained	  in	  TEU	  article	  5(4),	  “the	  content	  and	  form	  of	  Union	  action	  shall	  not	  exceed	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Treaties.”	  According	  to	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECJ,	  the	  principle	  contains	  at	  least	  a	  test	  of	  the	  suitability	  (i.e.	  whether	  suitable	  or	  appropriate	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  aim)	  and	  the	  necessity	  (i.e.	  whether	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  it)	  of	  the	  measure	  in	  question,	  but	  occasionally	  also	  a	  test	  sensu	  strictu	  i.e.	  whether	  the	  aim	  could	  have	  been	  attained	  by	  a	  less	  onerous	  method.114	  Given	  the	  objective	  of	  RED	  2009	  to	  increase	  the	  share	  of	  RES	  in	  energy	  consumption,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  envisage	  how	  the	  absence	  of	  state	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  support	  schemes	  would	  be	  suitable	  and	  necessary	  to	  that	  effect.115  Of	  course,	  the	  application	  of	  both	  principles	  must	  take	  account	  of	  the	  specific	  legislation	  context	  in	  which	  potential	  attempts	  to	  eliminate	  the	  principal	  state	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  are	  raised.	  However,	  these	  principles	  together	  with	  the	  sovereignty	  caveat	  enshrined	  in	  the	  legal	  bases	  for	  secondary	  energy	  and	  environmental	  legislation	  described	  above,	  provide	  the	  member	  states	  with	  a	  significant	  arsenal	  of	  constitutional	  arguments	  in	  favour	  of	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  regard.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  state	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  is	  likely	  be	  to	  the	  prevailing	  starting	  point	  for	  a	  considerable	  time	  ahead,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  constitutional	  competence	  norms.116	  
1.4 A	  two	  folded	  problem	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  	  The	  wide	  discretion	  provided	  as	  to	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design	  is	  a	  function	  of	  states	  exercising	  their	  sovereignty	  interests	  in	  competence	  matters	  at	  the	  level	  of	  primary	  law.	  However,	  the	  actual	  exercise	  of	  state	  discretion	  will	  inevitably	  have	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  fundamental	  obligation	  resting	  upon	  the	  EU	  pursuant	  to	  article	  3(3)	  TEU	  to	  establish	  an	  internal	  market.	  According	  to	  article	  26(2)	  TFEU	  “[t]he	  internal	  market	  shall	  comprise	  an	  area	  without	  internal	  frontiers	  in	  which	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  persons,	  services	  and	  capital	  is	  ensured	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Treaties.”	  The	  creation	  of	  an	  internal	  market	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  EU	  project117	  and	  constitutes,	  according	  to	  some	  commentators,	  its	  principal	  economic	  rationale118	  –	  albeit	  the	  Union,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  very	  same	  article	  3(3)	  TEU,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  See	  for	  instance	  Craig	  2006:423,	  Fouquet	  and	  Johansson	  2008:4091,	  Jansen	  and	  Uyterlinde	  2004:106.	  Compare	  Ringel	  2006:13	  who	  suggests	  radically	  that	  due	  to	  the	  subsidiary	  principle,	  the	  Commission	  has	  no	  competence	  for	  energy	  policy	  on	  its	  own.	  The	  subsidiarity	  principle	  was	  also	  invoked	  in	  the	  negotiations	  preceding	  RED	  2001,	  see	  Jansen	  and	  Uyterlinde	  2004:97.	  	  114	  Craig	  2006:656f.	  	  115	  As	  exemplified	  by	  Delvaux	  2013:129	  para.	  386	  the	  sensu	  strictu	  requirement	  would	  not	  be	  met	  if	  it,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  fulfilling	  a	  legally	  binding	  RES	  target	  for	  each	  member	  state,	  prescribed	  the	  utilization	  of	  certain	  kind	  of	  RES	  technologies.	  Oschmann	  2008:26	  concludes	  that	  given	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  current	  framework,	  the	  only	  form	  of	  Community	  regulation	  that	  would	  be	  conceivable	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  would	  be	  a	  European	  regulation	  on	  prices.	  116	  See	  also	  Hildingsson,	  Striple	  and	  Jordan	  2010:111	  who,	  albeit	  from	  a	  non-­‐legal	  perspective	  though	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  contentious	  negotiations	  preceding	  RED	  2009,	  concludes	  that	  ”the	  possibility	  of	  a	  fully	  harmonised	  support	  scheme	  seems	  as	  remote	  as	  ever.”	  	  117	  Barnard	  2010:10.	  	  118	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:604.	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also	  shall	  work	  for	  values	  traditionally	  considered	  as	  non-­‐economic	  such	  as	  “sustainable	  development	  …	  and	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  and	  improvement	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  environment”.119	  The	  legal	  instruments	  aiming	  to	  attain	  an	  internal	  market	  operate	  at	  the	  level	  of	  both	  primary	  and	  secondary	  law,	  which	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  integration	  process	  is	  formulated	  largely	  corresponds	  to	  the	  notions	  of	  negative	  or	  judiciary-­‐driven	  and	  positive	  or	  legislature	  driven	  integration	  respectively.120	  Several	  secondary	  legislative	  acts	  have	  been	  adopted	  with	  the	  view	  of	  attaining	  an	  internal	  energy	  market,	  notably	  within	  the	  third	  energy	  package	  currently	  in	  force,121	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  gas	  and	  the	  electricity	  sector.122	  The	  Electricity	  Directive	  2009/72	  complements	  RED	  2009	  in	  several	  regards,	  for	  instance	  providing	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  prioritized	  grid	  access	  common	  for	  REFIT.123	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  minimum	  harmonisation,	  the	  directive	  provides	  the	  floor	  whilst	  the	  EU	  treaties	  provides	  the	  substantial	  upper	  ceiling	  with	  which	  national	  legislation	  must	  comply.124	  As	  a	  consequence,	  trade	  barriers	  and	  distortions	  arising	  from	  the	  various	  national	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  are	  assessed	  under	  the	  substantive	  treaty	  rules.125	  Illustratively,	  while	  the	  early	  unilateral	  state	  efforts	  to	  accelerate	  RES	  have	  been	  motivated	  by	  energy	  security	  and	  environmental	  concerns	  of	  which	  both	  are	  elements	  within	  the	  trinity,	  the	  efforts	  favouring	  “a	  common	  policy	  framework	  at	  EU	  level	  has	  to	  be	  seen	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  EU’s	  longer-­‐term	  ambition	  to	  integrate	  European	  energy	  markets	  and	  promote	  competition	  within	  them.”126	  	  Thus,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  RES-­‐E,	  one	  can	  assume	  a	  principal	  tension	  in	  respect	  of	  both	  the	  form	  and	  substance	  between	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  underpinned	  by	  sustainability	  as	  well	  as	  energy	  security	  concerns	  and	  a	  top-­‐down	  approach	  underpinned	  by	  internal	  market	  concerns.	  Additionally,	  one	  can	  assume	  a	  tension	  between	  sustainability	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  delocalised	  feature	  and	  energy	  security	  concerns.	  Accordingly,	  even	  if	  RES-­‐E	  may	  be	  framed	  as	  a	  seamless	  synthesis	  that	  represent	  a	  triple-­‐win	  solution	  at	  a	  policy	  level,127	  the	  application	  of	  substantial	  internal	  market	  provisions	  may	  very	  well	  prove	  otherwise/involve	  trade	  offs.	  	  In	  the	  following,	  two	  internal	  market	  regimes	  will	  be	  presented	  as	  well	  as	  motivated	  and	  the	  problem	  under	  each	  stated.	  In	  this	  essay,	  the	  chosen	  regimes	  serve	  as	  a	  delimitation	  and	  operationalization	  of	  the	  competitiveness	  objective	  within	  the	  trinity.	  It	  is	  submitted	  that	  these	  two	  substantial	  primary	  law	  regimes	  are	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  interfere	  with	  state	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  These	  are	  the	  general	  environmental	  objectives	  of	  EU,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  specific	  environmental	  objectives	  under	  article	  191	  discussed	  above.	  See	  Krämer	  2011:8	  and	  13,	  para.	  1-­‐10	  and	  1-­‐15	  respectively.	  120	  Syrpis	  2012:5.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  de	  Sadeeler	  2013:212,	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:606.	  	  121	  See	  for	  instance	  Delvaux	  2012:50-­‐60.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  legislation,	  see	  http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/legislation/legislation_en.htm	  122	  See	  for	  instance	  Cameron	  2002:5-­‐7,	  29f	  and	  363f,	  Padrós	  and	  Cocciolo	  2010:34.	  See	  also	  Van	  Hende	  2011:65	  on	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  internal	  energy	  market	  in	  EU	  primary	  law.	  123	  See	  for	  instance	  Gunst	  2005:99,	  who	  though	  compares	  the	  previous	  –	  now	  repealed	  –	  directives.	  	  124	  See	  for	  instance	  Barnard	  2010:632f,	  Snell	  2014:322.	  	  125	  See	  for	  instance	  Cross	  et	  al	  2001:269	  para	  5.148.	  	  126	  Hildingsson,	  Stripple	  and	  Jordan	  2010:112.	  	  127	  Ringel	  2006:5,	  Buchanan	  2009:14.	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scheme	  design.	  Thus,	  an	  analysis	  of	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  regard	  enables	  considerable	  generality	  as	  to	  the	  principal	  scope	  of	  discretion	  under	  EU	  law	  in	  general.	  	  
1.4.1 The	  first	  problem:	  Articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU	  	  	  Considered	  by	  the	  Commission	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  success	  stories	  of	  the	  European	  project	  and	  remains	  a	  major	  catalyst	  for	  growth	  in	  the	  European	  Union,”128	  the	  treaty	  provisions	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  lie	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  EU	  integration	  process	  and	  the	  efforts	  to	  attain	  an	  internal	  market.	  These	  provisions	  basically	  aims	  to	  remove	  trade	  barriers,	  to	  guarantee	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  national	  market	  but	  do	  not	  encourage	  a	  general	  deregulation	  of	  national	  economies	  i.e.	  negative	  integration.129	  According	  to	  settled	  case	  law	  electricity	  constitutes	  goods.130	  The	  provisions	  are	  commonly	  grouped	  according	  to	  whether	  they	  target	  fiscal	  measures,	  such	  as	  custom	  duties,	  charges	  having	  equivalent	  effect,	  taxes	  and	  para-­‐fiscal	  charges,	  or	  non-­‐fiscal	  measures,	  such	  as	  quantitative	  measures	  (QRs)	  and	  all	  measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect	  (MEEs).131	  None	  of	  the	  four	  main	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  outlined	  among	  EU’s	  27	  member	  states	  rely	  on	  fiscal	  measures.132	  Rather,	  they	  are	  prima	  facie	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  non-­‐fiscal	  measures,	  which	  are	  specifically	  regulated	  depending	  on	  whether	  they	  impede	  exports	  or	  imports.	  Assumingly,	  all	  member	  states	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  exporting	  RES-­‐E133	  and	  this	  is	  indeed	  encouraged	  by	  RED	  2009	  which	  additionally	  recognizes	  states	  “right	  to	  decide	  …	  to	  which	  extent	  they	  support	  energy	  from	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  which	  is	  produced	  in	  a	  different	  Member	  State.”134	  Together	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  of	  the	  four	  main	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  at	  the	  outset	  are	  national	  i.e.	  supporting	  domestic	  RES-­‐E	  generation	  only,	  their	  legality	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  questioned	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  hindering	  the	  importation	  of	  electricity.	  For	  this	  reason	  this	  essay	  explores	  article	  34	  TFEU	  which	  governs	  non-­‐fiscal	  measures	  in	  the	  context	  of	  imports	  as	  well	  as	  article	  36	  TFEU	  which	  provides	  exceptions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  imports	  and	  exports,	  but	  excludes	  article	  35	  TFEU	  that	  solely	  regulates	  exports.	  	  	  To	  which	  extent,	  then,	  are	  the	  main	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  compatible	  with	  article	  34	  and	  36	  TFEU?	  According	  to	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  former	  article	  “[q]uantitative	  restrictions	  on	  imports	  and	  all	  measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect	  shall	  be	  prohibited	  between	  Member	  States.”	  Basically,	  QRs	  are	  measures	  which	  amount	  to	  a	  total	  or	  partial	  restraint	  of	  imports.135	  Since	  none	  of	  the	  main	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  directly	  restraints	  imports,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  they	  nevertheless	  constitute	  MEEs.	  Several	  examples	  of	  MEEs	  are	  given	  in	  the	  now	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Commission	  2010:3.	  129	  AG	  opinion	  in	  Cases	  C-­‐158/04	  and	  C-­‐159/04	  Alfa	  Vita	  para	  37,	  Craig	  2014:19.	  	  130	  See	  for	  instance	  Barnard	  2010:34	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  	  	  131	  See	  for	  instance	  Barnard	  2010:42f,	  66f,	  70.	  	  132	  Until	  early	  2011,	  Finland	  was	  indeed	  the	  only	  country	  employing	  a	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  primarily	  relying	  on	  taxation.	  An	  early	  version	  of	  this	  RES-­‐E	  scheme	  was	  assessed	  in	  Case	  C-­‐213/96	  Outokumpu	  Oy.	  Today	  Finland	  employs	  a	  REFIT	  scheme,	  see	  for	  instance	  Kitzing,	  Mitchell	  and	  Morthorst	  2012:196.	  	  133	  This	  is	  indeed	  an	  explanation	  put	  forth	  by	  Barnard	  2010:71	  for	  the	  extensive	  amount	  of	  case	  law	  regarding	  import	  in	  comparison	  with	  export,	  articles	  34	  and	  35	  respectively.	  	  	  134	  RED	  2009,	  article	  3(3).	  135	  And	  can	  according	  to	  the	  circumstances	  restraint	  exports	  or	  goods	  in	  transit,	  see	  e.g.	  Barnard	  2010:71	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	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expired	  Directive	  70/50136	  of	  which	  in	  particular	  the	  classic	  example	  of	  “measures	  which	  …	  encourage,	  require	  or	  give	  preference	  to	  the	  purchase	  of	  domestic	  products	  only”	  at	  first	  sight	  are	  relevant.137	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  famous	  
Dassonville	  case	  MEEs	  was	  defined	  as	  “[a]ll	  trading	  rules	  enacted	  by	  Member	  States	  which	  are	  capable	  of	  hindering,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  actually	  or	  potentially,	  intra-­‐[Union]	  trade”138	  –	  prompting	  suggestions	  that	  article	  34	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  EU	  economic	  constitution.139	  	  Applying	  the	  Dassonville	  formula	  on	  regulatory	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes,	  which	  beyond	  doubt	  constitute	  rules	  enacted	  by	  states,	  the	  first	  question	  would	  arguably	  be	  whether	  these	  rules	  are	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  trading	  rules.	  In	  this	  regard	  suggestions	  have	  been	  made	  that	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  possibly	  can	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  “policy	  instruments	  in	  form	  of	  market-­‐enhancing	  tools”	  rather	  than	  trading	  rules.140	  To	  be	  sure,	  such	  an	  approach	  yields	  considerable	  potential	  to	  exempt	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes,	  but	  the	  suggestion	  is	  poorly	  qualified	  and	  cannot	  be	  identified	  in	  case	  law.141	  Indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  ECJ	  in	  nearly	  every	  subsequent	  case	  has	  repeated	  the	  Dassonville	  formula	  but	  recently	  frequently	  omitted	  the	  “trading”	  element	  and	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  “any	  measure”,	  clearly	  suggests	  that	  the	  ECJ	  does	  not	  confine	  its	  overall	  assessment	  of	  MEEs	  to	  this	  particular	  issue.142	  Rather,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Dassonville	  formula	  is	  that	  it	  exclusively	  refers	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  measure,	  not	  taking	  into	  account	  its	  purpose(s),	  and	  authorizes	  an	  examination	  of	  its	  actual	  or	  potential,	  direct	  or	  indirect	  effects	  without	  regard	  to	  either	  statistical	  analysis	  or	  a	  de	  minimis	  threshold.143	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  This	  directive	  was	  effective	  during	  the	  transational	  period	  of	  the	  original	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  until	  what	  is	  now	  article	  34	  became	  full	  effective.	  See	  Oliver	  2010:85.	  	  137	  Article	  2,	  letter	  k.	  See	  also	  Oliver2010:93	  para	  93.	  	  138	  Case	  8/74	  Dassonville	  para	  5.	  	  139	  Barnard	  2010:73.	  	  140	  Fouquet	  and	  Johansson	  2008:4089,	  who	  unfortunately	  do	  not	  elaborate	  this	  issue	  further.	  Moreover,	  since	  the	  Dassonville	  case	  itself	  concerned	  measures	  at	  the	  marketing	  stage,	  Barnard	  2010:74	  suggests	  that	  the	  formula	  does	  not	  comprise	  measures	  at	  “the	  production	  stage,	  of	  the	  economic	  process”.	  If	  such	  an	  approach	  were	  applied,	  it	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  that	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  a	  specific	  mechanism	  considered	  isolated	  of	  a	  specific	  scheme	  would	  fall	  outside	  the	  formula.	  However,	  although	  several	  arguments	  was	  put	  forth	  in	  favour	  of	  such	  a	  distinction	  by	  the	  parties	  involved	  in	  Dassonville,	  the	  ECJ	  –	  in	  my	  view	  –	  does	  not	  explicitly	  authorize	  such	  a	  distinction.	  One	  could	  possibly	  submit	  Case	  3/76	  Kramer	  paras	  55-­‐59	  where	  ECJ	  differentiated	  between	  the	  marketing	  and	  production	  stage	  but	  ECJ’s	  reasoning	  seems	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  highly	  specific	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  rather	  than	  a	  principal	  guidance	  on	  the	  application	  of	  article	  34.	  	  141	  The	  only	  but	  far-­‐fetched	  possibility	  would	  be	  where	  the	  effects	  of	  non-­‐trading	  rules	  are	  too	  uncertain	  and	  indirect	  i.e.	  the	  remoteness	  test/doctrine.	  One	  thread	  of	  these	  rules	  are	  those	  where	  the	  restrictive	  effects	  on	  imports	  is	  inherent	  in	  proportional	  legislation	  pursuing	  goals	  permitted	  by	  the	  treaty.	  The	  applicability	  of	  the	  remoteness	  test	  is	  however	  highly	  questionable	  in	  the	  context	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes,	  since	  the	  effects	  at	  the	  outset	  are	  neither	  too	  uncertain	  nor	  too	  indirect.	  An	  additional	  obstacle	  is	  that	  the	  ECJ	  in	  several	  cases	  solely	  applied	  this	  test	  to	  rules	  that	  was	  applied	  without	  distinction	  or	  did	  not	  discriminate,	  see	  for	  instance	  Spaventa	  2009:250-­‐253.	  This	  is,	  as	  further	  explained	  below,	  hardly	  the	  case	  in	  respect	  of	  legislation	  prescribing	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  	  142	  See	  for	  instance	  Oliver	  2010:93	  para	  6.20,	  Gormley	  2009:404	  para	  11.06,	  Barnard	  2010:74	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  See	  also	  Commission	  2010b:13.	  	  143	  Oliver	  2010:94.	  As	  regard	  the	  potential	  application	  of	  a	  de	  minimis	  rule,	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  remoteness	  test	  sometimes	  applied	  in	  effect	  is	  a	  de	  minimis	  rule	  in	  disguise,	  see	  Oliver	  2010:96	  para	  6.25.	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Having	  regard	  to	  the	  expired	  Directive	  70/50,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  acknowledged	  two	  types	  of	  MEEs	  that	  are	  of	  a	  significant	  importance	  in	  the	  context	  discussed:	  distinctly	  and	  indistinctly	  applicable	  measures.	  Basically,	  the	  latter	  category	  consist	  of	  measures	  “which	  are	  equally	  applicable	  to	  domestic	  and	  imported	  products”	  but	  in	  fact	  have	  a	  particular	  burden	  on	  the	  imported	  goods.144	  In	  contrast,	  distinctly	  applicable	  measures	  are	  “measures,	  other	  than	  those	  applicable	  equally	  to	  domestic	  or	  imported	  goods,	  which	  hinder	  imports	  which	  could	  otherwise	  take	  place.”145	  Basically,	  these	  measures	  are	  overtly	  or	  directly	  discriminatory	  and	  impose	  a	  different	  burden	  in	  law	  and	  in	  fact	  on	  the	  domestic	  and	  imported	  goods.146	  Having	  this	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Dassonville	  formula	  in	  mind,	  it	  seems	  at	  first	  sight	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  are	  directly	  discriminatory	  since	  the	  support	  at	  the	  outset	  only	  applies	  to	  domestic	  RES-­‐E	  generation	  the	  effects	  of	  which	  actually	  or	  potentially,	  indirectly	  or	  directly	  impedes	  the	  import	  of	  the	  electricity	  (green	  or	  grey)	  that	  otherwise	  could	  have	  taken	  place.	  	  The	  main	  rule	  is	  however	  not	  absolute	  and	  derogations	  may	  be	  justified	  on	  two	  grounds,	  provided	  that	  the	  measure	  comply	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality.	  Firstly,	  an	  exemption	  is	  provided	  by	  way	  of	  fulfilling	  article	  36	  TFEU.	  The	  specific	  grounds	  contained	  therein	  –	  such	  as	  public	  security,	  public	  policy,	  protection	  of	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  or	  plants	  –	  are	  however	  interpreted	  strictly	  by	  the	  ECJ	  and	  cannot	  be	  employed	  to	  serve	  economic	  objectives.147	  The	  second	  exemption	  basis	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  mandatory	  requirements	  or	  case	  law	  based	  derogations	  developed	  by	  ECJ.	  Although	  its	  contours	  are	  notoriously	  vague	  the	  traditional	  view	  hold	  that	  a	  mandatory	  requirement	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  justification	  only	  when	  the	  measure	  at	  hand	  is	  indistinctly	  applicable	  measure	  i.e.	  applicable	  to	  domestic	  and	  imported	  products	  alike.148	  Several	  diverse	  requirements	  may	  fall	  within	  its	  scope,	  such	  as	  environmental	  protection,	  protection	  of	  public	  health	  and	  protection	  of	  cinema	  as	  a	  form	  of	  cultural	  expression.	  	  	  Regarding	  energy	  security	  measures	  infringing	  article	  34,	  the	  Campus	  oil	  case149	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  they	  may	  be	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  public	  security	  under	  article	  36,	  even	  when	  economic	  objectives	  are	  pursued.150	  If	  nothing	  else	  this	  case	  reinforces	  and	  acknowledge	  the	  perception	  of	  energy	  security	  as	  a	  state	  prerogative	  under	  EU	  law	  (as	  it	  stood	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  verdict,	  at	  least151).	  However,	  since	  the	  case	  concerned	  petroleum	  products	  by	  ECJ	  considered	  of	  “exceptional	  importance	  as	  an	  energy	  source	  in	  the	  modern	  economy	  [and]	  of	  fundamental	  importance	  for	  a	  country’s	  existence”,152	  it	  may	  be	  questioned	  whether	  the	  current	  deployment	  of	  RES-­‐E	  amount	  to	  such	  fundamental	  importance.	  With	  regard	  to	  climate	  change	  mitigating	  measures,	  they	  may	  at	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Directive	  70/50	  article	  3,	  Barnard	  2010:90.	  	  145	  Directive	  70/50	  article	  2.	  	  146	  Oliver	  2010:105	  para	  6.43,	  Barnard	  2010:80.	  147	  Barnard	  2010:15,	  Oliver	  2010:239	  para	  8.54,	  Gormley	  2009:455	  para	  11.62.	  148	  Gormley	  2009:507,	  Barnard	  2010:166f.	  	  149	  Case	  72/83	  Campus	  Oil.	  	  150	  Daniel	  Cross,	  Eugene,	  Hancher,	  Leigh	  and	  Jan	  Slot,	  Piet	  2001:225f	  paras	  5.29.	  Compare	  Barnard	  2010:156.	  	  151	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  an	  approach	  would	  be	  upheld	  today	  is	  doubted	  by	  several	  commentators,	  see	  for	  instance	  Delvaux	  2013:203	  paras	  589-­‐590.	  	  152	  Case	  72/83	  Campus	  Oil	  para	  34.	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outset	  be	  classified	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  environmental	  protection	  pertaining	  to	  the	  mandatory	  requirements	  doctrine.	  However,	  since	  this	  doctrine	  under	  the	  traditional	  view	  is	  applicable	  solely	  to	  indistinctly	  applicable	  measures,	  any	  reconciliation	  with	  the	  distinctly	  applicable	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  seems	  doomed.	  	  How,	  then,	  does	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  stand	  in	  this	  regard?	  The	  answer	  is	  not	  evident.	  	  Until	  2014,	  the	  leading	  case	  on	  these	  issues	  was	  PreussenElektra	  concerning	  a	  German	  FIT	  scheme	  from	  1998.	  Symptomatically,	  it	  yielded	  considerable	  criticism	  and	  ECJ’s	  reasoning	  was	  described	  as	  “tortous”,	  “baffling	  …	  [and]	  idiosyncratic,	  to	  say	  the	  least”,	  “quite	  ambiguous,	  ignoring	  a	  number	  of	  key	  questions.”153	  Moreover,	  the	  multifaceted	  legal	  area	  in	  question	  is	  under	  development	  and	  subject	  to	  several	  potentially	  colliding	  objectives,	  and	  this	  was	  indeed	  recognized	  by	  ECJ	  in	  PreussenElektra,	  basing	  its	  judgement	  on	  “the	  current	  state	  of	  Community	  law	  concerning	  the	  electricity	  market”.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Commission	  has	  subsequently	  suggested	  that	  FIT	  schemes	  may	  be	  challenged	  under	  internal	  market	  principles	  related	  to	  free	  trade	  while	  being	  quiet	  on	  the	  compatibility	  of	  TENFIT	  and	  TGC	  with	  these	  principles.154	  Since	  all	  these	  aspects	  may	  affect	  state	  discretion,	  the	  first	  problem	  that	  this	  essay	  seeks	  to	  explore	  is	  whether	  states	  under	  this	  internal	  market	  regime	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  freely	  choose	  between	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  	  
1.4.2 The	  second	  problem:	  State	  aid	  rules	  	  Article	  3(3)	  RED	  2009	  envisages	  the	  application	  of	  state	  aid	  provisions	  on	  the	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  employed.	  Systematically,	  these	  provisions	  are	  positioned	  among	  the	  treaty	  rules	  on	  competition	  under	  title	  VII	  TFEU.	  As	  a	  competition	  policy,	  the	  EU	  has	  pursuant	  to	  article	  3(1)(b)	  TFEU	  exclusive	  competence	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  the	  state	  aid	  regime.155	  In	  contrast	  to	  cartel	  and	  merger	  control	  regulating	  the	  conduct	  of	  enterprises,	  state	  aid	  law	  basically	  regulates	  states	  budgetary	  policies.156	  The	  plain	  conceptualisation	  of	  internal	  market	  rules	  typically	  refers	  to	  the	  four	  freedoms,	  excluding	  state	  aid.157	  Nonetheless,	  the	  suggestion	  that	  “State	  Aid	  DNA	  shares	  more	  chromosomes	  with	  free	  movement	  than	  with	  antitrust	  rules”	  seems	  profound.158	  Firstly,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  rules	  on	  both	  state	  aid	  and	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  (in	  particular	  article	  34)	  may	  be	  applicable	  to	  the	  same	  material	  facts159	  indicates	  a	  functional	  overlap.	  Additionally,	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  national	  correlatives	  exists	  of	  either	  EU	  state	  aid	  or	  free	  movement	  can	  be	  explained	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  both	  regimes	  complement	  each	  other	  in	  securing	  free	  and	  undistorted	  cross-­‐border	  trade	  and	  thus	  finds	  its	  paramount	  rationale	  in	  the	  internal	  market.160	  However,	  a	  significant	  difference	  –	  of	  cardinal	  importance	  in	  this	  essay	  –	  is	  that	  apart	  from	  policing	  negative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Delvaux	  2013:216	  para	  621,	  Oliver	  2010:304f	  para	  8.194,	  Fernandez	  Armenteros	  and	  Lefevere	  2001:347,	  respectively.	  	  154	  Commission	  2005:4f,	  8.	  	  155	  See	  also	  Rusche	  2013.	  	  156	  Blauberger	  2008:7.	  	  157	  See	  for	  instance	  Snell	  2014:301.	  	  158	  The	  qoute	  originates	  from	  JL	  Buendia	  Sierra	  and	  others	  in	  Liber	  Amircorum	  Francisco	  
Santaollalla	  Gadea	  (The	  Hague,	  Kluwer,	  2008,	  p.	  9)	  but	  is	  reproduced	  in	  de	  Cecco	  2013:38,	  Hancher,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Jan	  Slot	  2012:27.	  	  159	  See	  for	  instance	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1107f	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  	  160	  de	  Cecco	  2013:38.	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integration,	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  distinct	  dimension	  of	  positive	  integration	  promoting	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  regulatory	  realities.161	  	  	   The	  importance	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  cannot	  be	  overstated.	  	  Firstly,	  as	  the	  initial	  decision-­‐maker	  in	  respect	  of	  both	  existing	  aid	  and	  newly/altered	  aid	  pursuant	  to	  article	  108(1)	  and	  (3)	  TFEU,	  it	  is	  entrusted	  the	  functions	  of	  law	  enforcer,	  watchdog	  and	  policy	  maker	  in	  this	  area.162	  Secondly,	  the	  Commission	  enjoys	  discretion	  regarding	  the	  general	  approach	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  state	  aids.	  It	  may	  for	  instance	  develop	  its	  policy	  in	  general,	  either	  by	  formal	  legislation	  (i.e.	  certain	  regulations)	  or	  informal	  rule	  making,	  or	  through	  individual	  decisions.163	  The	  informal	  rule	  making	  or	  soft	  law,	  such	  as	  guidelines,	  communications	  and	  frameworks,	  is	  not	  binding	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  article	  288	  TFEU.	  Guidelines	  nevertheless	  bind	  the	  Commission	  once	  published	  and	  also	  the	  states	  if	  they	  have	  agreed	  on	  the	  content,	  even	  though	  the	  latter	  condition	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  given	  much	  weight	  by	  the	  courts.164	  Subject	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  formal	  investigations	  of	  all	  its	  existing	  aid	  measures,	  member	  states	  are	  typically	  induced	  by	  the	  Commission	  to	  explicitly	  approve	  its	  soft	  law.165	  The	  legal	  basis	  for	  adopting	  guidelines	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  derived	  from	  article	  108(1)	  TFEU	  that	  obliges	  the	  Commission	  to	  propose	  appropriate	  measures.166	  The	  soft	  law	  can	  also	  be	  enforced	  indirectly	  via	  individual	  decisions	  concerning	  the	  approval/disapproval	  of	  notified	  aid.167	  These	  decisions	  are	  subject	  to	  judicial	  review,	  but	  the	  Union	  courts	  have	  entitled	  the	  Commission	  “a	  broader	  discretion”	  in	  two	  significant	  situations.168	  First	  of	  all,	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  decision	  on	  whether	  the	  aid	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  pursuant	  to	  article	  107(3)	  TFEU,	  the	  judicial	  review	  is	  confined	  to	  determining	  whether	  the	  decision	  is	  vitiated	  by	  manifest	  error	  or	  misuse	  of	  powers.	  Additionally,	  the	  Commission	  enjoys	  broad	  discretion	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  aid	  pursuant	  to	  article	  107(1)	  whenever	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  complex,	  technical	  or	  economic	  assessment.	  Here,	  apart	  from	  ensuring	  no	  manifest	  error	  or	  misuse	  of	  power,	  the	  review	  is	  generally	  confined	  to	  verifying	  that	  the	  Commission	  has	  complied	  with	  relevant	  procedural	  rules	  as	  well	  as	  stated	  the	  reasons	  and	  the	  facts	  on	  which	  it	  has	  based	  its	  decision.	  	  To	  which	  extent,	  then,	  are	  the	  main	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  compatible	  with	  the	  state	  aid	  rules?	  Article	  107(1)	  TFEU	  provide	  the	  starting	  point:	  	   Save	  as	  otherwise	  provided	  in	  the	  Treaties,	  any	  aid	  granted	  by	  a	  Members	  State	  or	  through	  State	  resources	  in	  any	  form	  whatsoever	  which	  distorts	  or	  threatens	  to	  distort	  competition	  by	  favouring	  certain	  undertakings	  or	  the	  production	  of	  certain	  goods	  shall,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  affects	  trade	  between	  Member	  States,	  be	  incompatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  de	  Cecco	  2013:38f.	  	  162	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1084,	  Johnston,	  Heffron	  and	  McCauley	  2014:2,	  Heidenhain	  2010:575.	  	  163	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1084f.	  	  164	  See	  Hancher,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:24f,	  Heidenhain	  2010:9	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  	  165	  Blauberger	  2008:18.	  	  166	  EEAG	  2014	  point	  250,	  EAG	  2008	  section	  7.4.	  See	  also	  Blauberger	  2008:13.	  	  167	  Blauberger	  2008:17.	  	  168	  See	  Hancher,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:59f	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  See	  also	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1084.	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This	  provision	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  definition	  of	  state	  aid.169	  Similarly	  to	  article	  34,	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  measure	  –	  neither	  purpose	  nor	  form	  –	  is	  decisive.170	  	  Basically,	  four	  cumulative	  conditions	  must	  be	  fulfilled	  in	  order	  to	  constitute	  state	  aid.171	  Firstly,	  an	  economic	  advantage	  has	  to	  be	  gratuitously	  conferred	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  benefit	  received	  would	  not	  normally	  have	  been	  enjoyed	  by	  virtue	  of	  own	  commercial	  endeavours	  i.e.	  private	  investor	  test,	  favouring	  either	  certain	  undertakings	  or	  the	  production	  of	  certain	  goods	  i.e.	  selectivity	  criterion.172	  Both	  REFIT	  and	  TGC	  schemes	  certainly	  provide	  such	  an	  advantage,	  but	  TENFIT	  schemes	  –	  due	  to	  its	  initial	  competitive	  bidding	  process	  –	  may	  possibly	  be	  assessed	  differently.	  Since	  all	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  exclusively	  promote	  RES-­‐E	  generation	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  competitors	  producing	  grey	  electricity,	  the	  selectivity	  criterion	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  met.173	  	  Secondly,	  related	  to	  both	  the	  selectivity	  criterion	  and	  the	  third	  condition,	  the	  advantage	  must	  distort	  or	  threaten	  to	  distort	  competition.174	  This	  condition	  is	  usually	  met	  with	  ease	  and	  this	  is	  also	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  since	  they	  at	  least	  threatens	  to	  distort	  the	  competition	  on	  the	  electricity	  market.175	  	  	   Thirdly,	  the	  measure	  must	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  trade	  between	  member	  states.	  Even	  this	  condition	  is	  usually	  met	  with	  ease	  since	  it	  neither	  depends	  on	  the	  locality	  of	  the	  goods/services	  nor	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  activity	  in	  question,	  but	  rather	  infer	  the	  outcome	  out	  of	  the	  preferential	  treatment	  under	  the	  selectivity	  and	  second	  condition	  without	  regard	  to	  whether	  the	  favoured	  undertaking(s)	  participate	  in	  such	  trade.176	  Thus,	  it	  is	  most	  likely	  that	  the	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  meet	  this	  condition.	  	   	  Fourthly,	  the	  advantage	  must	  be	  granted	  by	  a	  member	  state	  or	  through	  state	  resources.	  This	  condition	  requires	  that	  the	  advantage	  stems	  from	  state	  resources	  and	  additionally	  –	  though	  not	  always	  distinguished	  –	  are	  transferred	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  to	  the	  favoured	  undertaking(s).177	  State	  resources	  include	  not	  only	  the	  resources	  of	  public	  undertakings	  and	  authorities,	  but	  also	  –	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Commentators	  actually	  diverge	  as	  to	  whether	  state	  aid	  is	  defined	  at	  all	  in	  the	  treaty	  or	  only	  in	  an	  imprecise	  manner	  whose	  substance	  must	  be	  deduced	  from	  the	  elements	  set	  forth.	  See	  for	  instance	  Hancher,	  Otteranger	  and	  Slot	  2012:51	  and	  Heidenhain	  2010:14,	  respectively.	  	  170	  See	  for	  instance	  Delvaux	  2003:104,	  Kaur	  2009:268f,	  Krieglstein	  2001:54.	  171	  For	  an	  easily	  accessible	  overview,	  see	  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html.	  	  172	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1087ff,	  Heidenhain	  2010:23ff,	  43ff,	  Hancher,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Jan	  Slot	  2012:53ff,	  76ff.	  	  173	  There	  is	  however	  a	  possibility	  to	  exempt	  measures	  viewed	  as	  integral	  components	  of	  the	  general	  treatment	  of	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  therefore	  not	  specific/selective	  measures.	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  can	  assumingly	  be	  construed	  so	  as	  to	  fall	  within	  this	  exemption,	  but	  the	  Courts	  have	  so	  far	  only	  relied	  on	  this	  in	  a	  few	  cases,	  notably	  in	  tax	  and	  social	  security	  law.	  See	  Hancner,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:61,	  84,	  Heidenhain	  2010:48	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  	  174	  Hancher,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:59,	  103f,	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1092,	  Heidenhain	  2010:50ff.	  	  175	  See	  also	  Krieglstein	  2001:54f.	  	  	  176	  Hancher,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:100f,	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1092,	  Heidenhain	  2010:54ff	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  It	  should	  perhaps	  be	  mentioned	  that	  there	  is	  a	  de	  minimis	  regulation	  applicable	  to	  aid	  of	  very	  low	  level	  given	  to	  an	  undertaking	  but	  it	  is	  clearly	  not	  relevant	  here.	  See	  also	  Kaur	  2009:277.	  	  177	  Heidenhain	  2010:33,	  40,	  Hanchner	  et	  al	  2010:63f.	  Compare	  Jaeger	  2012:536	  and	  cited	  case	  law	  according	  to	  which	  the	  two	  criteria	  are,	  firstly,	  granting	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  through	  state	  resources,	  and	  secondly,	  the	  advantage	  being	  imputable	  to	  the	  state.	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traditional	  view	  goes	  –	  resources	  of	  private	  entities	  upon	  which	  the	  state	  or	  public	  authorities	  can	  exercise	  decisive	  influence	  as	  regard	  the	  allocation,	  even	  where	  these	  are	  the	  outcome	  of	  private	  economic	  activity.	  Similarly,	  the	  traditional	  view	  goes,	  resources	  of	  private	  undertakings	  by	  virtue	  of	  legislation	  subject	  to	  state	  disposal	  also	  constitute	  state	  resources.178	  As	  to	  the	  transferral	  of	  state	  resources	  the	  means	  are	  manifold.	  Subsides	  are	  obviously	  included	  and	  the	  transfer	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  to	  charge	  the	  public	  budget.	  To	  the	  extent,	  then,	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources	  received	  by	  virtue	  of	  TGC	  schemes	  are	  subject	  solely	  to	  the	  interplay	  of	  and	  through	  market	  forces,	  these	  would	  assumingly	  not	  constitute	  state	  resources.179	  	  In	  contrast,	  financing	  schemes	  established	  through	  legislation	  aimed	  to	  distribute	  and	  compensate	  TSOs	  for	  being	  obligated	  to	  purchase	  RES-­‐E	  at	  minimum	  prices	  contained	  in	  some	  FITs	  and	  TENFITs,	  are	  at	  first	  sight	  likely	  to	  constitute	  state	  resources.	  The	  fourth	  condition	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  evaluate	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  Until	  late	  2013,	  PreussenElektra	  was	  the	  only	  ECJ	  case	  dealing	  with	  these	  issues.	  Seemingly	  shifting	  from	  an	  effect-­‐based	  approach	  towards	  a	  formalistic	  one,	  the	  ECJ	  found	  that	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  on	  minimum	  prices	  did	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  transfer	  of	  resources	  and	  omitted	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  they	  constituted	  state	  resources	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  According	  to	  one	  commentator	  PreussenElektra	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  that	  case	  law	  on	  state	  aid	  “is	  considered	  by	  many	  to	  be	  …	  catastrophic,	  or	  at	  least	  fanciful	  …	  [and]	  showing	  signs	  of	  mental	  fatique”	  –	  indeed	  triggering	  arguments	  against	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  state	  aid	  control.180	  	  	   Furthermore,	  even	  if	  certain	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  are	  considered	  to	  constitute	  state	  aid,	  they	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  exempted	  by	  virtue	  of	  article	  107(3)	  TFEU	  according	  to	  which:181	  	  	   The	  following	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market:	  (a) aid	  to	  promote	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  areas	  where	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  is	  abnormally	  low	  or	  where	  there	  is	  serious	  underemployment,	  and	  in	  the	  regions	  referred	  to	  in	  article	  	  349,	  in	  view	  if	  their	  structural,	  economical	  and	  social	  situation;	  (b) aid	  to	  promote	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  important	  project	  of	  common	  European	  interest	  or	  to	  remedy	  a	  serious	  disturbance	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  a	  Member	  State;	  	  (c) aid	  to	  facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  certain	  economic	  activities	  or	  of	  a	  certain	  economic	  areas,	  where	  such	  aid	  does	  not	  adversely	  affect	  trading	  conditions	  to	  an	  extent	  contrary	  to	  the	  common	  interests;	  (d) aid	  to	  promote	  culture	  and	  heritage	  conservation	  …	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  Heidenhain	  2010:36ff.	  	  179	  Compare	  Hancher,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:860	  according	  to	  which	  “[t]he	  obligation	  to	  purchase	  a	  specific	  amount	  of	  green	  certificates	  appears	  comparable	  to	  the	  obligation	  to	  purchase	  electricity	  produced	  from	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  at	  fixed	  minimum	  prices.”	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  discussed	  the	  state	  exercised	  a	  decisive	  influence	  over	  a	  fund	  that	  further	  compensated	  RES-­‐E	  producers.	  This	  feature	  is	  hardly	  present	  in	  TGC	  schemes,	  but	  rather	  refers	  to	  certificates	  under	  a	  totally	  different	  and	  now	  abandoned	  scheme.	  	  180	  Biondi	  2013:1718,	  and	  p	  1727	  where	  an	  overruling	  of	  PreussenElektra	  in	  the	  name	  of	  legal	  certainity	  is	  suggested.	  See	  e.g.	  also	  Jaeger	  2012:537	  asking	  “whether	  it	  is	  not	  time	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  PreussenElektra	  judgment	  was,	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  good	  intentions,	  a	  mistake.	  […]	  and	  to	  abandon	  the	  ill-­‐fitted	  PreussenElektra	  criterion?”	  	  181	  The	  second	  subparagraph	  of	  article	  107	  providing	  automatic	  exemption	  –	  “shall	  be	  compatible”	  –	  is	  not	  relevant	  here.	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(e) such	  other	  categories	  of	  aid	  as	  may	  be	  specified	  by	  decision	  of	  the	  Council	  on	  a	  proposal	  from	  the	  Commission.	  	  	  The	  first	  four	  categories	  of	  aid	  are	  subject	  to	  Commission	  approval	  whose	  discretion	  –	  as	  indicated	  by	  “may”	  –	  is	  considerable	  and	  only	  subject	  to	  marginal	  review	  by	  EU	  courts.	  The	  Commission	  commonly	  issues	  guidelines	  on	  how	  it	  intends	  to	  apply	  its	  discretion	  in	  a	  particular	  area.	  The	  existence	  and	  application	  of	  such	  guidelines	  potentially	  provide	  the	  dimension	  of	  positive	  integration	  mentioned	  above.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  environmental	  protection	  aid	  to	  which	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  subsequently	  was	  pertained,	  the	  first	  guidelines	  were	  issued	  1974	  and	  qualified	  for	  an	  exemption	  under	  letter	  B.	  The	  subsequently	  adopted	  guidelines	  1994,	  2001	  and	  2008	  gradually	  moved	  to	  mainly	  provide	  exemption	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  letter	  C.182	  RED	  2009	  underlines,	  though	  in	  a	  footnote	  to	  Annex	  1,	  “that	  the	  [2008]	  State	  aid	  guidelines	  for	  environmental	  protection	  recognize	  the	  continued	  need	  for	  national	  mechanisms	  of	  support	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  energy	  from	  renewable	  sources.”	  However,	  the	  2008	  guidelines	  was	  replaced	  1	  July	  2014	  by	  the	  guidelines	  for	  environment	  protection	  and	  energy	  (EEAG)	  which	  will	  be	  applicable	  until	  31	  December	  2020,183	  coinciding	  with	  the	  expiry	  of	  the	  target	  set	  forth	  by	  RED	  2009.	  	  	   The	  outcome	  of	  PreussenElektra	  as	  well	  as	  the	  subsequent	  case	  law	  developments,	  the	  new	  EEAG	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Commission’s	  decisional	  practice,	  may	  very	  well	  affect	  state	  discretion.	  Against	  this	  background,	  the	  second	  problem	  that	  this	  essay	  seeks	  to	  explore	  is	  whether	  states	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  freely	  choose	  between	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  	  	  
1.5 Problem	  statement	  and	  purpose	  	  Having	  established	  that	  states	  in	  legislative	  matters	  easily	  can	  defend	  their	  wide	  discretion	  as	  to	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design,	  the	  problem	  to	  be	  explored	  is	  whether	  this	  discretion	  is	  upheld	  or	  curtailed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  two	  internal	  market	  regimes.	  	  	   Accordingly,	  the	  prime	  purpose	  of	  this	  essay	  is	  to	  delimit	  the	  principal	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  as	  to	  the	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  regimes	  specified.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  outcome	  under	  the	  two	  internal	  market	  regimes	  may	  involve	  trade-­‐offs	  in	  respect	  of	  how	  the	  trinity	  is	  balanced	  and	  potentially	  intervene	  in	  states	  energy	  rights,	  a	  subsidiary	  purpose	  is	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  outcome	  may	  be	  considered	  legitimate.	  	  
1.6 Method	  and	  material	  	  In	  order	  to	  fulfil	  the	  primary	  purpose,	  the	  following	  main	  types	  of	  legal	  sources	  will	  be	  analysed:	  1)	  primary	  law	  provisions	  and	  their	  substance	  as	  elaborated	  by	  the	  ECJ	  and,	  more	  rarely,	  the	  General	  Court;	  2)	  AG’s	  opinion	  when	  deemed	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  contentious	  aspects	  of	  relevance	  for	  state	  discretion;	  3)	  the	  Commission’s	  decisional	  practice	  and	  the	  guidelines	  establishing	  the	  compatibility	  criteria.	  	  The	  material	  will	  be	  analysed	  through	  the	  so-­‐called	  argumentativist	  legal	  dogmatics	  method.	  This	  means	  that	  apart	  from	  describing	  the	  content	  of	  positive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  Delvaux	  2003:105,	  Maca	  2009:19.	  	  183	  EEAG	  point	  246.	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law	  as	  elaborated	  primarily	  by	  ECJ,	  I	  will	  also	  propose	  possible	  applications	  on	  hard	  cases	  to	  which	  the	  law	  seemingly	  does	  not	  provide	  clear	  and	  single	  answers.184	  Since	  two	  or	  three	  of	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  –	  depending	  on	  the	  internal	  market	  regime	  discussed	  –	  has	  not	  been	  reviewed	  by	  ECJ,	  this	  method	  enable	  the	  primary	  purpose	  to	  be	  met.	  	  More	  specifically,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  article	  34-­‐36	  TFEU,	  the	  argumentative	  framework	  will	  be	  based	  in	  particular	  on	  ECJ’s	  intensity	  of	  review	  and	  how	  it	  approaches	  discretional	  elements,	  such	  as	  proportionality	  and	  possible	  justifications.	  Additionally,	  I	  will	  seek	  to	  approach	  ECJ’s	  reasoning	  through	  a	  trinity	  perspective,	  assuming	  that	  energy	  security	  considerations	  may	  induce	  a	  wider	  and	  steadier	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  while	  the	  glocal	  feature	  of	  environmental	  matters	  may	  tip	  in	  either	  direction.	  All	  ECJ	  cases	  concerning	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU	  will	  be	  analysed,	  and	  these	  are:	  
PreussenElektra,185	  Ålands	  vindkraft,186	  and	  Essent	  Belgium.187	  	  Under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime,	  the	  argumentative	  framework	  will	  centre	  on	  whether,	  and	  on	  what	  basis,	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  are	  considered	  as	  aid	  by	  the	  ECJ	  and	  the	  Commission	  and	  whether	  the	  conditions	  laid	  down	  for	  considering	  a	  measure	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  prompts	  a	  higher	  or	  lower	  level	  of	  scrutiny.	  The	  ECJ	  cases	  dealing	  with	  support	  schemes	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  are	  PreussenElektra	  and	  Vent	  De	  Colère.188	  Four	  decisions	  taken	  by	  the	  Commission	  are	  also	  analysed	  and	  specifically	  chosen	  in	  order	  to	  cover	  all	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes,	  but	  other	  decisions	  will	  be	  invoked	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  consistency	  or	  inconsistency	  in	  its	  decisional	  practise.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  gratitude	  of	  the	  shift	  provided	  by	  the	  recently	  issued	  EEAG,	  an	  approach	  enabling	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  previous	  guidelines	  will	  be	  adopted	  and	  further	  described	  below.	  	  Several	  of	  the	  specific	  substantive	  elements	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  assess	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  the	  principal	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  under	  both	  regimes	  will	  be	  presented	  and	  analysed	  in	  due	  course	  as	  the	  analysis	  proceeds.	  All	  ECJ	  cases	  analysed	  are	  preliminary	  rulings	  i.e.	  initiated	  by	  article	  267	  references.	  Under	  such	  judgements	  the	  ECJ	  formulate	  the	  judgement	  in	  an	  abstract	  manner	  whilst	  enabling	  the	  national	  court	  to	  apply	  the	  judgement	  to	  the	  facts.	  The	  referring	  national	  court	  and	  all	  other	  courts	  dealing	  with	  the	  same	  matter	  are	  bound	  by	  the	  operative	  part	  of	  the	  judgment.	  Additionally,	  the	  judgement	  constitutes	  a	  precedent	  that	  the	  ECJ	  will	  follow	  in	  similar	  cases.189	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  analysed	  cases	  enables	  considerable	  generalisation.	  This	  is	  hardly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  decisional	  practice,	  at	  least	  not	  formally.	  Nevertheless,	  given	  the	  particular	  features	  of	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  and	  the	  considerable	  discretion	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  Commission,	  the	  decisions	  analysed	  illustrates	  its	  general	  approach	  which	  in	  turn	  serves	  as	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  states	  can	  freely	  choose	  between	  the	  support	  schemes	  in	  question.	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  Vaquero	  2013:66f,	  80.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity	  it	  should	  perhaps	  be	  mentioned	  that	  Vaqueuro	  distinguish	  this	  method	  from	  legal	  dogmatics	  by	  1)	  not	  specifically	  addressing	  judges	  with	  the	  solutions	  proposed,	  2)	  to	  a	  larger	  degree	  focusing	  on	  problematic	  hard	  cases,	  and	  3)	  always	  engage	  in	  describing	  the	  content	  of	  law.	  	  185	  Case	  C-­‐379/98,	  PreussenElektra.	  	  186	  Case	  C-­‐573-­‐12,	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	  	  187	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  Belgium.	  	  188	  Case	  C-­‐216/12	  Vent	  De	  Colère.	  	  189	  See	  for	  instance	  Lenz	  1993:398,	  403.	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This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  ECJ’s	  possible	  approach	  will	  be	  substituted	  by	  Commission’s	  approach,	  since	  I	  will	  raise	  and	  assess	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  approach	  by	  the	  latter	  is	  reasonable	  and	  can	  be	  substantiated	  in	  case	  law.	  Generalisation	  is	  in	  particular	  enabled	  by	  the	  Guidelines,	  since	  its	  very	  purpose	  is	  to	  communicate	  how	  the	  Commission	  will	  assess	  the	  compatibility	  criteria.	  	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  outcome	  will	  be	  analysed	  concisely	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  input	  and	  output	  legitimacy.190	  Under	  an	  input	  criterion,	  legitimacy	  basically	  depend	  on	  whether	  the	  outcome	  reflect	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  members	  of	  a	  given	  community	  and	  favours	  to	  this	  end	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	  that	  enable	  participation	  and/or	  consensus.	  Under	  an	  output	  criterion,	  in	  contrast,	  legitimacy	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  ability	  to	  effectively	  solve	  problems	  requiring	  collective	  solutions	  and	  relies	  to	  this	  end	  on	  indirect	  participation.	  Naturally,	  both	  concepts	  are	  important	  and	  in	  practice	  often	  indistinguishable,	  but	  they	  can	  and	  should	  be	  analytically	  separated	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  assertions	  concerning	  (il)legitimacy.	  	  Although	  both	  concepts	  may	  sound	  superficial,	  especially	  in	  a	  legal	  context,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  and	  sought	  illustrated	  that	  they	  are	  highly	  relevant	  in	  a	  legal	  context.	  The	  purpose	  will	  not	  be	  to	  reach	  a	  definite	  conclusion	  on	  whether	  the	  outcome	  is	  either	  legitimate	  or	  illegitimate,	  but	  rather	  to	  assesses	  whether	  the	  outcome	  may	  be	  considered	  more	  or	  less	  (il)legitimate.	  	  	  
1.6.1 Research	  questions	  	  In	  order	  to	  fulfil	  the	  purpose,	  the	  following	  general	  research	  questions	  will	  guide	  me:	  	  
• In	  the	  context	  of	  article	  34	  and	  36;	  	  	  -­‐ Does	  the	  schemes	  amount	  to	  QRs/MMEs?	  If	  so,	  on	  what	  basis?	  	  -­‐ How	  is	  the	  justification	  approach	  constituted	  in	  terms	  of	  scope,	  basis	  and	  proportionality?	  	  -­‐ Is	  it	  possible	  to	  discern	  a	  preference	  in	  respect	  of	  certain	  RES-­‐E	  supporting	  measures?	  	  	  
• In	  the	  context	  of	  state	  aid;	  	  	  -­‐ Does	  the	  measures	  amount	  to	  state	  aid?	  If	  so,	  on	  what	  basis?	  	  -­‐ How	  are	  the	  compatibility	  criteria	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  (im)precision	  and	  what	  level	  of	  review	  do	  they	  indicate?	  	  -­‐ Is	  it	  possible	  to	  discern	  a	  preference	  in	  respect	  of	  certain	  RES-­‐E	  supporting	  measures?	  	  	  
• In	  the	  context	  of	  assessing	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  outcome;	  -­‐ Does	  it	  meet	  basic	  input	  criteria?	  	  -­‐ Does	  it	  meet	  basic	  procedural	  output	  criteria?	  	  -­‐ Does	  it	  enable	  an	  effective	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  trinity?	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  Scharpf	  1999:	  616f,	  11-­‐13	  elaborated	  this	  concept.	  For	  a	  distinct	  application,	  see	  Craig	  2012:25-­‐34.	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1.7 Outline	  	  Chapter	  2	  discusses	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU	  and	  concludes	  definitely	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  regard.	  Chapter	  3	  discusses	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime,	  comprising	  the	  ECJ	  cases	  and	  the	  Commission’s	  decisional	  practice	  as	  well	  as	  its	  preconditions	  in	  terms	  of	  relevant	  guidelines.	  This	  chapter	  will	  also	  conclude	  definitely	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  under	  this	  regime.	  Finally,	  chapter	  4	  briefly	  analyses	  and	  concludes	  on	  whether	  the	  outcome	  under	  the	  previously	  assessed	  regimes	  may	  be	  considered	  legitimate.	  	  
2 RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  and	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU	  	  In	  the	  following	  I	  will	  present	  and	  discuss	  the	  three	  cases	  relevant	  to	  the	  subject	  matter.	  The	  discussion	  is	  largely	  structured	  around	  the	  two	  key	  issues	  enabling	  state	  discretion:	  firstly,	  the	  classification	  of	  the	  measure,	  dealing	  with	  how	  potential	  infringement	  is	  conceptualised,	  and	  secondly,	  the	  justification	  assessment	  comprising	  both	  the	  establishment	  of	  justification	  bases	  and	  a	  review	  in	  light	  of	  the	  proportionality	  principle.	  I	  will	  pursue	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  approach	  employed	  by	  the	  ECJ	  is	  highly	  favourable	  towards	  the	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  assessed,	  yet	  take	  into	  account	  certain	  contradicting	  aspects.	  	  Having	  presented	  these	  cases	  isolated	  I	  will	  proceed	  to	  an	  overall	  assessment	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  regard,	  discussing	  the	  key	  doctrinal	  issue	  of	  justification	  bases,	  intensity	  of	  review,	  how	  the	  trinity	  is	  balanced	  and	  whether	  the	  approach	  may	  be	  generalised	  to	  other	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  	  	  
2.1 PreussenElektra:	  FIT	  scheme	  
2.1.1 Background	  and	  measure	  	  The	  case	  concerns	  a	  German	  FIT	  law	  whose	  scope	  comprised	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  in	  Germany.	  	  It	  obliged	  distribution	  undertakings	  to	  purchase	  at	  minimum	  prices	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  in	  their	  area	  of	  supply	  and	  provided	  a	  certain	  compensation	  mechanism	  to	  that	  effect.	  191	  PreussenElektra	  is	  a	  conventional	  electricity	  producer	  (and	  a	  TSO)	  whilst	  Schleswag	  is	  the	  DSO	  subject	  to	  the	  purchase	  obligation.	  Although	  the	  dispute	  between	  these	  parties	  primarily	  concerned	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  and	  the	  compensation	  mechanism	  with	  state	  aid	  law,	  the	  referring	  national	  court	  in	  the	  alternative	  also	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  the	  compatibility	  with	  article	  34	  TFEU.	  According	  to	  the	  AG,	  however,	  the	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  article	  34	  were	  not	  fully	  discussed	  by	  the	  parties	  and	  the	  ECJ	  was	  not	  fully	  informed	  of	  the	  facts.	  In	  his	  view	  it	  remained	  unclear	  how	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  intra-­‐Union	  trade	  was	  affected	  by	  the	  German	  legislation	  and	  in	  particular	  whether	  such	  trade	  was	  technically	  feasible	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  at	  all	  and	  whether	  such	  electricity	  could	  be	  distinguished	  from	  conventional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  para	  6-­‐7,	  9,	  AG	  opinion	  para	  3,	  5-­‐6.	  Compare	  Heinen	  2001:94	  according	  to	  which	  “the	  obligation	  to	  purchase	  is	  not	  explicitly	  mentioned	  in	  the	  German	  law,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  logical	  consequence	  of	  the	  obligation	  to	  pay	  certain	  prices	  for	  electricity	  originating	  from	  renewable	  energy	  sources.”	  However,	  both	  the	  Swedish	  and	  English	  translations	  of	  the	  case	  are	  clear	  on	  this	  issue.	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electricity.192	  This	  is	  important	  since	  it	  may	  explain	  the	  brief	  and	  ambiguous	  reasoning	  by	  the	  ECJ.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  analysing	  the	  compatibility	  with	  articles	  34	  and	  36,	  the	  measure	  at	  stake	  is	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  upon	  DSOs	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  in	  their	  area	  of	  supply.	  	  	  
2.1.2 Classification	  of	  the	  measure	  In	  the	  course	  of	  assessing	  the	  compatibility	  with	  article	  34,	  the	  ECJ	  initially	  reminded	  of	  two	  threads	  of	  case	  law.	  Firstly,	  the	  Dassonville	  formula	  was	  recalled,	  though	  omitting	  its	  original	  “trading	  rules”	  element.	  Secondly,	  referring	  to	  Campus	  Oil	  and	  Du	  Pont	  de	  Nemours	  Italiana,	  it	  stated	  “that	  an	  obligation	  placed	  on	  traders	  in	  a	  Member	  State	  to	  obtain	  a	  certain	  percentage	  of	  their	  supplies	  of	  a	  given	  product	  from	  a	  national	  supplier	  limits	  to	  that	  extent	  the	  possibility	  of	  importing	  the	  same	  product	  by	  preventing	  those	  traders	  from	  obtaining	  supplies	  in	  respect	  of	  part	  of	  their	  needs	  from	  traders	  situated	  in	  other	  Member	  states.”193	  The	  statuary	  purchase	  obligation,	  the	  ECJ	  shortly	  concluded,	  was	  “therefore	  capable,	  at	  least	  potentially,	  of	  hindering	  intra-­‐Community	  trade.”194	  	  Neither	  the	  parties	  nor	  the	  AG	  questioned	  whether	  the	  FIT	  law	  constituted	  “trading	  rules”.	  Together	  with	  the	  ECJ’s	  omission	  of	  this	  issue	  in	  a	  more	  or	  less	  straightforward	  application	  of	  the	  Dassonville	  formula,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  this	  issue	  was	  not	  really	  contested.	  There	  are	  however	  certain	  aspects	  of	  this	  application	  that	  signify	  a	  favourable	  approach	  towards	  the	  measure	  at	  hand,	  namely	  that	  it	  is	  considered	  “capable,	  at	  least	  potentially”,	  of	  hindering	  inter	  state	  trade.	  Certainly,	  the	  insertion	  of	  “at	  least	  potentially”	  can	  for	  instance	  be	  indicative	  of	  the	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  AG	  as	  to	  whether	  RES-­‐E	  was	  possible	  to	  import	  at	  all.195	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  obliged	  party	  claimed	  that	  it	  declined	  an	  offer	  of	  RES-­‐E	  from	  Sweden	  at	  a	  relatively	  low	  price	  due	  to	  the	  purchase	  obligation.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  ECJ	  –	  unlike	  AG196	  –	  neither	  categorized	  the	  measure	  as	  being	  discriminatory,	  distinct	  applicable	  or	  the	  like,	  nor	  examined	  whether	  it	  is	  of	  a	  discriminatory	  character.	  In	  my	  opinion	  the	  German	  FIT	  scheme	  is	  outright	  discriminatory	  and	  a	  distinctly	  applicable	  measure	  since	  it	  not	  only	  favours	  –	  which	  is	  sufficient197	  –	  but	  also	  explicitly	  prescribes	  the	  demand	  of	  domestic	  and	  regionally	  produced	  RES-­‐E.	  Since	  the	  sole	  function	  of	  establishing	  a	  discriminatory	  feature	  is	  to	  determine	  the	  amount	  and	  type	  of	  justification	  bases	  available,198	  the	  conscious	  avoidance	  in	  this	  regard	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  AG	  Opinion	  para	  195-­‐196	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	  	  193	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  para	  69-­‐70.	  	  194	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  para	  71.	  195	  Compare	  Delvaux	  2013:214	  para	  615	  according	  to	  which	  the	  courts	  conclusion	  on	  what	  the	  measure	  is	  potentially	  capable	  of	  is	  remarkable,	  since	  it	  undoubtedly	  favours	  the	  marketing	  of	  the	  RES-­‐E	  in	  question	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  imported	  electricity.	  In	  my	  opinion	  he	  mixes	  up	  the	  question	  of	  potential/real	  effect	  with	  the	  question	  of	  distinctly/non-­‐distinctly	  measures.	  	  196	  AG’s	  Opinion	  paras	  103,	  201-­‐205	  of	  the	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	  	  197	  See	  for	  instance	  Barnard	  2010:166f	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited	  on	  ”buy	  national”-­‐campaigns.	  198	  Jacobs	  2006:192	  who	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  the	  sole	  function	  of	  the	  indistinct/distinct	  classification	  and	  therefore	  a	  necessary	  first	  step.	  Compare	  Delvaux	  2013:216	  para	  621	  according	  to	  which	  an	  approach	  that	  do	  not	  distinguish	  between	  distinct/indistinct	  cannot	  take	  into	  account	  whether	  the	  measure	  at	  stake	  is	  appropriate	  or	  desirable	  for	  policy	  reasons.	  Compare	  also	  Krämer	  2011:113	  para	  3-­‐40	  according	  to	  which	  the	  discriminatory	  character	  of	  the	  measure	  in	  question	  ”could	  not	  really	  be	  put	  in	  doubt.	  The	  only	  explanation	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	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seem	  to	  serve	  ECJ’s	  preoccupation	  with	  finding	  the	  measure	  compatible	  with	  primary	  law.	  A	  preliminary	  conclusion,	  therefore,	  is	  that	  the	  measure	  amounts	  to	  a	  MEE	  but	  its	  discriminatory	  features	  are	  not	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  
2.1.3 Justification	  	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  measure	  nevertheless	  was	  compatible	  with	  article	  34,	  ECJ	  held	  that	  “account	  must	  be	  taken,	  first,	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  provisions	  in	  question,	  and,	  second,	  of	  the	  particular	  features	  of	  the	  electricity	  market.”199	  Although	  it	  is	  anything	  but	  clear,	  the	  ECJ	  have	  in	  a	  subsequent	  case200	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  review	  of	  “particular	  features”	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  proportionality	  assessment.	  	  	   Having	  assessed	  these	  aspects	  the	  ECJ	  concluded	  that,	  “in	  the	  current	  state	  of	  Community	  Law	  concerning	  the	  electricity	  market”,	  the	  German	  FIT	  law	  was	  not	  incompatible	  with	  article	  34	  TFEU.	  In	  the	  following	  the	  path	  toward	  this	  conclusion	  will	  be	  presented	  and	  discussed.	  	  
2.1.3.1 Justification	  bases	  	  Assessing	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  FIT	  law,	  the	  ECJ	  considered	  the	  use	  of	  RES-­‐E	  as	  “useful”	  for	  protecting	  the	  environment	  since	  it	  reduces	  GHG	  which	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  member	  states	  have	  pledged	  to	  combat.	  Reference	  is	  here	  made	  to	  both	  the	  international	  climate	  change	  regime	  (UNFCC	  and	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol)	  and	  the	  multiannual	  programme	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  in	  the	  Union	  (ALTENER)	  whose	  implementation	  amongst	  its	  priority	  objectives	  identify	  the	  growth	  of	  renewable	  energy	  use.	  Given	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  explicit	  basis	  for	  environmental	  protection	  under	  article	  36	  TFEU,	  this	  thread	  of	  justification	  is	  technically	  based	  on	  the	  mandatory	  requirements	  doctrine.	  According	  to	  the	  general	  principle,201	  only	  non-­‐distinctly	  measures	  can	  be	  justified	  under	  this	  heading.	  Since	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  measure	  in	  question	  is	  discriminatory,	  though	  not	  classified	  so	  by	  the	  ECJ,	  this	  thread	  of	  justification	  suggest	  that	  the	  court	  either	  will	  modify	  or	  abandon	  its	  previous	  case	  law	  to	  which	  it	  in	  the	  judgement	  also	  authoritatively	  refers.202	  	  	   However,	  the	  ECJ	  went	  further	  and	  added	  that	  “[i]t	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  that	  policy	  [UNFCC,	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  ALTENER]	  is	  also	  designed	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants.”203	  This	  brief	  and	  indirect	  reference	  to	  article	  36	  TFEU	  is	  interesting	  in	  several	  regards.	  Firstly,	  as	  indicated	  above	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  which	  will	  be	  elaborated	  below,	  the	  parties	  did	  not	  explicitly	  invoke	  this	  ground.	  Neither	  did	  the	  AG.	  Secondly,	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants	  may	  be	  interpreted	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Court	  considered	  the	  legislation	  to	  be	  a	  discrimination,	  but	  not	  an	  arbitrary	  discrimination.”	  Whilst	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  former	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  prolongation	  of	  the	  basic	  point	  made	  i.e.	  the	  availability	  of	  justification	  bases	  whose	  amount	  and	  type	  in	  effect	  consider	  the	  merits	  of	  policy	  reasons,	  Krämer	  seems	  to	  conflate	  the	  prohibition	  of	  arbitrary	  discrimination	  under	  article	  36	  TFEU	  with	  the	  initial	  classification.	  	  199	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  para	  72.	  	  200	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  para	  84.	  Compare	  Jacobs	  2006:191,	  who	  was	  the	  AG	  in	  
PreussenElektra,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  ECJ	  did	  not	  conduct	  any	  proportionality	  assessment.	  	  201	  Compare	  Kuhn	  2001:373f.	  See	  AG	  opinion	  para	  220,	  228	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	  202	  Case	  C-­‐21/88	  Du	  Pont	  de	  Nemours	  Italiana	  para	  14	  in	  which	  ECJ	  states	  that	  a	  discriminatory	  measure	  cannot	  be	  justified	  by	  way	  of	  the	  mandatory	  requirements	  doctrine.	  In	  the	  instant	  case,	  however,	  the	  reference	  is	  made	  in	  the	  context	  of	  assessing	  the	  issue	  of	  infringement.	  	  203	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  para	  75,	  my	  emphasis.	  	  
	   35	  
the	  effect	  that	  environmental	  protection	  is	  actually	  subsumed	  under	  article	  36	  TFEU.	  The	  starting	  point	  for	  such	  an	  interpretation	  would	  arguably	  seek	  to	  identify	  what	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  environment	  refers	  to.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  ontology	  or	  perspective	  deployed	  –	  eco-­‐centric	  or	  anthropocentric.	  Basically,	  the	  former	  seeks	  to	  protect	  the	  biosphere	  per	  se	  whilst	  the	  latter	  aim	  at	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  human	  life.	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  established	  definition	  within	  EU	  law	  on	  the	  precise	  meaning	  of	  environment,204	  one	  can	  nevertheless	  conclude	  that	  ECJ’s	  reference	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  at	  least	  comprises	  core	  anthropocentric	  elements.	  Assuming	  then	  that	  ECJ	  construes	  the	  reference	  to	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants	  broadly	  and	  conjunctively	  as	  opposed	  to	  disjunctively,205	  this	  thread	  of	  justification	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  subsuming	  environmental	  protection	  under	  article	  36.	  Furthermore,	  as	  the	  reference	  to	  this	  basis	  is	  situated	  between	  ECJ’s	  previous	  consideration	  of	  environmental	  protection	  and	  the	  subsequent	  reference	  to	  the	  environmental	  integration	  obligation,	  the	  internal	  structure	  of	  the	  judgment	  may	  also	  serve	  as	  authority	  for	  such	  a	  conclusion.	  If	  so,	  this	  may	  explain	  why	  ECJ	  invoked	  this	  basis	  in	  spite	  of	  not	  being	  invoked	  by	  the	  parties	  nor	  AG;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  this	  basis	  was	  already	  inherent	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  arguments	  put	  forth	  in	  substantiating	  environmental	  protection	  as	  a	  mandatory	  requirement.	  However,	  such	  a	  reading	  represents	  a	  radical206	  reorientation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  article	  34	  and	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  be	  established	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  formal	  clarification	  by	  ECJ.	  Thirdly,	  the	  features	  of	  climate	  change,	  especially	  its	  long-­‐term	  effects,	  may	  very	  well	  raise	  doubts	  on	  the	  approximate	  causation	  towards	  endangering	  health	  and	  life.	  ECJs’	  silent	  stance	  could	  certainly	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  possible	  application	  of	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  in	  article	  192(2)	  TFEU.	  This	  principle	  were	  interpreted	  in	  United	  
Kingdom	  v	  Commission	  as	  allowing	  action	  to	  be	  taken	  “[w]here	  there	  is	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  existence	  or	  extent	  of	  the	  risks	  to	  human	  health	  …	  without	  having	  to	  wait	  until	  the	  reality	  and	  seriousness	  of	  those	  risks	  become	  fully	  apparent.”207	  This	  and	  several	  other	  cases	  nevertheless	  concerns	  measures	  related	  to	  assumingly	  more	  immediate	  harm,	  in	  contrast	  to	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  climate	  change,	  arising	  for	  instance	  from	  BSE	  transmission	  (the	  so-­‐called	  mad	  cow	  disease),208	  foodstuffs	  containing	  unlawful	  nutrients209,	  cosmetic	  protects.210	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  first	  and	  the	  latter	  aspects	  are	  evident,	  fourthly,	  in	  both	  the	  burden	  of	  proof211	  resting	  on	  the	  party	  alleging	  this	  justification	  basis	  to	  be	  applicable	  and	  the	  rigorous	  proportionality	  assessment	  to	  be	  undertaken	  by	  the	  court.212	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  parties	  did	  not	  invoke	  this	  basis	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  204	  de	  Sadeleer	  2014:7.	  See	  also	  Langlet	  and	  Mahmoudi	  2011:53.	  	  205	  See	  Gormley	  2009:465	  para	  11.69	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited	  which	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  even	  though	  the	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans	  is	  ranked	  first	  among	  the	  interests	  considered	  protected	  by	  the	  treaties.	  See	  also	  the	  suggestion	  by	  Johnston	  et	  al	  2008:135	  on	  the	  conjunctive	  approach	  ECJ	  explicitly	  may	  pursue	  in	  order	  to	  include	  environmental	  protection	  under	  article	  36.	  	  206	  Barnard	  2010:162.	  	  207	  C-­‐180/96	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Commission	  99.	  	  208	  C-­‐180/96	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Commission.	  	  209	  C-­‐192/01	  Commission	  v	  Denmark.	  	  210	  T-­‐199/96	  Labaratoires	  pharmaceutiques	  Bergaderm.	  	  211	  Oliver	  2010:221.	  212	  Oliver	  2010:226,	  259.	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accordingly	  had	  no	  burden	  of	  proof	  in	  this	  regard	  did	  apparently	  neither	  prevent	  ECJ	  from	  considering	  the	  basis	  to	  be	  applicable	  nor	  subject	  it	  to	  any	  explicit	  proportionality	  review.	  	  	   Having	  established	  the	  two	  justification	  bases,	  the	  ECJ	  mentioned	  the	  obligation	  to	  integrate	  environmental	  protection	  requirements	  into	  the	  definition	  and	  implementation	  of	  Community	  policies	  and	  activities.	  ECJ	  notes	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  proceedings	  this	  obligation	  was	  contained	  in	  article	  130r(2)	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  but	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  judgement	  included	  in	  article	  6	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  and	  there	  elevated	  to	  its	  “principles”.213	  Given	  ECJ’s	  vague	  reasoning	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  grasp	  what	  it	  wanted	  to	  communicate	  by	  mentioning	  the	  environmental	  integration	  requirement	  and	  its	  elevation	  to	  principle.214	  According	  to	  the	  AG	  the	  requirement	  “is	  not	  merely	  programmatic;	  it	  imposes	  legal	  obligations.”	  However,	  in	  the	  AG’s	  opinion	  this	  requirement	  is	  submitted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  justifying	  directly	  discriminatory	  measures.215	  Additionally,	  the	  integration	  requirement	  as	  such	  seems	  to	  impose	  obligations	  on	  the	  Union	  legislator,	  not	  on	  the	  adjudication	  of	  the	  treaty	  rules	  concerning	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  exhaustive	  harmonisation.216	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  opinion	  by	  the	  AG	  provide	  the	  opposite	  angle.	  	  Since	  the	  ECJ	  neither	  classifies	  the	  measure	  as	  being	  discriminatory	  nor	  explains	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  integration	  requirement,	  its	  relevance	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  remains	  obscure.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  environmental	  integration	  obligation	  is	  mentioned	  but	  not	  other	  cross-­‐sectorial	  integration	  provisions	  on	  health	  and	  animal	  welfare217	  may	  however	  suggest	  a	  hierarchy	  in	  which	  environmental	  protection	  rank	  higher	  than	  the	  simultaneously	  applicable	  article	  36	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  justifying	  the	  measure.	  Again,	  this	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  subsumtion	  of	  environmental	  protection	  under	  article	  36.	  ECJ	  then	  make	  two	  references	  to	  the	  Electricity	  directive218.	  Firstly,	  it	  mentions	  articles	  8(3)	  and	  11(3)	  according	  to	  which	  a	  member	  state	  for	  environmental	  reasons	  may	  require	  TSOs	  and/or	  DSOs,	  “when	  dispatching	  generating	  installations,	  to	  give	  priority	  to	  generating	  installations	  using	  RES”.	  These	  provisions	  basically	  enable	  a	  prioritized	  access	  to	  the	  electricity	  grid.219	  The	  priority	  dismantling	  mechanism	  was	  indeed	  utilized	  by	  most	  member	  states	  prior	  to	  the	  Directive.220	  Several	  commentators	  have	  taken	  the	  view	  that	  the	  mechanism	  as	  such,	  namely	  without	  any	  provisions	  on	  financing,	  would	  not	  significantly	  affect	  the	  promotion	  of	  RES-­‐E.221	  These	  provisions	  were	  also	  submitted	  by	  several	  of	  the	  governmental	  and	  intervening	  parties	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  measure.	  It	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  how	  their	  arguments	  were	  constructed.	  What	  is	  clear	  however	  is	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  these	  arguments	  were	  dismantled	  by	  AG.	  According	  to	  him	  these	  provisions,	  first,	  “must	  be	  interpreted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  para	  76.	  	  214	  See	  also	  Dhondt	  2003:163.	  	  215	  AG	  opinion	  para	  230-­‐233	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra,	  Jacobs	  2006:191.	  	  216	  Johnston	  2008:134.	  See	  also	  Dhondt	  2003:183.	  	  217	  See	  protocol	  on	  protection	  and	  welfare	  of	  animals	  and	  art.	  129	  of	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  Amending	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  European	  Union,	  the	  Treaties	  Establishing	  the	  European	  Communities	  and	  Certain	  Related	  Acts.	  	  218	  Directive	  96/92/EC.	  	  219	  Compare	  Heinen	  2001:95.	  	  220	  Cameron	  2002:149,	  para.	  414	  221	  Cross,	  Hancher	  and	  Slot	  2001:316	  para	  5.307	  and	  Cameron	  2002:149,	  para	  414.	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narrowly	  as	  exceptions	  to	  the	  general	  non-­‐discrimination	  rule	  in	  Articles	  8(2)	  and	  11(2)”,	  and	  second,	  “allow	  only	  distinctions	  between	  different	  modes	  of	  production	  of	  electricity.”	  Since	  the	  measure	  favoured	  domestic	  electricity	  over	  imported	  electricity	  of	  the	  same	  type	  the	  AG	  concluded	  that	  they	  could	  not	  be	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  provisions.222	  Apparently,	  the	  ECJ	  must	  have	  come	  to	  another	  conclusion	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  these	  provisions.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  amplification	  the	  potential	  relevance	  remains	  ambiguous.	  However,	  it	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  that	  the	  reference	  is	  merely	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  strategy	  to	  establish	  environmental	  protection	  as	  the	  main	  thread	  of	  justification,	  which	  leads	  me	  to	  the	  second	  reference	  to	  the	  Electricity	  directive	  and	  the	  proportionality	  assessment.	  	  
2.1.3.2 Proportionality	  	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  consideration	  of	  the	  “particular	  features	  of	  the	  electricity	  market”	  is	  in	  effect	  a	  proportionality	  assessment	  i.e.	  whether	  the	  means	  are	  appropriate	  for	  achieving	  the	  legitimate	  objective	  pursued	  and	  necessary	  for	  those	  purposes.	  	  	   In	  this	  regard	  the	  ECJ	  noted	  that	  according	  to	  the	  39th	  recital	  of	  the	  then	  applicable	  Electricity	  directive,	  it	  constituted	  only	  a	  further	  phase	  in	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  and	  left	  some	  obstacles	  to	  Inter-­‐state	  trade	  at	  place.	  Considered	  de	  jure,	  the	  statement	  simply	  seems	  to	  legitimize	  other	  distortions	  than	  those	  arising	  from	  the	  monopolistic	  market	  structures	  of	  the	  electricity	  sector	  which	  the	  directive	  primarily	  targets.	  However,	  if	  considered	  de	  facto,	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  a	  stance	  would	  imply	  that	  to	  the	  extent	  the	  electricity	  market	  is	  not	  fully	  liberalised,	  further	  distortions	  on	  environmental	  grounds	  would	  be	  permissible.	  This	  is	  a	  self-­‐defeating	  and	  circulatory	  reasoning	  since	  it	  would	  justify	  distortions	  to	  trade	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  very	  same	  distortions.	  	  	  	  	   Secondly,	  the	  ECJ	  found	  that	  “the	  nature	  of	  electricity	  is	  such	  that,	  once	  it	  has	  been	  allowed	  into	  the	  transmission	  or	  distribution	  system,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  its	  origin	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  source	  of	  energy	  from	  which	  it	  was	  produced.”223	  In	  this	  regard	  reference	  is	  made	  to	  the	  view	  taken	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  its	  proposal	  for	  RED	  2001	  where	  a	  system	  of	  guarantees	  of	  origin	  for	  renewable	  electricity,	  capable	  of	  being	  subject	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  among	  member	  states,	  is	  essential	  in	  order	  to	  make	  trade	  in	  that	  type	  of	  electricity	  reliable	  as	  well	  as	  practically	  possible.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  system,	  one	  must	  assume,	  the	  purported	  “nature	  of	  electricity”	  will	  inevitably	  justify	  the	  obstacles	  to	  intra-­‐Union	  trade	  provided	  by	  the	  measure.	  	  
2.1.3.3 Energy	  security?	  AG’s	  opinion	  According	  to	  inter	  alia	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  German	  government	  the	  measure	  should	  be	  justified	  on	  basis	  of	  security	  of	  supply	  concerns	  by	  virtue	  of	  public	  security	  under	  article	  36	  and	  the	  former	  applicable	  Electricity	  directive.224	  Whilst	  the	  ECJ	  in	  principle	  acknowledges	  the	  possibility	  of	  justifying	  the	  measure	  by	  reference	  to	  environmental	  protection,	  it	  disregarded	  the	  justification	  basis	  advanced	  in	  respect	  of	  security	  of	  supply	  concerns.	  The	  neglect	  of	  a	  legal	  basis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  222	  AG	  opinion	  para	  214	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	  223	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  para	  79.	  	  224	  AG	  Opinion	  para	  207	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	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actually	  raised	  by	  the	  parties	  implies	  that	  the	  basis	  under	  no	  circumstances	  could	  be	  applicable	  under	  the	  present	  conditions.	  The	  dismissive	  opinion	  of	  AG	  must	  under	  these	  conditions225	  be	  considered	  as	  highly	  indicative	  as	  to	  the	  principal	  possibility	  to	  invoke	  security	  of	  supply	  concerns.	  	  Two	  specific	  legal	  grounds	  were	  invoked	  in	  order	  to	  substantiate	  the	  justification	  on	  security	  of	  supply	  concerns.	  Firstly,	  it	  was	  contended	  that	  security	  of	  electricity	  supply	  concerns	  as	  such	  were	  included	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  security	  under	  article	  36	  TFEU.	  Secondly,	  article	  8(4)	  of	  the	  former	  applicable	  Electricity	  Directive	  was	  invoked,	  providing:	  	   A	  Member	  State	  may,	  for	  reasons	  of	  security	  of	  supply,	  direct	  that	  priority	  be	  given	  to	  the	  dispatch	  of	  generating	  installations	  using	  indigenous	  primary	  energy	  fuel	  sources	  to	  an	  extent	  not	  exceeding	  in	  any	  calendar	  year	  15%	  of	  the	  overall	  primary	  energy	  necessary	  to	  produce	  the	  electricity	  consumed	  in	  the	  Member	  State	  concerned.	  	  This	  provision	  remains	  unchanged	  in	  article	  15(4)	  of	  the	  Electricity	  directive	  currently	  in	  force.	  Essentially,	  the	  provision	  enables	  a	  prioritized	  access	  to	  the	  grid	  of	  the	  production	  installations	  concerned	  and	  targets	  the	  TSO.226	  AG	  dismissed	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  provision	  on	  two	  grounds.	  Firstly,	  the	  article	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  interpreted	  strictly	  since	  it	  constituted	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  main	  rule	  in	  article	  8(2)	  providing	  objective,	  transparent	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory	  criteria.	  More	  precisely,	  wind	  in	  AG’s	  opinion	  constituted	  neither	  a	  “fuel	  source”	  nor	  an	  “indigenous”	  commodity	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  article’s	  wording.	  Secondly,	  in	  his	  view	  this	  article	  allowed	  “differential	  treatment	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  primary	  energy	  fuel	  sources	  used	  and	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  location	  of	  the	  generation	  installation.”227	  Although	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  reasoning	  is	  correct	  in	  my	  view,	  the	  validity	  of	  not	  classifying	  wind	  as	  an	  indigenous	  source	  could	  be	  questioned,	  at	  least	  in	  light	  of	  the	  subsequent	  policy	  developments	  and	  considering	  the	  Commission’s	  stance	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  AG	  rejected	  the	  possibility	  to	  invoke	  energy	  security	  concerns	  pertaining	  to	  public	  security	  under	  article	  36.	  While	  acknowledging	  the	  possibility	  of	  recourse	  to	  article	  36	  provided	  by	  Campus	  oil,	  the	  AG	  nevertheless	  found	  it	  doubtful	  whether	  this	  was	  still	  possible	  in	  light	  of	  the	  measures	  allowed	  under	  the	  aforementioned	  Directive	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  security	  of	  supply.228	  Additionally,	  wind	  as	  an	  energy	  source	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  less	  importance	  than	  petroleum	  products	  for	  the	  modern	  economy,	  which	  was	  a	  decisive	  factor	  in	  the	  ECJ’s	  “rather	  exceptional	  judgement	  in	  Campus	  Oil.”	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  FIT	  law	  in	  question	  “pursues	  essentially	  environmental	  objectives	  and	  the	  admittedly	  positive	  consequences	  for	  security	  of	  energy	  supply	  are	  only	  side-­‐effects	  of	  the	  Law	  in	  issue.”229	  In	  any	  event,	  AG	  continued,	  the	  measure	  might	  be	  found	  incompatible	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  and	  the	  second	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  See	  Hettne	  and	  Otken	  Eriksson	  2011:116f	  on	  when	  the	  opinion	  of	  AG	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  source	  of	  law.	  	  226	  See	  also	  Hancher	  and	  Salerno	  2012:390.	  	  227	  AG	  opinon	  para	  208	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	  228	  The	  backdrop	  is	  Case	  72/83	  Campus	  oil	  para	  27	  according	  to	  which	  ”[r]ecourse	  to	  article	  36	  is	  no	  longer	  justified	  if	  Community	  rules	  provide	  for	  the	  necessary	  measures	  to	  ensure	  protection	  of	  the	  interests	  set	  out	  in	  that	  article.”	  	  229	  AG	  Opinion	  para	  209	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	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sentence	  of	  article	  36.	  More	  specifically,	  it	  was	  considered	  unclear	  whether	  the	  exclusion	  of	  renewable	  energy	  produced	  in	  other	  member	  states	  contributed	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  security	  of	  supply	  whereby	  it	  might	  be	  liable	  of	  arbitrary	  discrimination	  against	  RES-­‐E	  from	  other	  member	  states.	  	  	   The	  AG’s	  reasoning	  is	  straightforward	  and	  in	  my	  view	  correct	  but	  it	  might	  nevertheless	  be	  questioned	  whether	  the	  limitation	  to	  wind	  and	  not	  RES-­‐E	  in	  general	  is	  the	  appropriate	  point	  of	  reference.	  Although	  the	  specific	  area	  in	  which	  Schleswag	  operated	  presented	  ideal	  conditions	  for	  RES-­‐E	  based	  on	  wind,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  law	  in	  question	  is	  wider	  and	  comprises	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  from	  at	  least	  water,	  wind,	  sun	  and	  biomass.230	  This	  would	  hardly	  have	  altered	  AG’s	  assessment	  but	  nevertheless	  constitutes	  an	  unduly	  limitation	  in	  my	  opinion.	  	  
2.1.4 Preliminary	  assessment	  	  The	  approach	  employed	  by	  the	  ECJ	  is	  highly	  favourable	  towards	  the	  measure	  assessed.	  The	  prima	  facie	  discriminatory	  character	  of	  the	  FIT	  law	  is	  not	  examined	  and	  it	  is	  furthermore	  justified	  by	  an	  exceptional	  two-­‐tier	  justification	  approach,	  largely	  based	  on	  environmental	  protection	  concerns	  considering	  the	  other	  subordinated	  but	  seldom	  elaborated	  references.	  Energy	  security	  concerns	  are	  disregarded.	  The	  invoking	  of	  article	  36	  TFEU	  without	  explicitly	  taking	  into	  account	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  aspects	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  its	  creative	  and	  lam	  making	  role.231	  The	  seemingly	  common	  perception	  that	  “the	  ECJ	  closely	  scrutinizes	  such	  claims	  […and]	  will	  also	  closely	  examine	  the	  arguments	  concerning	  public	  health	  to	  determine	  whether	  they	  make	  sense	  on	  the	  facts”232	  is	  thus	  not	  an	  accurate	  description	  of	  ECJ’s	  approach	  in	  this	  particular	  case.	  Nevertheless,	  considering	  that	  the	  measure	  in	  question	  is	  prima	  facie	  discriminatory,	  invoking	  article	  36	  may	  have	  been	  considered	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  measure	  under	  the	  traditional	  approach	  –	  albeit	  the	  approach	  employed	  is	  anything	  but	  traditional.	  However,	  by	  confining	  the	  conclusion	  to	  how	  the	  “Community	  law	  currently	  stands”,	  assumingly	  comprising	  the	  particular	  features	  of	  the	  electricity	  market,	  the	  ECJ	  suggests	  that	  it	  will	  reconsider	  its	  approach	  in	  light	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  regulatory	  landscape.	  	  	  
2.2 Ålands	  vindkraft:	  TGC	  scheme	  	  
2.2.1 Background	  and	  measure	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  legal	  environment	  in	  PreussenElektra,	  the	  judgement	  in	  Ålands	  
Vindkraft	  was	  rendered	  in	  the	  immediate	  context	  of	  Union	  legislation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  RES-­‐E	  promotion,	  namely	  RED	  2009.	  The	  Swedish	  legislator	  adopted	  a	  TGC	  scheme	  intended	  inter	  alia	  to	  transpose	  the	  Directive	  into	  Swedish	  law.	  Under	  the	  law,	  approved	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  located	  in	  Sweden	  are	  awarded	  a	  certificate	  per	  MWh	  RES-­‐E	  produced.	  These	  certificates	  are	  tradable	  on	  an	  open	  and	  competitive	  market	  where	  price	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  interplay	  of	  supply	  and	  demand.	  Demand	  for	  certificates	  stems	  from	  a	  quota	  obligation	  placed	  upon	  electricity	  suppliers,	  and	  certain	  electricity	  users	  corresponding	  to	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  total	  volume	  electricity	  supplied	  or	  used	  respectively.	  A	  specific	  fee	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  AG	  opinion	  para	  25	  and	  48	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	  231	  For	  a	  general	  account,	  see	  for	  instance	  Hettne	  and	  Otken	  Eriksson	  2012:49.	  	  232	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2011:673.	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imposed	  in	  the	  event	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  quota	  obligation.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  international	  agreement	  coordinating	  the	  Swedish	  TGC	  scheme	  with	  a	  TGC	  scheme	  of	  another	  state	  (such	  as	  the	  one	  between	  Norway	  and	  Sweden),	  the	  quota	  obligation	  was	  possible	  to	  fulfil	  only	  by	  certificates	  issued	  under	  the	  Swedish	  TGC	  law.	  The	  purchase	  price	  for	  certificate	  is	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  consumers.	  	  Ålands	  Vindkraft,	  a	  RES-­‐E	  producer	  located	  in	  the	  Åland	  archipelago	  in	  Finland,	  sought	  approval	  by	  the	  Swedish	  Energy	  Agency	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  being	  granted	  tradable	  certificates.	  The	  application	  was	  however	  refused	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  only	  RES-­‐E	  production	  installations	  located	  in	  Sweden	  were	  eligible	  for	  certificates,	  whereby	  Ålands	  Vindkraft	  took	  action	  for	  annulment	  of	  that	  decision	  and	  approval	  of	  its	  application.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  territorial	  restraint	  of	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  at	  first	  sight	  seems	  to	  be	  of	  prime	  concern	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  analysing	  the	  compatibility	  with	  articles	  34	  and	  36	  TFEU,	  the	  question	  formulated	  by	  the	  referring	  court	  was	  basically	  whether	  the	  whole	  scheme	  as	  constituted	  by	  the	  elements	  outlined	  above,	  was	  compatible	  with	  article	  34.233	  Thus,	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  in	  general	  is	  the	  measure	  subject	  to	  ECJ’s	  review.	  	  
2.2.2 Classification	  of	  the	  measure	  	  ECJ	  quite	  briefly	  identified	  the	  starting	  point,	  recalling	  the	  Dassonville	  formula	  while	  also	  referring	  to	  PreussenElektra	  employing	  it.	  Applying	  this	  formula	  ECJ,	  again	  omitting	  the	  “trading	  rules”	  element,	  found	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  “the	  legislation	  at	  issue	  is	  capable,	  in	  various	  ways,	  of	  hindering	  –	  at	  least	  indirectly	  and	  potentially	  –	  imports	  of	  electricity,	  especially	  green	  electricity,	  from	  other	  Member	  States.”234	  Unlike	  “various	  ways”	  may	  suggest,	  the	  infringement	  is	  ascertained	  in	  two	  distinct	  but	  seemingly	  interrelated	  means.	  	  Firstly,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  inter	  alia	  an	  international	  agreement	  to	  that	  effect,	  only	  certificates	  issued	  under	  the	  national	  scheme	  can	  meet	  the	  quota	  obligation.	  The	  suppliers	  and	  consumers	  subject	  to	  the	  quota	  obligation	  would	  therefore	  as	  a	  rule	  have	  to	  purchase	  such	  national	  certificates	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  electricity	  imported,	  failing	  which	  they	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  a	  specific	  fee.	  	  Such	  a	  construction	  was	  considered	  capable	  of	  impeding	  electricity	  imports.	  	  Secondly,	  although	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  may	  trade	  their	  certificates	  on	  an	  open	  and	  competitive	  market,	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  does	  not	  preclude	  producers	  from	  selling	  the	  certificates	  together	  with	  the	  electricity	  they	  produce	  –	  as	  a	  package.	  The	  mere	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  possibility,	  ECJ	  continues,	  “seems	  capable	  in	  practice	  of	  facilitating	  the	  opening	  of	  negotiations	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  contractual	  relationships”	  whereby	  suppliers	  and	  users	  are	  able	  to	  obtain	  a	  package	  of	  both	  the	  electricity	  and	  the	  certificates	  needed.235	  Also	  in	  this	  regard,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  The	  referring	  court	  also	  asked,	  firstly,	  whether	  the	  Swedish	  TGC	  scheme	  was	  allowed	  by	  the	  RED	  2009,	  and	  secondly,	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  article	  34	  did	  not	  preclude	  the	  scheme	  at	  hand,	  whether	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  territorial	  restraint	  did	  not	  follow	  explicitly	  from	  the	  law	  itself	  but	  from	  its	  preparatory	  work	  and	  previous	  law	  affected	  the	  assessment.	  Whilst	  the	  affirmative	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  question	  is	  the	  very	  starting	  point	  of	  this	  essay	  and	  hence	  not	  subject	  to	  doubt	  in	  the	  authors	  view,	  the	  second	  question	  does	  not	  raise	  substantial	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  design.	  For	  those	  reasons,	  none	  of	  these	  questions	  and	  corresponding	  answers	  will	  be	  further	  analysed	  here.	  	  234	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  para	  67.	  	  235	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  paras	  71-­‐72.	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ECJ	  reasoned,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Swedish	  support	  scheme	  at	  least	  potentially	  restrained	  electricity	  imports.	  This	  finding	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  reference	  to	  previous	  case	  law	  on	  “Buy	  national”-­‐campaigns	  supported	  by	  the	  Irish	  Government.	  Additionally,	  referring	  to	  the	  Angry	  Farmer-­‐case,	  ECJ	  in	  particular	  noted	  “that	  a	  failure	  by	  a	  Member	  State	  to	  adopt	  adequate	  measures	  to	  prevent	  barriers	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  that	  have	  been	  created,	  in	  particular,	  through	  the	  actions	  of	  traders	  but	  made	  possible	  by	  specific	  legislation	  that	  that	  State	  has	  introduced,	  is	  just	  likely	  to	  obstruct	  intra-­‐Community	  trade	  as	  is	  a	  positive	  act.”236	  Against	  this	  background	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  constituted	  an	  MEE	  and	  was	  in	  principle	  incompatible	  with	  the	  obligations	  under	  article	  34,	  unless	  objectively	  justified.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  PreussenElektra,	  the	  measure	  at	  hand	  does	  not	  explicitly	  prescribe	  the	  purchase	  of	  domestic	  RES-­‐E.	  It	  is	  therefore	  perfectly	  reasonable	  for	  ECJ	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  means	  in	  which	  article	  34	  prima	  facie	  are	  breached.	  In	  contrast	  to	  ECJ’s	  stance,	  the	  AG,	  having	  found	  that	  the	  certificates	  “indisputably	  confers	  an	  economic	  advantage,”	  concluded	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  impossible	  for	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  located	  in	  other	  member	  states	  to	  have	  access	  to	  such	  a	  scheme	  when	  they	  exported	  RES-­‐E	  constituted	  “a	  discriminatory	  restriction”	  as	  such	  prohibited	  by	  article	  34	  TFEU.237	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  ECJ,	  unlike	  the	  AG,	  does	  not	  characterize	  the	  measure	  as	  being	  discriminatory.	  Although	  the	  effects	  by	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  on	  intra-­‐Union	  trade	  may	  be	  framed	  differently,	  as	  displayed	  by	  the	  different	  conceptualisation	  by	  ECJ	  and	  AG,	  the	  scheme	  is	  in	  my	  opinion	  clearly	  discriminatory	  since	  it	  in	  law	  and	  in	  fact	  has	  a	  different	  burden	  for	  domestic	  and	  imported	  RES-­‐E.	  This	  may,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  infringement	  assessment	  in	  PreussenElektra,	  be	  read	  so	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  ECJ	  is	  preoccupied	  with	  justifying	  the	  measure.	  
2.2.3 Justification	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  ambiguous	  reasoning	  in	  PreussenElektra,	  the	  ECJ	  clarify	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  that	  it	  has	  “consistently	  held”	  that	  MEEs/QRs	  may	  be	  justified	  on	  one	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  grounds	  listed	  in	  article	  36	  TFEU	  or	  by	  mandatory/overriding	  requirements.238	  In	  either	  case,	  ECJ	  continues	  in	  even	  sharper	  contrast	  to	  the	  approach	  in	  PreussenElektra,	  the	  measure	  must	  comply	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  i.e.	  be	  appropriate	  for	  achieving	  the	  objective	  pursued	  and	  not	  go	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  attain	  that	  objective.	  While	  the	  former	  part	  amounts	  to	  6	  paragraphs	  in	  the	  judgement,	  the	  latter	  amounts	  to	  37	  –	  signalling	  thereby	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  jurisprudential	  devices	  employed.	  	   Having	  established	  the	  justification	  bases	  and	  undertaken	  the	  proportionality	  assessment,	  the	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  was	  not	  precluded	  by	  article	  34	  TFEU.	  In	  the	  following	  the	  path	  toward	  this	  conclusion	  will	  be	  presented	  and	  discussed.	  
2.2.3.1 Justification	  bases	  	  The	  Swedish	  Energy	  Agency,	  as	  well	  as	  all	  governments	  which	  had	  submitted	  observations,	  argued	  that	  the	  justifications	  established	  in	  PreussenElektra	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  para	  74.	  	  237	  AG	  opinion	  para	  76	  in	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	  	  238	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  para	  76.	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applied	  equally	  to	  the	  measure	  in	  question.	  The	  AG	  did	  not	  share	  this	  view	  since	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  regulatory	  framework,	  in	  his	  view,	  necessitated	  a	  review	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  debate.239	  However,	  the	  ECJ	  basically	  adhered	  to	  the	  governmental	  view.	  	  Both	  the	  establishment	  and	  the	  reasoning	  in	  respect	  of	  principal	  justification	  bases	  nearly	  duplicate	  the	  ones	  employed	  in	  PreussenElektra	  to	  which	  the	  ECJ	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  also	  refers.	  Accordingly,	  the	  ECJ	  notes,	  the	  use	  of	  RES-­‐E	  is	  useful	  for	  environmental	  protection	  and	  the	  increase	  of	  that	  usage	  is,	  “as	  is	  explained,	  in	  particular,	  in	  recital	  1”	  to	  RED	  2009,	  one	  of	  the	  important	  components	  to	  comply	  with	  obligations	  pertaining	  to	  the	  international	  climate	  change	  regime	  and	  other	  external	  as	  well	  as	  internal	  commitments.240	  The	  fact	  that	  energy	  from	  RES	  according	  to	  the	  very	  same	  recital	  also	  have	  an	  important	  role	  in	  promoting	  security	  of	  energy	  supply	  is	  clearly	  not	  considered.	  Secondly,	  the	  increased	  usage	  is	  also	  considered	  designed	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants	  under	  article	  36	  TFEU.	  However,	  ECJ	  also	  invokes	  the	  new	  energy	  provision	  in	  article	  194(1)(c)	  TFEU	  which	  in	  its	  interpretation	  makes	  it	  clear	  “that	  the	  development	  of	  renewable	  energy	  is	  one	  of	  the	  objectives	  that	  must	  guide	  EU	  energy	  policy.”241	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations,	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  promoting	  the	  use	  of	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  is	  in	  principle	  capable	  of	  justifying	  barriers	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	  	  	  
2.2.3.2 Proportionality	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  proportionality	  the	  ECJ	  found	  it	  appropriate	  initially	  to	  review	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  that	  it	  took	  into	  consideration	  in	  
PreussenElektra.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  court	  seemingly	  follows	  the	  approach	  recommended	  by	  AG	  but	  depart	  on	  how	  the	  substantial	  issues	  are	  assessed.	  In	  the	  AG’s	  view	  discriminatory	  national	  measures	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  justify	  on	  environmental	  protection	  grounds	  “provided,	  however,	  that	  it	  undergoes	  a	  particularly	  rigorous	  proportionality	  test”,	  one	  described	  as	  reinforced.242	  The	  development	  of	  two	  new	  factors	  underlie	  AG’s	  scepticism	  of	  the	  continued	  relevance	  of	  the	  PreussenElektra	  judgement	  and	  those	  are	  also	  assessed	  by	  ECJ.	  	  Firstly,	  in	  line	  with	  AG’s	  opinion,	  the	  legal	  context	  in	  which	  the	  first	  Electricity	  directive	  operated	  and	  constituted	  a	  further	  liberalisation	  that	  nevertheless	  left	  some	  obstacles	  to	  trade	  in	  place	  was	  considered	  no	  longer	  true.	  This	  was	  so	  due	  to	  the	  various	  legislative	  instruments	  that	  have	  been	  adopted	  since	  PreussenElektra	  in	  order	  to	  gradually	  dismantle	  the	  barriers	  so	  as	  to	  enable	  a	  fully	  operational	  internal	  electricity	  market.243	  	  	   Secondly,	  the	  dictum	  in	  PreussenElektra	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  electricity	  is	  such	  that	  once	  it	  has	  been	  allowed	  into	  the	  transmission/distribution	  system	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  its	  origin	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  source	  of	  energy	  from	  which	  it	  was	  produced,	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  continuing	  validity.	  The	  fact	  that	  GO’s	  had	  been	  established,	  the	  absence	  of	  which	  was	  decisive	  for	  the	  outcome	  in	  PreussenElektra	  according	  to	  AG,244	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  AG	  opinion	  paras	  81-­‐82	  in	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	  240	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  para	  79.	  	  241	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  para	  81.	  	  242	  AG	  opinion	  para	  79	  in	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	  243	  Compare	  Kröger	  2013:389	  on	  the	  actual	  developments	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  for	  electricity.	  	  244	  AG	  opinion	  para	  90	  in	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	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not	  in	  the	  courts	  view	  capable	  of	  calling	  that	  finding	  into	  question.	  The	  ECJ	  submitted	  two	  arguments	  in	  this	  regard	  –	  one	  of	  legal,	  the	  other	  of	  factual/empirical	  character.	  Firstly,	  pursuant	  to	  the	  RED	  2009,	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  GO’s	  is	  to	  indicate	  to	  final	  customers	  the	  proportion	  of	  RES	  in	  the	  suppliers	  energy	  mix.	  Secondly,	  the	  systematic	  identification	  of	  RES-­‐E	  at	  the	  distribution	  and	  transmission	  level	  remained	  difficult	  to	  put	  into	  practice	  due	  to	  the	  fungible	  nature	  of	  electricity	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  GO’s	  to	  confirm	  that	  a	  certain	  electricity	  volume	  in	  the	  grid	  is	  produced	  from	  RES.	  	  Although	  the	  legal	  argument	  on	  the	  function	  of	  GO’s	  as	  such	  is	  correct	  in	  my	  view,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  used	  –	  as	  predicted	  by	  AG	  –	  to	  justify	  infringement	  of	  primary	  law	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  wording	  of	  a	  lower-­‐ranking	  source	  of	  law.	  In	  particular,	  the	  absence	  of	  GO’s	  seemed	  decisive	  in	  the	  PreussenElektra	  judgement	  which	  took	  into	  account	  the	  discussions	  held	  at	  Union	  level	  aiming	  to	  introduce	  GO’s	  and	  explicitly	  confined	  the	  outcome	  to	  how	  the	  EU	  law	  “currently	  stood”.	  Thus,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  much	  more	  frank	  by	  the	  ECJ	  to	  state	  that	  it	  in	  PreussenElektra	  misunderstood	  the	  potential	  function	  of	  GO’s	  (after	  all,	  their	  introduction	  and	  substance	  was	  merely	  discussed)	  and/or	  to	  clarify	  that	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  measure(s)	  at	  hand	  cannot	  in	  itself	  depend	  upon	  the	  possibility	  to	  distinguish	  RES-­‐E	  from	  grey	  electricity.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  clarification	  and	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  ECJ’s	  empirical	  argument	  is	  correct	  and	  indeed	  will	  remain	  correct	  for	  a	  considerable	  time	  ahead,	  the	  principal	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  regarding	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design	  will	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  be	  significant.	  	  	  However,	  having	  taken	  account	  to	  these	  “preliminary	  considerations”	  since	  PreussenElektra,	  ECJ	  went	  on	  and	  assessed	  core	  features	  of	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  at	  hand,	  namely	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  and	  the	  quota	  obligation.	  The	  territorial	  limitation,	  in	  my	  view	  outright	  discriminatory,	  was	  the	  very	  basis	  for	  the	  proceedings	  initiated.	  Several	  general	  and	  interrelated	  arguments	  were	  pursued	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  territorial	  restriction	  of	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  concerned	  and	  all	  were	  underpinned	  by	  a	  general	  reference	  to	  environmental	  protection.245	  The	  first	  argument	  was	  based	  on	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  the	  support	  scheme	  and	  not	  to	  comprise	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  member	  states	  to	  meet	  their	  national	  target.	  The	  second	  argument	  held	  that	  cross-­‐border	  trade	  in	  electricity	  requires	  the	  prior	  conclusion	  of	  a	  international	  cooperation	  agreement	  between	  the	  member	  states	  concerned.	  Thirdly,	  it	  was	  contented	  that	  any	  prohibition	  on	  territorial	  restrictions	  would	  cause	  the	  member	  states	  to	  lose	  control	  over	  their	  energy	  mix.	  The	  fourth	  argument	  was	  that	  electricity	  producers	  located	  in	  other	  member	  states	  would	  be	  free	  to	  select	  the	  support	  scheme	  that	  was	  most	  favourable	  to	  them	  and	  that	  this	  would	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  ‘à	  la	  carte’	  support	  and	  even	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  obtain	  support	  from	  two	  national	  schemes.	  Finally,	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  making	  support	  schemes	  accessible	  to	  foreign	  electricity	  production	  would	  have	  the	  consequence	  of	  forcing	  national	  consumers	  to	  finance	  green	  energy	  production	  installations	  located	  in	  other	  Member	  States.	  The	  AG	  dismissed	  all	  of	  the	  arguments	  put	  forward	  and	  concluded	  that	  none	  of	  the	  arguments	  relied	  on	  is	  capable	  of	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  territorial	  restriction	  are	  appropriate	  for	  the	  attainment	  of	  environmental	  protection.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  measure	  at	  stake	  was	  considered	  inconsistent	  with	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the	  principle	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	  What	  is	  more,	  since	  RED	  2009	  authorized	  the	  alleged	  inconsistency	  it	  was	  also	  considered	  invalid	  in	  this	  regard.	  The	  main	  argument	  pursued	  by	  the	  AG	  is	  interesting	  since	  it	  illustrates	  the	  deterritorialised	  feature	  of	  environmental	  protection	  and	  the	  difficulties	  informing	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  respect.	  Basing	  it	  on	  one	  of	  the	  four	  specific	  EU	  environmental	  objectives	  contained	  in	  article	  191(1)	  TFEU,	  namely	  the	  prudent	  and	  rational	  utilisation	  of	  natural	  resources,	  the	  AG	  argued	  that:	  	  	   [T]he	  development	  	  of	  cross-­‐border	  trade	  in	  green	  electricity	  which	  would	  result	  from	  making	  national	  support	  schemes	  accessible	  to	  foreign	  electricity	  producers	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  that	  objective	  by	  facilitating	  the	  optimal	  distribution	  of	  production	  between	  the	  Member	  State	  according	  to	  their	  respective	  potentials.246	  	  	  This	  statement	  bears	  close	  resemblances	  with	  the	  theory	  of	  comparative	  advantage	  underpinning	  the	  case	  for	  free	  international	  trade.247	  The	  ECJ	  was	  however	  not	  convinced	  by	  the	  AG’s	  opinion,	  holding	  that	  “as	  EU	  law	  currently	  stands,	  such	  a	  [territorial]	  limitation	  may	  in	  itself	  be	  regarded	  necessary”	  in	  order	  to	  attain	  the	  objective	  of	  increased	  RES-­‐E	  usage.248	  Admitting	  that	  the	  underlying	  objectives	  of	  environmental	  protection	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  etc.	  at	  first	  sight	  may	  seem	  possible	  to	  pursue	  within	  the	  EU	  regardless	  of	  specific	  locality,	  the	  absence	  of	  in	  particular	  harmonisation	  in	  this	  regard	  enabled	  in	  principle	  member	  states	  to	  limit	  their	  schemes	  territorially.	  This	  is	  noteworthy	  since	  it	  may	  be	  read	  so	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  ECJ	  is	  attracted	  by	  the	  deterritorialised	  component	  of	  environmental	  protection	  whose	  legal	  force,	  however,	  is	  precluded	  by	  secondary	  legislation.	  Two	  main	  arguments	  were	  advanced	  to	  this	  end.	  	  	  	   Firstly,	  the	  ECJ	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  is	  primarily	  at	  the	  production	  stage	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  GHG-­‐gases	  can	  be	  pursued,	  explaining	  why	  a	  national	  support	  scheme	  favour	  directly	  the	  production	  rather	  than	  the	  consumption	  of	  RES-­‐E	  solely.	  This	  finding	  is	  based	  on	  the	  perceived	  nature	  of	  electricity	  and	  the	  accompanying	  practical	  difficulties	  to	  systematically	  identify	  RES-­‐E	  at	  the	  grid,	  and	  accordingly	  the	  consumption,	  level.	  This	  empirical	  statement	  is	  followed	  by	  several	  references	  to	  RED	  2009	  interpreted	  by	  the	  ECJ	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  “the	  EU	  legislature	  has	  assigned	  the	  various	  Member	  States	  mandatory	  national	  targets	  formulated	  in	  terms	  of	  quotas	  for	  the	  production	  of	  green	  electricity.”249	  With	  those	  two	  seemingly	  elusive	  statements	  the	  ECJ,	  in	  my	  view,	  underline	  the	  importance	  of	  territorial	  constraints	  insofar	  that	  the	  national	  RES	  targets	  are	  calculated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  production	  and	  not	  consumption.	  If	  the	  target(s)	  was	  based	  on	  consumption,	  one	  must	  assume,	  the	  case	  for	  territorial	  limitation	  would	  have	  been	  weaker,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  difficulties	  to	  systematically	  identify	  different	  types	  of	  electricity.	  	  Secondly,	  the	  ECJ	  took	  account	  of	  the	  considerations	  informing	  the	  EU	  legislature	  in	  15th	  and	  25th	  recital	  RED	  2009.	  Both	  recitals	  take	  their	  point	  of	  departure	  in	  the	  national	  variations	  regarding	  renewable	  energy	  potential	  and	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energy	  mix.	  However,	  while	  the	  former	  moved	  the	  EU	  legislature	  to	  consider	  it	  appropriate	  to	  allocate	  among	  the	  states	  a	  differentiated	  share	  of	  EUs	  overall	  20	  %	  target,	  the	  latter	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  states’	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  effect	  and	  costs	  of	  their	  in	  schemes	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  its	  proper	  functioning	  and	  maintaining	  investor	  confidence.	  In	  this	  connection	  the	  ECJ	  also	  refuted	  the	  argument	  put	  forward	  by	  Ålands	  Vindkraft	  that	  Sweden’s	  share	  of	  RES-­‐E	  production	  enabled	  it	  to	  meet	  its	  mandatory	  target.	  Even	  if	  this	  was	  the	  case,	  the	  ECJ	  held,	  it	  could	  not	  support	  the	  inference	  that	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  was	  no	  longer	  necessary	  since	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme,	  due	  to	  its	  higher	  productions	  costs	  “requires	  by	  definition	  a	  measure	  of	  continuity	  sufficient,	  in	  particular,	  to	  ensure	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  legitimate	  expectations	  of	  investors	  who	  have	  committed	  themselves	  to	  such	  projects.”250	  	  Having	  taken	  into	  account	  these	  aspects,	  ECJ	  found	  that	  a	  territorial	  limitation	  appeared	  to	  not	  breach	  the	  proportionality	  principle.	  More	  precisely,	  in	  light	  of	  how	  “EU	  law	  currently	  stands”,	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  was	  considered	  to	  not	  go	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  attain	  the	  objective,	  pursued	  by	  both	  RED	  2009	  and	  the	  Swedish	  TGC	  scheme,	  of	  increasing	  the	  production	  and	  indirectly	  the	  consumption	  of	  RES-­‐E	  in	  EU.	  Two	  things	  should	  be	  noted	  here.	  Firstly,	  ECJ	  consider	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  as	  such,	  not	  confining	  itself	  to	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  Swedish	  TGC	  scheme.	  I	  submit	  that	  such	  a	  principal	  reasoning	  enables	  considerable	  generality	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  extended,	  by	  analogy,	  to	  other	  similar	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  	  Secondly,	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  legitimate	  expectations	  of	  investors	  are	  raised	  in	  the	  context	  of	  relatively	  higher	  RES-­‐E	  production	  costs	  when	  it	  is	  alleged	  that	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  in	  question	  already	  enables	  the	  fulfilment	  the	  target	  set.	  Although	  RED	  2009	  is	  full	  of	  references	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  investor	  confidence,	  the	  ECJ’s	  	  angle	  in	  the	  case	  at	  hand	  may	  be	  read	  so	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  the	  cost	  deficiency	  on	  part	  of	  RES-­‐E	  that	  ultimately	  justify	  support	  schemes,	  not	  the	  long-­‐term	  objective	  to	  decarbonize	  the	  energy	  sector.	  Both	  objectives	  are	  certainly	  highly	  interrelated	  but	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  assumingly	  shifting	  expectations	  of	  investors	  than	  the	  more	  easily	  and	  objectively	  captured	  RES	  targets,	  the	  basis	  for	  state	  discretion	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  unstable.	  	  Having	  found	  that	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  comply	  with	  the	  proportionality	  requirement,	  ECJ	  went	  on	  to	  examine	  whether	  the	  other	  features	  of	  the	  legislation	  at	  issue,	  viewed	  as	  a	  whole,	  meets	  the	  requirement.	  This	  examination	  centres	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  annual	  quota	  obligation	  and	  associated	  aspects	  such	  as	  the	  specific	  fee	  in	  case	  of	  non-­‐compliance,	  the	  subjection	  of	  certificates	  to	  a	  competitive	  market,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  package	  sales.	  	  The	  court	  initially	  stated	  that	  a	  member	  state,	  in	  choosing	  a	  TGC	  scheme	  with	  the	  intermediary	  quota	  obligation	  whereby	  the	  costs	  are	  borne	  by	  the	  market,	  did	  not	  exceed	  the	  bounds	  of	  discretion	  to	  which	  it	  remained	  entitled	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  legitimate	  objective.	  Secondly,	  the	  ECJ	  noted	  that,	  unlike	  for	  instance	  investment	  aid,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  scheme	  at	  hand	  is	  to	  support	  the	  operation	  of	  production	  installations	  once	  they	  become	  active.	  The	  quota	  obligation	  functions	  in	  this	  regard	  in	  particular	  to	  guarantee	  the	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  a	  demand	  of	  the	  certificates	  awarded,	  thereby	  facilitating	  the	  sale	  at	  a	  price	  higher	  than	  the	  market	  price	  for	  conventionally	  produced	  energy.	  The	  effect	  of	  such	  a	  scheme	  in	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terms	  of	  providing	  an	  incentive	  for	  electricity	  producers	  to	  increase	  their	  production	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  open	  to	  doubt,	  nor	  its	  ability	  to	  attain	  the	  legitimate	  objective.	  Thirdly,	  however,	  a	  proper	  functioning	  of	  such	  a	  scheme	  requires	  in	  the	  ECJ’s	  view	  market	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  suppliers/users	  subject	  to	  the	  quota	  obligation	  actually	  can	  obtain	  certificates	  under	  fair	  terms.	  	  Fourthly,	  provided	  that	  these	  market	  mechanisms	  are	  established	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  assumed	  by	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  affirmative	  finding	  of	  the	  referring	  court,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  at	  issue	  did	  not	  prohibit	  package	  sales	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  went	  beyond	  what	  was	  necessary	  to	  attain	  the	  legitimate	  objective.	  Actually,	  “[t]he	  fact	  that	  such	  a	  possibility	  remains	  open	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  additional	  incentive	  for	  producers	  to	  increase	  their	  production	  of	  green	  electricity.”251	  Finally,	  as	  regards	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  specific	  fee	  in	  case	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  quota	  obligation,	  the	  ECJ	  considered	  it	  necessary	  as	  an	  incentive	  on	  both	  producers	  and	  traders	  subject	  to	  the	  quota	  obligation	  provided,	  however,	  that	  the	  fee	  did	  not	  go	  beyond	  what	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  such	  an	  incentive.	  	  
2.2.4 Preliminary	  assessment	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  ECJ	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  adhere	  to	  the	  justification	  bases	  in	  
PreussenElektra	  reinforces	  the	  perception	  that	  it	  is	  highly	  favourable	  towards	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  ambiguous	  reasoning	  in	  
PreussenElektra,	  the	  judgement	  seems	  to	  have	  set	  an	  important	  precedent	  in	  the	  context	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design.	  By	  not	  tying	  the	  justification	  possibilities	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  whether	  the	  measure	  is	  discriminatory,	  the	  court	  validate	  a	  rather	  original	  approach	  where	  two	  set	  of	  justification	  regimes	  are	  seemingly	  equally	  applicable	  but	  no	  guidance	  is	  provided	  as	  to	  the	  specific	  base	  on	  which	  the	  measure	  is	  exempted.	  Thus,	  several	  of	  the	  arguments	  that	  were	  made	  in	  the	  context	  of	  PreussenElektra	  may	  be	  reinvented.	  There	  are	  however	  two	  important	  differences.	  Firstly,	  the	  ECJ’s	  reasoning	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  is	  not	  structured	  so	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  environmental	  protection	  is	  subsumed	  under	  article	  36.	  Although	  this	  may	  technically	  still	  be	  the	  case,	  the	  earlier	  reference	  to	  environmental	  provisions	  at	  the	  level	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  law	  is	  replaced	  by	  the	  new	  energy	  provision	  in	  respect	  of	  promoting	  RES.	  Secondly,	  a	  quite	  detailed	  proportionality	  review	  has	  entered	  the	  justification	  assessment.	  Although	  this	  in	  principle	  may	  restrict	  state	  discretion,	  its	  function	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  seems	  rather	  be	  to	  validate	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  in	  light	  of	  the	  justification	  bases.	  	  	  
2.3 Essent	  Belgium:	  GO’s	  and	  TGC	  scheme	  	  
2.3.1 Background	  and	  measure	  	  The	  predecessor	  to	  RED	  2009	  –	  RED	  2001	  –	  established	  GO’s	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  trade	  in	  RES-­‐E	  and	  to	  increase	  transparency	  for	  the	  consumer’s	  choice	  between	  RES-­‐E	  and	  grey	  electricity.	  Member	  states	  are	  obliged	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  origin	  of	  electricity	  produced	  from	  RES	  can	  be	  guaranteed	  as	  such.	  To	  this	  end,	  a	  GO	  shall	  1)	  specify	  the	  energy	  source,	  date	  and	  place	  of	  production,	  and	  2)	  serve	  to	  enable	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  marketed	  electricity	  is	  produced	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  251	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  para	  116.	  	  
	   47	  
RES.	  Additionally,	  states	  are	  obliged	  to	  mutually	  recognize	  the	  issuance	  of	  GO’s,	  exclusively	  as	  proof	  of	  the	  elements	  mentioned,	  and	  any	  refusal	  in	  this	  regard	  must	  be	  based	  on	  objective,	  transparent	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory	  criteria.	  Under	  RED	  2001,	  as	  in	  RED	  2009,	  GO’s	  do	  not	  in	  themselves	  imply	  a	  right	  to	  benefit	  from	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  established	  in	  different	  member	  states.	  Under	  the	  RED	  regime	  it	  is	  important	  to	  clearly	  distinguish	  GO’s	  from	  tradable	  green	  certificates.	  Thus,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  leeway	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design,	  the	  establishment	  of	  GO’s	  are	  compulsory.	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  implement	  inter	  alia	  RED	  2001,	  the	  Flemish	  region	  in	  Belgium	  instituted	  a	  TGC	  scheme.	  Under	  this	  regime	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  are	  awarded	  a	  green	  certificate	  for	  each	  1000	  kWH	  RES-­‐E	  generated.	  Suppliers	  are	  obliged	  to	  annually	  surrender	  a	  number	  of	  certificates	  corresponding	  basically	  to	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  electricity	  supplied	  multiplied	  with	  a	  certain	  coefficient	  set	  for	  each	  year.	  An	  administrative	  fee	  was	  imposed	  in	  case	  of	  non-­‐compliance.	  Under	  this	  regime	  a	  GO	  was	  defined	  as	  proof	  confirming	  that	  a	  quantity	  of	  electricity	  supplied	  to	  final	  consumers	  originated	  from	  renewable	  energy	  sources,	  which	  roughly	  corresponded	  to	  the	  definition	  and	  usage	  of	  a	  green	  certificate	  in	  the	  context	  of	  sales	  to	  final	  consumers.	  However,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  express	  approval	  by	  the	  Flemish	  government,	  only	  certificates	  for	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  in	  the	  Flemish	  region	  was	  able	  to	  met	  the	  quota	  obligation.	  	  	   The	  supplier	  Essent	  Belgium	  surrendered	  inter	  alia	  GO’s	  attached	  to	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  in	  Norway,	  Netherlands,	  Denmark	  and/or	  Sweden	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  quota	  obligation	  arising	  from	  the	  Flemish	  TGC	  scheme.	  Since	  only	  green	  certificates	  for	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  in	  the	  Flemish	  Region	  could	  meet	  the	  quota	  obligation,	  the	  Flemish	  Regulatory	  Authority	  for	  the	  Electricity	  and	  Gas	  Market	  (VREG)	  imposed	  on	  Essent	  Belgium	  an	  administrative	  fee	  per	  each	  green	  certificate	  not	  surrendered.	  	   The	  system	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  and	  establishment	  of	  GO’s	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme.	  However,	  as	  displayed	  by	  Commission’s	  criticized	  proposal	  for	  RED	  2009,	  GO’s	  are	  nevertheless	  easy	  to	  combine	  with	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes,	  in	  particular	  TGC	  schemes.	  In	  effect,	  by	  not	  allowing	  a	  state	  to	  require	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  a	  quota	  obligation	  by	  certificates	  issued	  for	  domestic	  RES-­‐E,	  the	  very	  basis	  for	  state	  discretion	  –	  minimum	  harmonisation	  –	  would	  be	  erased.	  	  Additionally,	  even	  though	  the	  territorial	  restraint	  of	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  and	  the	  usage	  of	  GO’s	  at	  first	  sight	  seems	  to	  be	  of	  prime	  concern	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  analysing	  the	  compatibility	  with	  articles	  34-­‐36,	  the	  question	  formulated	  by	  the	  referring	  court	  is	  basically	  whether	  the	  whole	  scheme	  as	  constituted	  by	  the	  elements	  outlined	  above	  is	  compatible	  with	  article	  34.252	  Thus,	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  in	  general	  and	  its	  interrelation	  with	  GO’s	  is	  the	  measure	  subject	  to	  ECJ’s	  review.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  The	  national	  court	  in	  fact	  asked	  whether	  the	  provisions	  were	  compatible	  with	  articles	  11	  and	  13	  of	  the	  EEA	  agreement.	  According	  to	  settled	  case	  law,	  however,	  the	  provisions	  of	  TFEU	  and	  EEA	  agreements	  must	  be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion.	  The	  ECJ	  assessed	  the	  TFEU	  provisions	  and	  stated	  that	  the	  considerations	  in	  this	  regard	  must	  be	  construed	  as	  applying	  mutatis	  mutandis	  to	  the	  said	  provisions	  in	  the	  EEA	  agreements.	  Moreover,	  similar	  to	  Ålands	  vindkraft,	  it	  was	  asked	  whether	  the	  RED	  2001	  allowed	  a	  support	  scheme	  such	  as	  that	  in	  the	  instant	  case,	  which	  is	  the	  very	  starting	  point	  of	  this	  essay.	  See	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  Belgium	  paras	  42,	  69,	  72.	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2.3.2 Classification	  of	  the	  measure	  Several	  objectives	  were	  raised	  against	  the	  classification	  of	  GO’s	  as	  “goods”	  within	  the	  meaning	  –	  ultimately	  the	  applicability	  –	  of	  article	  34	  TFEU.	  In	  my	  view,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  handle	  this	  particular	  issue	  since	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  GO’s	  can	  serve	  the	  same	  function	  as	  certificates	  under	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  arguably	  must	  be	  assumed	  to	  affect	  the	  trade	  of	  electricity	  which	  is	  a	  good.253	  However,	  after	  designating	  the	  Dassonville	  formula	  as	  the	  point	  of	  departure	  while	  also	  referring	  to	  PreussenElektra,	  the	  ECJ	  sought	  to	  handle	  this	  objection	  and	  also	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  movement	  of	  GO’s	  was	  affected	  by	  the	  scheme.	  In	  this	  regard,	  ECJ	  observed	  that	  the	  “very	  existence,	  content,	  scope	  and	  functions”	  of	  GO’s	  is	  regulated	  by	  RED	  2001.254	  Having	  analysed	  the	  characteristics	  of	  GO’s	  which	  basically	  have	  been	  outlined	  above,	  ECJ	  found,	  firstly,	  that	  GO’s	  are	  designed	  to	  be	  incidental	  to	  both	  the	  RES-­‐E	  generated	  by	  a	  producer	  and	  the	  electricity	  sold	  by	  a	  supplier	  to	  consumers.	  Secondly,	  it	  found	  that	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  GO’s,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  purposes	  attached	  to	  them	  under	  RED	  2001,	  is	  not	  restricted	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  a	  national	  TGC	  scheme.	  However,	  the	  ECJ	  did	  not	  find	  it	  necessary	  to	  rule	  definitely	  on	  these	  questions,	  because	  even	  if	  GO’s	  were	  deemed	  to	  constitute	  goods	  whose	  movement	  was	  restricted	  by	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  at	  hand,	  they	  would	  nevertheless	  –	  “in	  any	  event”	  –	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  justification	  considerations	  set	  out	  in	  the	  judgement.255	  The	  properness	  of	  not	  ruling	  definitely	  on	  the	  character	  of	  a	  certain	  legal	  construction	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  justification	  assessment	  of	  a	  system	  promoting	  a	  good	  to	  which	  the	  construction	  “in	  any	  event”	  belong	  but	  only	  in	  an	  seemingly	  “incidental”	  manner	  may	  certainly	  be	  discussed.	  In	  particular,	  it	  may	  be	  discussed	  whether	  GO’s	  which	  are	  exhaustively	  regulated	  by	  secondary	  legislation	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  primary	  law	  considerations.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  ECJ’s	  approach	  indicates	  a	  principal	  reasoning	  where	  components	  incidental	  to	  the	  overall	  support	  scheme,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  good	  traded	  thereunder,	  are	  to	  be	  assessed	  under	  the	  justification	  considerations	  applicable	  to	  its	  main	  components.	  	  	   	  Referring	  exclusively	  and	  extensively	  to	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  case,	  the	  ECJ	  found	  that	  this	  legislation	  is	  capable	  in	  various	  ways	  of	  hindering	  –	  at	  least	  indirectly	  and	  potentially	  –	  the	  imports	  of	  electricity,	  particularly	  RES-­‐E,	  from	  other	  member	  states.	  Unlike	  “various	  ways”	  may	  suggest,	  the	  restriction	  is	  conceptualised	  by	  two	  distinct	  means.	  	  Firstly,	  since	  only	  green	  certificates	  awarded	  under	  the	  domestic	  legislation	  could	  fulfil	  the	  quota	  obligation,	  imports	  of	  electricity	  would	  as	  a	  rule	  necessitate	  the	  purchase	  of	  those	  certificates,	  failing	  which	  an	  administrative	  fee	  would	  have	  to	  be	  paid.	  Secondly,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  legislation	  did	  not	  prohibit	  package	  sales	  (i.e.	  selling	  the	  RES-­‐E	  together	  with	  the	  certificates),	  appeared	  capable	  in	  practice	  to	  establish	  contractual	  relationships,	  sometimes	  on	  a	  long-­‐term	  basis,	  through	  which	  suppliers	  obtained	  both	  the	  electricity	  and	  the	  certificates	  required.	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  import	  of	  electricity	  was	  considered	  potentially	  restricted.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations	  the	  ECJ	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  253	  For	  a	  similiar	  view,	  see	  AG	  opinion	  para	  76	  in	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  Belgium.	  AG,	  however,	  seem	  to	  misconceive	  the	  issue	  by	  also	  raising	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  certificates	  constitutes	  goods.	  Ultimately,	  he	  falls	  back	  on	  a	  broad	  definition	  of	  goods.	  	  254	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  Belgium	  para	  78.	  	  255	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  Belgium	  para	  81.	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concluded	  that	  the	  scheme	  at	  issue	  constituted	  an	  MEE	  in	  principle	  incompatible	  with	  article	  34,	  unless	  objectively	  justified.	  	  It	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  the	  ECJ	  nearly	  duplicates	  the	  dicta	  in	  Ålands	  
Vindkraft.	  The	  Flemish	  TGC	  scheme	  is	  after	  all	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  Swedish	  TGC	  scheme.	  This	  is	  also	  one	  reason	  for	  disregarding	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  GO’s	  constitute	  goods.	  It	  should	  nevertheless	  be	  mentioned	  that	  ECJ,	  unlike	  AG,	  does	  not	  expressly	  classify	  the	  MEE	  as	  discriminatory.	  
2.3.3 Justification	  	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  justification	  approach	  in	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  to	  which	  it	  also	  referred,	  ECJ	  considered,	  first,	  whether	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  may	  be	  justified	  by	  any	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  grounds	  listed	  in	  article	  36	  TFEU	  or	  by	  overriding	  requirements,	  and,	  second,	  whether	  it	  complied	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality.	  	  Having	  established	  the	  justification	  bases	  and	  undertaken	  the	  proportionality	  assessment,	  the	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  was	  not	  precluded	  by	  article	  34	  TFEU,	  provided	  however	  that	  two	  aspects	  related	  to	  the	  scheme	  were	  considered	  proportional	  the	  interpretation	  of	  which	  was	  leaved	  to	  the	  national	  court.	  In	  the	  following	  the	  path	  toward	  this	  conclusion	  will	  be	  presented	  and	  discussed.	  
2.3.3.1 Justification	  bases	  	  According	  to	  AG	  who	  favoured	  the	  possibility	  to	  justify	  discriminatory	  measures	  on	  grounds	  of	  environmental	  protection	  as	  a	  mandatory	  requirement,	  the	  arguments	  presented	  for	  such	  a	  justification	  was	  nevertheless	  weak.	  Firstly,	  as	  noted	  elsewhere,	  the	  dicta	  in	  PreussenElektra	  on	  the	  further	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  that	  nevertheless	  left	  some	  obstacles	  to	  inter-­‐state	  trade	  at	  place	  and	  the	  perceived	  nature	  of	  electricity,	  could	  in	  his	  view	  not	  longer	  be	  accepted	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  regulatory	  framework.	  Secondly,	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  contributed	  to	  a	  reduction	  of	  GHG	  was	  dismissed,	  because	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  in	  other	  member	  states	  contributed	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  GHG	  in	  the	  Flemish	  region	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  in	  that	  region.	  In	  this	  connection	  AG	  also	  refuted	  the	  principle	  that	  environmental	  damage	  should	  be	  remedied	  at	  source,	  which	  justifies	  local	  treatment	  of	  waste	  and	  was	  successfully	  invoked	  in	  Wallonian	  Waste	  case,	  assumingly	  due	  to	  the	  different	  conceptualisation	  of	  territorialised	  waste	  and	  deterritorialised	  GHG.	  This	  thread	  of	  argument	  highlight	  the	  deterritorialised	  feature	  of	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  and	  underline	  the	  shaky	  foundation	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  establishing	  state	  discretion.	  Thirdly,	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  targets	  set	  by	  RED	  2001	  would	  be	  jeopardized	  if	  national	  support	  schemes	  were	  made	  available	  to	  foreign	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  was	  dismissed	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  consumption	  target	  was	  defined	  as	  national	  production	  plus	  imports	  minus	  exports,	  and	  that	  imports	  of	  RES-­‐E	  accordingly	  could	  be	  counted	  of	  towards	  the	  national	  target.	  	  The	  rationale	  pursued	  by	  AG,	  similar	  to	  the	  main	  argument	  pursued	  in	  
Ålands	  vindkraft	  though	  not	  referring	  to	  a	  specific	  legal	  basis,	  is	  that	  environmental	  protection	  is	  “not	  understood	  in	  purely	  national	  terms,	  but	  is	  part	  of	  a	  European	  momentum”	  and	  subject	  to	  a	  EU	  common	  policy,	  amongst	  other	  in	  the	  field	  of	  climate	  change	  mitigation.	  In	  AG’s	  view,	  therefore,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
also	  take	  into	  account	  the	  benefits	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  intra-­‐Union	  RES-­‐E	  trade,	  such	  as	  “reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  renewable	  energy	  by	  permitting	  a	  more	  rational	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location	  of	  production.”256	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  although	  these	  aspects	  can	  be	  underpinned	  by	  internal	  market	  and	  cost	  based	  energy	  security	  concerns,	  contingent	  on	  angle,	  they	  are	  pursued	  by	  AG	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  deterritorialised	  environmental	  protection.	  AG	  finally257	  concluded	  that	  article	  34	  TFEU	  precluded	  national	  support	  schemes	  that	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  GO’s	  issued	  for	  RES-­‐E	  production	  in	  other	  member	  states.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  establishing	  environmental	  protection	  as	  a	  mandatory	  requirement,	  the	  ECJ	  duplicated	  the	  general	  dictum	  in	  Ålands	  
vindkraft	  according	  to	  which	  the	  use	  of	  RES-­‐E,	  which	  the	  measure	  seeks	  to	  promote,	  contributes	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  GHG	  which	  are	  amongst	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  climate	  change	  that	  the	  EU	  have	  pledged	  to	  combat.	  Referring	  to	  the	  first	  three	  recitals	  of	  RED	  2001	  and	  also	  the	  judgment	  IBV	  &	  Cie	  which	  referred	  to	  the	  first	  two,	  ECJ	  then	  stated	  that	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  RES-­‐E	  is	  a	  high	  priority	  for	  EU	  and	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  measures	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  and	  achieve	  this	  more	  quickly.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  first	  two	  recitals	  of	  RED	  2001	  also	  mention	  the	  contribution	  of	  RES	  to	  security	  of	  energy	  supply	  is	  clearly	  not	  considered.	  Secondly,	  the	  increased	  usage	  of	  RES-­‐E	  was	  also	  found	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants	  under	  article	  36	  TFEU.	  These	  principal	  findings	  duplicate	  the	  reasoning	  in	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Ålands	  vindkraft,	  the	  ECJ	  then	  added	  that	  the	  national	  RES	  support	  mechanisms	  are	  capable	  of	  contributing	  to	  attain	  the	  objectives	  in	  articles	  6	  and	  174(1)	  EC,	  now	  contained	  in	  articles	  11	  and	  191(1):	  the	  environmental	  integration	  principle	  and	  the	  four	  specific	  EU	  environmental	  objectives.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  balancing	  of	  these	  objectives	  very	  well	  may	  result	  in	  a	  deterritorialised	  approach	  to	  environmental	  protection,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  AG’s	  reference	  to	  “prudent	  and	  rational	  utilisation	  of	  national	  resources”	  in	  Ålands	  
vindkraft,	  is	  not	  considered.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations	  the	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  the	  legislation	  at	  issue	  was	  in	  principle	  capable	  of	  justifying	  barriers	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	  
2.3.3.2 Proportionality	  	  As	  regards	  the	  compatibility	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  –	  namely	  whether	  the	  legislation	  is	  suitable	  for	  attaining	  the	  legitimate	  objective	  pursued	  and	  necessary	  to	  that	  end	  –	  the	  ECJ	  basically	  assessed	  the	  two	  components	  of	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  reviewed	  in	  Ålands	  vindkraft:	  the	  territorial	  restraint	  and	  the	  quota	  obligation.	  ECJ,	  however,	  omitted	  the	  initial	  “preliminary	  considerations”	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  raised	  in	  PreussenElektra.	  At	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  given	  that	  ECJ	  in	  its	  Ålands	  Vindkraft	  judgement	  dealt	  with	  these	  issues	  and	  basically	  formulated	  the	  justification	  approach	  applied	  on	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  at	  hand.	  At	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  the	  nature	  of	  electricity	  as	  understood	  in	  the	  two	  previous	  judgements	  is	  highly	  related	  to	  how	  ECJ	  conceptualise	  the	  function	  and	  usage	  of	  GO’s	  the	  question	  of	  which	  is	  far	  more	  important	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  than	  in	  the	  previous	  case.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  256	  AG	  opinion	  para	  110	  in	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  Belgium.	  	  257	  AG	  also	  submitted	  two	  more	  specific	  arguments	  related	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  GO’s	  and	  green	  certificates	  as	  well	  as	  VREGs	  practice	  in	  this	  regard.	  However,	  since	  AG	  does	  not	  definitely	  characterise	  GO’s	  as	  goods	  and	  ECJ’s	  envisaged	  justification	  assessment	  in	  any	  event	  are	  applicable	  on	  GO’s,	  I	  will	  not	  comment	  this	  issue	  further.	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In	  the	  absence	  of	  inter	  alia	  EU	  law	  harmonisation	  of	  national	  support	  schemes,	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  certificates	  issued	  for	  the	  regional	  (Flemish)	  RES-­‐E	  production	  could	  fulfil	  the	  quota	  obligation	  may,	  in	  ECJ’s	  view,	  in	  itself	  be	  considered	  necessary	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  RES-­‐E	  production.	  Two	  main	  arguments	  were	  advanced	  to	  this	  end.	  Both	  are	  nearly	  identical	  to	  the	  two	  employed	  in	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  and	  illustrate	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  provided	  by	  RED	  2001	  and	  RED	  2009,	  the	  starting	  point	  remains	  intact.	  Firstly,	  ECJ	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  is	  primarily	  at	  the	  production	  stage	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  GHG	  can	  be	  pursued,	  explaining	  why	  a	  national	  support	  scheme	  favour	  directly	  the	  production	  rather	  than	  the	  consumption	  of	  RES-­‐E	  solely.	  Additionally,	  it	  followed	  from	  RED	  2001	  that	  member	  states	  were	  allowed	  to	  set	  their	  indicative	  targets	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  national	  RES-­‐E	  production.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  ECJ	  here,	  unlike	  in	  Ålands	  vindkraft,	  does	  not	  mention	  the	  difficulty	  to	  systematically	  distinguish	  RES-­‐E	  at	  grid	  level	  arising	  from	  the	  perceived	  nature	  of	  electricity.	  By	  neither	  raising	  this	  issue	  nor	  referring	  to	  the	  relevant	  dictum	  in	  Ålands	  vindkraft,	  the	  AG’s	  argument	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  consumption	  also	  included	  imported	  RES-­‐E	  remains	  uncontradicted.	  Secondly,	  as	  regards	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  at	  issue	  does	  not	  benefit	  also	  the	  RES-­‐E	  production	  in	  other	  member	  states,	  ECJ	  observed	  that	  the	  starting	  points,	  the	  renewable	  energy	  potential	  and	  the	  energy	  mix	  of	  each	  state	  vary.	  Guaranteeing	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  national	  RES	  support	  schemes,	  as	  recognized	  in	  RED	  2001,	  is	  one	  important	  mean	  of	  achieving	  an	  increased	  use	  of	  energy	  from	  RES.	  Additionally,	  it	  was	  considered	  essential	  that	  member	  states	  are	  able	  to	  control	  the	  effects	  and	  costs	  of	  their	  schemes	  according	  to	  their	  potential.	  whilst	  maintaining	  investor	  confidence.	  	  Having	  found	  that	  the	  reservation	  of	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  exclusively	  to	  RES-­‐E	  production	  in	  the	  Flemish	  territory	  did	  not	  infringe	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality,	  ECJ	  proceeded	  and	  considered	  whether	  the	  other	  features	  of	  the	  legislation	  at	  hand	  satisfied	  the	  proportionality	  requirement.	  The	  review	  largely	  duplicates	  the	  proportionality	  assessment	  in	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	  Accordingly,	  member	  states	  did	  not	  exceed	  the	  bounds	  of	  discretion	  by	  adopting	  a	  TGC	  scheme	  which	  through	  the	  quota	  obligation	  is	  designed	  to	  have	  the	  additional	  costs	  to	  be	  borne	  by	  the	  market.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  quota	  obligation	  in	  terms	  of	  stimulating	  a	  higher	  RES-­‐E	  production	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  open	  to	  doubt;	  nor,	  consequently,	  its	  ability	  to	  attain	  the	  legitimate	  objective.	  Provided	  that	  a	  genuine	  market	  exists	  in	  which	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  obtain	  certificates	  under	  fair	  terms,	  the	  fact	  that	  package	  sales	  are	  not	  prohibited	  appeared	  to	  be	  an	  additional	  incentive	  for	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  to	  increase	  their	  output.	  Provided	  that	  neither	  the	  method	  for	  determining	  the	  fine	  nor	  the	  amount	  went	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  for	  providing	  an	  incentive,	  the	  verification	  of	  which	  ECJ	  leaved	  to	  the	  national	  court,	  the	  administrative	  fee	  was	  considered	  necessary.	  	  	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  the	  Flemish	  TGC	  scheme	  at	  issue	  was	  not	  precluded	  by	  article	  34	  and	  36	  TFEU,	  provided,	  however,	  that	  two	  conditions	  are	  met.	  Firstly,	  that	  mechanisms	  are	  established	  which	  ensure	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  genuine	  market	  for	  certificates	  in	  which	  supply	  can	  match	  demand,	  reaching	  some	  kind	  of	  balance,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  actually	  possible	  for	  the	  relevant	  suppliers	  to	  obtain	  certificates	  under	  fair	  terms.	  Secondly,	  that	  the	  administrative	  fee	  in	  case	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  quota	  obligation	  does	  not	  exceed	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  encourage	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  to	  actually	  increase	  
	   52	  
their	  output	  and	  obligated	  suppliers	  to	  actually	  purchase	  the	  required	  certificates,	  by	  avoiding	  in	  particular	  excessive	  penalties.	  	  	  	  
2.3.4 Preliminary	  assessment	  	  The	  approach	  by	  the	  ECJ	  basically	  reiterates	  the	  dicta	  of	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  and	  continues	  on	  the	  two-­‐tier	  justification	  approach	  established	  in	  PreussenElektra.	  The	  regulatory	  landscape,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  primary	  law	  and	  secondary	  law,	  lies	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  ones	  surrounding	  these	  cases.	  The	  favourable	  approach	  is	  thus	  maintained.	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  previous	  judgement,	  the	  ECJ	  explicitly	  conditions	  its	  verdict	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  two	  aspects,	  namely	  mechanisms	  establishing	  a	  genuine	  market	  and	  the	  method	  for	  determining	  the	  administrative	  fine.	  These	  two	  aspects	  constitutes	  prima	  facie	  restrictions	  on	  state	  discretion,	  but	  not	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design	  since	  a	  TGC	  scheme	  were	  cleared	  in	  the	  previous	  judgement.	  To	  what	  extent	  this	  imposes	  substantive	  constraints	  on	  state	  discretion	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  	  
2.4 Overall	  assessment	  	  
2.4.1 The	  doctrinal	  issue	  and	  intensity	  of	  review	  	  As	  previously	  mentioned	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  discriminatory	  measure	  may	  be	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  mandatory	  requirements	  doctrine	  –	  and	  conversely,	  whether	  it	  is	  only	  possible	  to	  justify	  under	  article	  36	  TFEU	  –	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  doctrinal	  issues	  in	  this	  area	  of	  law.	  Legal	  certainty,	  one	  may	  argue,	  is	  contingent	  upon	  a	  clear	  answer	  to	  this	  fundamental	  question.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  legal	  certainty	  in	  this	  regard	  the	  very	  basis	  for	  state	  discretion	  is	  uncertain.	  The	  assessment	  by	  ECJ	  of	  three	  national/regional	  and,	  therefore,	  prima	  facie	  discriminatory	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  provided	  a	  golden	  opportunity	  to	  finally	  settle	  this	  issue.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  ECJ	  did	  not	  seize	  the	  opportunity.	  On	  a	  general	  level,	  therefore,	  the	  key	  doctrinal	  question	  remains	  unsettled.	  In	  the	  specific	  cases	  presented,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  even	  refrained	  from	  examining	  whether	  the	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  constitutes	  discriminatory	  MEEs.	  	  	   However,	  notwithstanding	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  precedent	  which	  formally	  settle	  the	  doctrinal	  issue	  and	  provide	  guidance	  for	  cases	  concerning	  other	  measures,	  the	  case	  law	  on	  the	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  assessed	  provide	  in	  my	  opinion	  legal	  certainty	  sufficient	  to	  identify	  how	  similar	  measures	  may	  be	  assessed.	  This	  assertion	  is	  not	  casted	  into	  doubt	  by	  the	  confinement	  of	  the	  
PreussenElektra	  judgement	  to	  “the	  current	  state	  of	  Community	  law	  concerning	  the	  electricity	  market”	  and	  the	  similar	  expression	  in	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  that	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  may	  in	  itself	  be	  considered	  necessary	  in	  light	  of	  how	  “EU	  law	  currently	  stands.”	  Firstly,	  these	  seemingly	  similar	  statements	  were	  made	  in	  quite	  different	  regulatory	  frameworks:	  the	  first	  one	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  secondary	  legislation	  regarding	  RES,	  the	  other	  one	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  second	  legislation	  package	  regarding	  RES.	  Additionally,	  while	  the	  PreussenElektra	  dictum	  was	  uttered	  in	  relation	  to	  at	  least	  the	  perceived	  nature	  of	  electricity	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  GO’s	  the	  establishment	  of	  which	  was	  then	  discussed,	  the	  dictum	  in	  Ålands	  
Vindkraft	  is	  related	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  harmonisation	  which	  enables	  member	  states	  to	  territorially	  limit	  their	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  -­‐	  the	  latter	  being	  the	  very	  starting	  point	  of	  this	  essay.	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Thus,	  albeit	  ECJ’s	  reasoning	  in	  PreussenElektra	  was	  (and	  is)	  highly	  confusing,	  the	  two-­‐fold	  justification	  track	  originally	  established	  has	  been	  relied	  on	  in	  subsequent	  cases.	  The	  intensity	  of	  review,	  or	  rather	  the	  lack	  thereof,	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  prima	  facie	  discriminatory	  character	  of	  the	  support	  schemes	  assessed	  have	  also	  been	  maintained.	  The	  principal	  approach	  identified	  is	  thus	  constituted,	  first,	  by	  classifying	  the	  measure	  as	  an	  MEE	  (at	  least	  indirectly	  as	  in	  
PreussenElektra)	  without	  examining	  nor	  mentioning	  its	  discriminatory	  character,	  and	  second,	  by	  justifying	  the	  measure	  and	  the	  objective	  pursued	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  environmental	  protection	  as	  a	  mandatory	  requirement	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants	  under	  article	  36	  TFEU.	  Other	  policy	  and/or	  legal	  reasons	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  at	  this	  stage	  but	  are	  subordinated	  the	  principal	  justification	  bases.	  In	  respect	  of	  the	  treaty	  based	  justification	  basis,	  the	  intensity	  of	  scrutiny	  is	  rather	  low.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  connection	  with	  PreussenElektra,	  several	  objections,	  general	  as	  well	  as	  specific,	  can	  be	  raised	  against	  the	  view	  that	  an	  increased	  use	  of	  RES-­‐E	  is	  also	  designed	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  scientific	  basis	  for	  such	  a	  view	  but	  rather	  a	  questioning	  of	  how	  fundamental	  legal	  concepts	  are	  understood	  in	  this	  context,	  given	  that	  –	  as	  illustrated	  for	  instance	  by	  the	  preamble	  to	  UNFCCC	  –	  “there	  are	  many	  uncertainties	  in	  predictions	  of	  climate	  change,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  timing,	  magnitude	  and	  regional	  patterns	  thereof.”	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  somewhat	  sloppy	  establishment	  of	  this	  justification	  basis	  have	  been	  upheld	  in	  two	  subsequent	  cases,	  without	  further	  elaboration,	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  a	  firmly	  rooted	  pillar	  in	  the	  ECJ’s	  two-­‐tier	  justification	  approach.	  It	  is	  submitted	  that	  this	  exceptional	  two-­‐tier	  approach	  provides	  states	  with	  considerable	  discretion	  as	  to	  the	  choice	  between	  the	  principal	  support	  schemes	  assessed.	  However,	  from	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  and	  onwards	  a	  seemingly	  rigorous	  proportionality	  assessment	  have	  become	  integral	  to	  the	  justification	  assessment.	  This	  is	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  AG’s	  opinion	  in	  Essent	  Belgium,	  rendered	  prior	  to	  the	  opinion	  in	  Ålands	  Vindkraft,	  where	  he	  called	  upon	  the	  ECJ	  to	  clarify	  its	  position	  on	  the	  key	  doctrinal	  issue.	  He	  recommended	  the	  ECJ	  to	  expressly	  acknowledge	  the	  possibility	  to	  justify	  discriminatory	  measures	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  environmental	  protection,	  provided	  however	  that	  the	  measure	  undergoes	  a	  strict	  or	  reinforced	  proportionality	  assessment.258	  The	  ECJ	  certainly	  applied	  a	  stricter	  or	  at	  least	  a	  wider	  proportionality	  assessment,	  comprising	  aspects	  of	  the	  legislation	  not	  immediately	  related	  to	  the	  dispute,	  but	  did	  not	  clarify	  its	  principal	  position	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  doctrinal	  issue.	  It	  is	  commonly	  held	  that	  the	  ECJ,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  preliminary	  rulings,	  provides	  the	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law	  whilst	  the	  national	  courts	  apply	  that	  interpretation	  to	  the	  particular	  facts	  of	  the	  case.	  However,	  the	  more	  detailed	  interpretation	  provided,	  the	  closer	  it	  approximates	  application.259	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  aspects	  that	  enables/constrains	  state	  discretion	  and	  is	  perhaps	  most	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  proportionality	  principle	  whose	  interpretation	  the	  ECJ	  can	  leave	  to	  the	  national	  courts.	  Historically,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  that	  if	  the	  proportionality	  review	  is	  undertaken	  by	  the	  ECJ	  the	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  AG	  opinion	  para	  91	  and	  94	  in	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  Belgium.	  See	  also	  AG	  opinion	  para	  79	  in	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	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measure	  is	  found	  disproportionate.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  measure	  is	  upheld	  when	  reviewed	  by	  the	  national	  courts.260	  	  In	  view	  of	  this,	  does	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  seemingly	  stricter	  proportionality	  assessment	  has	  been	  adopted	  suggest	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  has	  gradually	  diminished?	  Several	  aspects	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  question.	  Firstly,	  it	  must	  be	  born	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  shift	  towards	  the	  stricter	  proportionality	  review	  is	  nevertheless	  rooted	  in	  the	  perceived	  nature	  of	  electricity	  which,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  exhaustive	  harmonisation,	  necessitate	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  of	  RES-­‐E	  schemes.	  Such	  a	  starting	  point	  significantly	  enables	  state	  discretion	  since	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  good	  traded	  which	  is	  common	  to	  all	  states	  and	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  	  	  Secondly,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  interpretation	  provided	  by	  the	  ECJ	  gradually	  have	  become	  more	  detailed	  and	  extended	  means	  that	  it	  to	  a	  larger	  extent	  controls	  the	  final	  application	  of	  the	  national	  courts.	  Formally,	  this	  restricts	  state	  discretion,	  since	  a	  state	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  having	  at	  least	  one	  component	  of	  its	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  being	  held	  disproportionate.	  In	  essence,	  one	  could	  argue,	  the	  mere	  shift	  to	  a	  stricter	  review	  restricts	  in	  itself	  state	  discretion.	  This	  could	  however	  also	  enable	  state	  discretion	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  ECJ,	  as	  in	  Ålands	  
vindkraft,	  essentially	  gives	  clearance	  to	  the	  whole	  national	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme.	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  substantial	  implications	  of	  this	  shift	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  examine	  in	  what	  respect	  and	  on	  what	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  the	  assessment	  has	  changed.	  	  The	  assertion	  that	  territorial	  limitations	  are	  necessary	  is	  by	  the	  ECJ	  mainly	  based	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  harmonisation,	  a	  territorialised	  understanding	  of	  the	  environmental	  objectives	  pursued	  by	  RES-­‐E,	  the	  applicable	  RED	  which	  in	  its	  view	  authorizes	  national	  RES	  targets	  based	  on	  production	  and,	  furthermore,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  various	  national	  differences	  and	  that	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  states	  are	  able	  to	  control	  the	  effects	  and	  costs	  of	  their	  support	  schemes.	  Even	  though	  the	  arguments	  pertaining	  to	  the	  RED’s	  as	  such	  are	  reasonable,	  it	  is	  in	  my	  view	  far	  from	  obvious	  to	  consider	  territorial	  limitations	  arising	  from	  secondary	  legislation	  as	  necessary	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  exhaustive	  harmonisation,	  since	  it	  departs	  from	  the	  principle	  that	  trade	  distortions	  arising	  from	  minimum	  harmonisation	  should	  be	  assessed	  under	  primary	  law.	  This	  indicates	  a	  circulatory	  reasoning	  on	  part	  of	  the	  ECJ	  where	  the	  absence	  of	  exhaustive	  harmonisation	  serves	  to	  justify	  trade	  distorting	  measures	  under	  primary	  law.	  Additionally,	  as	  repeatedly	  illustrated	  by	  the	  AG,	  RES-­‐E	  promotion	  within	  EU	  is	  not	  inherently	  contingent	  upon	  a	  territorialised	  approach.	  I	  therefore	  submit	  that	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  territorial	  limitation,	  the	  seemingly	  stricter	  proportionality	  review	  is	  in	  fact	  quite	  lenient.	  	  This	  is	  however	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  other	  features	  assessed.	  In	  the	  seemingly	  general	  approach	  related	  to	  the	  quota	  obligation	  and	  its	  fulfilment,	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  ECJ	  in	  Essent	  Belgium	  explicitly	  conditioned	  the	  compatibility	  with	  article	  34-­‐36	  TFEU	  upon	  two	  aspects	  which	  were	  left	  to	  the	  national	  court	  to	  finally	  interpret:	  mechanisms	  establishing	  a	  genuine	  market	  for	  certificates	  and	  the	  method	  of	  calculation	  of	  the	  administrative	  fee.	  Disregarding	  the	  historical	  tendency	  on	  behalf	  of	  national	  courts	  to	  find	  the	  national	  measure	  proportionate,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ECJ	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conditioned	  the	  outcome	  represents	  a	  prima	  facie	  restriction	  of	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  regard.	  It	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  why	  the	  outcome	  differed	  between	  Ålands	  
vindkraft	  and	  Essent	  Belgium.261	  The	  only	  apparent	  difference	  between	  the	  cases	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  that	  in	  the	  former	  case	  the	  certificates	  are	  actually	  sold	  on	  a	  market	  open	  to	  competition	  according	  to	  the	  referring	  court262	  but	  nothing	  is	  stated	  on	  how	  the	  fee	  is	  calculated.	  In	  contrast,	  according	  to	  the	  legislation	  in	  
Essent	  Belgium	  the	  fine	  is	  fixed	  at	  125	  EURO263	  for	  each	  certificate	  not	  surrendered	  whilst	  nothing	  is	  stated	  about	  the	  market	  conditions.	  The	  non-­‐clearance	  by	  the	  ECJ	  in	  this	  regard	  constitutes	  a	  restraint	  of	  state	  discretion,	  but	  not	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design.	  Moreover,	  in	  spite	  of	  being	  a	  restraint,	  it	  is	  in	  my	  view	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  the	  ECJ	  under	  similar	  circumstances	  would	  find	  a	  measure	  disproportionate	  on	  other	  grounds	  than	  its	  territorial	  limitation.	  The	  reason	  for	  this,	  I	  submit,	  is	  that	  the	  dispute	  was	  triggered	  by	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  and	  not	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  administrative	  fee	  or	  absence	  of	  genuine	  market	  conditions	  (the	  latter	  of	  which	  may	  arguably	  be	  remedied	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  antitrust	  law).	  Additionally,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  constituting	  parts	  of	  a	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme,	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  is	  explicitly	  authorized	  by	  both	  RED	  2001	  and	  RED	  2009.	  Hence,	  a	  judgement	  finding	  the	  latter	  components	  disproportionate	  may	  be	  criticized	  on	  reasons	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  its	  internal	  logic	  if	  it	  simultaneously	  does	  not	  find	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  disproportionate.	  One	  can	  in	  fact	  pursue	  the	  argument	  that	  such	  an	  outcome	  would	  amount	  to	  positive	  harmonisation	  i.e.	  defining	  a	  positive	  criteria	  for	  the	  clearance	  of	  a	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  while	  upholding	  the	  territorial	  limitation	  enabled	  by	  secondary	  legislation	  which	  evoked	  article	  34	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Even	  though	  the	  creative	  and	  law	  making	  role	  sometimes	  pursued	  by	  the	  ECJ	  cannot	  be	  underestimated,	  such	  a	  scenario	  is	  in	  my	  opinion	  unlikely.	  I	  therefore	  conclude	  that	  the	  shift	  toward	  a	  seemingly	  stricter	  proportionality	  assessment	  is	  more	  of	  a	  formal	  than	  substantial	  move	  in	  ECJ’s	  favourable	  approach	  towards	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  In	  any	  event,	  it	  does	  not	  signify	  a	  preference	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  specific	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme.	  	  	  
2.4.2 Balancing	  the	  trinity	  	  The	  two	  distinguished	  and	  recurring	  justification	  grounds	  are	  environmental	  protection	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  health,	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants.	  Technically,	  they	  originate	  from	  different	  sources	  of	  law	  –	  case	  law	  and	  treaty	  based	  derogations	  respectively	  –	  and	  are	  as	  a	  main	  rule	  also	  applicable	  to	  different	  facts.	  Substantially,	  however,	  they	  are	  highly	  interrelated	  since	  the	  policy	  underpinning	  environmental	  protection	  in	  ECJ’s	  view	  is	  also	  designed	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants.	  Accordingly,	  ECJ	  has	  consistently	  balanced	  the	  trinity	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  sustainability	  criteria	  in	  its	  territorialised	  sense.	  Moreover,	  it	  has	  consistently	  disregarded	  the	  deterritorialised	  approach	  to	  environmental	  protection	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  AG	  in	  
Ålands	  vindkraft	  and	  Essent	  Belgium.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  AG	  in	  these	  cases	  have	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  Calster	  2014:65	  according	  to	  which	  the	  Flemish	  scheme	  differ	  rather	  drastically	  from	  the	  Swedish	  scheme,	  inter	  alia,	  because	  of	  less	  transparent	  terms	  and	  larger	  degree	  of	  vertical	  integration.	  This	  can	  certainly	  be	  the	  case	  but	  nothing	  in	  the	  judgements	  or	  the	  AG	  opinions	  suggest	  that	  they	  were	  informed	  of	  such	  market	  structures.	  	  	  262	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  para	  115.	  	  263	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  Belgium	  para	  22.	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reached	  conclusions	  opposite	  to	  those	  by	  the	  ECJ	  mainly	  based	  on	  a	  deterritorialised	  approach	  to	  environmental	  protection	  nevertheless	  suggests	  a	  change	  in	  legal	  discourse	  that	  over	  time	  may	  affect	  the	  ECJ.	  	  	   Energy	  security	  concerns	  have	  consistently	  been	  downplayed.	  The	  only	  occasion	  where	  such	  concerns	  were	  expressly	  raised	  but	  also	  dismissed	  was	  in	  the	  early	  case	  of	  PreussenElektra.	  This	  may	  seem	  quiet	  odd	  given	  that	  following	  the	  judgement	  the	  amount	  of	  RES-­‐E	  in	  the	  energy	  mix	  has	  significantly	  increased	  in	  EU.	  Arguably,	  the	  AG’s	  dismissive	  opinion	  in	  PreussenElektra	  together	  with	  the	  favourable	  ECJ	  approach	  in	  respect	  of	  other	  justification	  bases	  affected	  the	  legal	  discourse	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  viability	  of	  submitting	  energy	  security	  concerns.	  The	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  the	  justification	  bases	  available	  for	  the	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  assessed	  is	  based	  on	  article	  36	  TFEU	  ultimately	  provide	  the	  same	  type	  of	  robustness	  as	  energy	  security	  would	  provide,	  although	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  former	  can	  be	  discussed.	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  the	  territorialised	  approach	  towards	  environmental	  protection	  is	  abandoned	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  deterritorialised	  one,	  it	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  that	  the	  ECJ	  will	  approach	  these	  measures	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  energy	  security.	  Firstly,	  the	  aspects	  of	  states’	  energy	  mix	  have	  been	  touched	  upon	  by	  ECJ	  in	  the	  two	  latest	  cases.	  Additionally,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ECJ	  in	  the	  case	  concerning	  the	  latest	  regulatory	  landscape	  for	  the	  first	  time	  abandoned	  overloaded	  references	  to	  environmental	  issues	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  integration	  principle	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  new	  energy	  provision	  in	  article	  194	  TFEU,	  suggests	  a	  shift	  towards	  an	  understanding	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  as	  increasingly	  energy	  related	  issues.	  Thirdly,	  the	  direction	  towards	  the	  long-­‐term	  objective	  of	  EU	  energy	  and	  climate	  policy	  to	  an	  almost	  carbon-­‐free	  energy	  sector	  by	  2050	  -­‐	  by	  commentators	  considered	  an	  industrial	  revolution264	  -­‐	  may	  very	  well	  elevate	  the	  importance	  of	  RES-­‐E	  to	  the	  modern	  economy.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Commission,	  the	  share	  of	  RES-­‐E	  in	  the	  energy	  mix	  will	  amount	  to	  nearly	  100%	  by	  2050.265	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  ECJ	  has	  not	  consistently	  balanced	  the	  trinity	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  sustainability	  criteria	  but	  rather	  that	  a	  shift	  in	  its	  jurisprudence	  can	  be	  discerned	  which	  may	  be	  accelerated	  in	  light	  of	  the	  increasing	  deployment	  of	  RES-­‐E.	  Nevertheless,	  if	  and	  when	  the	  amount	  of	  RES-­‐E	  reaches	  the	  heights	  of	  being	  of	  paramount	  importance	  to	  the	  modern	  economy,	  it	  will	  most	  likely	  not	  be	  in	  a	  need	  for	  territorial	  support	  schemes.	  	  	  
2.4.3 Conclusion	  and	  generality:	  FIP	  and	  TENFIT?	  	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  above	  that	  the	  ECJ,	  under	  articles	  34	  and	  36	  TFEU,	  employs	  a	  highly	  favourable	  approach	  towards	  the	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  assessed.To	  what	  extent,	  then,	  can	  this	  approach	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  schemes	  assessed	  be	  generalised	  and	  understood	  as	  “equally	  applicable”	  to	  FIP	  and	  TENFIT	  schemes?	  Nothing	  in	  ECJ’s	  reasoning	  suggests	  a	  preference	  towards	  a	  certain	  principal	  support	  scheme.	  The	  shift	  towards	  a	  seemingly	  stricter	  proportionality	  assessment	  in	  judgements	  concerning	  the	  TGC	  schemes	  has	  above	  been	  explained	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  AG’s	  call	  for	  clarification	  on	  a	  key	  doctrinal	  question.	  Thus,	  the	  difference	  between	  ECJ’s	  approach	  in	  PreussenElektra,	  at	  one	  hand,	  and	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  and	  Essent	  Belgium,	  at	  the	  other	  hand,	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  different	  support	  schemes.	  The	  difference	  between	  Ålands	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  264	  Jacobsson	  et	  al	  2009:2143f.	  	  265	  Commission	  2011:6.	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vindkraft	  and	  Essent	  Belgium	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  different	  assessment	  of	  components	  constituting	  the	  scheme.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  principal	  scheme	  design	  remained	  the	  same	  in	  both	  cases.	  In	  spite	  of	  being	  difficult	  to	  forecast	  the	  future	  examination	  of	  FIP	  and	  TENFIT,	  there	  are	  two	  aspects	  that	  in	  my	  opinion	  enable	  a	  generalisation	  of	  ECJ’s	  approach	  to	  these	  schemes.	  Firstly,	  these	  schemes,	  just	  like	  the	  ones	  assessed,	  are	  as	  starting	  point	  national	  which	  means	  that	  they	  will	  contain	  a	  territorial	  limitation.	  Secondly,	  albeit	  all	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  designs	  are	  different,	  the	  largest	  difference	  is	  commonly	  held	  to	  be	  the	  one	  between	  TGC	  schemes	  and	  FIT	  schemes.	  As	  indicated	  above	  both	  FIP	  schemes	  and	  TENFIT	  schemes	  can	  be	  described	  as	  elaborations	  of	  the	  original	  FIT	  scheme.	  These	  two	  aspects	  makes	  it	  very	  likely	  that	  the	  ECJ’s	  favourable	  approach	  towards	  in	  effect	  the	  two	  most	  disparate	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  will	  be	  upheld	  also	  in	  respect	  of	  FIP	  schemes	  and	  TENFIT	  schemes.	  I	  therefore	  conclude	  that	  states,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  articles	  34	  and	  36	  TFEU,	  retain	  a	  considerable	  scope	  of	  discretion	  as	  to	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design.	  	  
3 RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  and	  state	  aid	  	  In	  the	  following	  I	  will	  first	  present	  and	  discuss	  the	  two	  ECJ	  cases	  dealing	  with	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  state	  aid.	  Having	  presented	  these	  cases	  isolated	  I	  will	  proceed	  to	  a	  presentation	  of	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  state	  aid	  control	  regime	  in	  which	  the	  Commission	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role,	  notably	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  compatibility	  assessment.	  Subsequently,	  I	  will	  undertake	  an	  overall	  assessment	  of	  state	  discretion	  under	  the	  material	  state	  aid	  regime,	  taking	  into	  account	  and	  ECJ’s	  case	  law	  and	  Commission’s	  soft	  law.	  I	  will	  pursue	  the	  argument	  that	  due	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  state	  aid	  regime,	  the	  shift	  toward	  an	  intervening	  compatibility	  approach	  on	  part	  of	  the	  Commission	  significantly	  constrains	  state	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design	  and	  amounts,	  in	  principle,	  to	  positive	  harmonisation	  from	  above	  and	  intervenes	  in	  states	  energy	  rights.	  	  	  
3.1 PreussenElektra:	  FIT	  scheme	  
3.1.1 Background	  and	  measure	  	  The	  German	  FIT	  law	  has	  already	  been	  described	  in	  the	  context	  of	  articles	  34	  and	  36.	  It	  will	  then	  be	  recalled	  that	  the	  scheme	  obliged	  DSO’s	  to	  purchase	  at	  minimum	  prices	  the	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  in	  their	  area	  of	  supply.	  The	  purchase	  obligation	  is	  also	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  state	  aid	  provisions.	  However,	  other	  elements	  are	  relevant	  as	  well.	  As	  regards	  the	  minimum	  price	  it	  was	  calculated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  average	  nationwide	  sales	  price	  for	  electricity	  but	  differentiated	  according	  to	  the	  RES	  technology	  employed,	  which	  in	  effect	  meant	  that	  the	  price	  paid	  by	  DSO	  for	  RES-­‐E	  was	  higher	  than	  its	  real	  economical	  value.	  The	  FIT	  scheme	  contained	  a	  hardship	  clause	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  when	  DSO’s	  purchase	  of	  RES-­‐E	  exceeded	  5%	  of	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  electricity	  sold	  over	  the	  previous	  year,	  the	  additional	  costs	  entailed	  would	  be	  borne	  by	  the	  upstream	  TSO.	  In	  reaching	  this	  threshold,	  the	  obliged	  Schleswag	  invoiced	  PreussenElektra	  for	  the	  additional	  costs	  which	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  dispute.	  It	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  PreussenElektra	  was	  a	  wholly	  owned	  subsidiary	  of	  another	  company	  which	  was	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100%	  privately	  owned.	  PreussenElektra	  had	  a	  majority	  shareholding	  in	  Schleswag	  of	  which	  the	  remaining	  third	  was	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  municipal	  authorities.	  According	  to	  the	  referring	  court,	  the	  individual	  undertakings	  were	  precluded	  by	  law	  and	  by	  circumstance	  from	  passing	  on	  the	  additional	  costs	  to	  the	  final	  consumers	  but	  this	  was	  contested	  and	  in	  the	  AG’s	  view	  there	  was	  indeed	  serious	  doubts	  whether	  this	  was	  really	  the	  case.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  analysing	  whether	  it	  amount	  to	  state	  aid,	  the	  measure	  consists	  of	  1)	  the	  obligation	  to	  purchase	  RES-­‐E	  at	  minimum	  prices	  exceeding	  its	  real	  economic	  value,	  and	  2)	  the	  mechanism	  allocating	  the	  financial	  burden	  among	  DSOs	  and	  TSOs.	  	  	  
3.1.2 Notion	  of	  aid	  	  
3.1.2.1 Other	  conditions	  than	  state	  resources	  	  The	  ECJ	  initially	  noted,	  “as	  a	  preliminary	  observation”,	  that	  there	  was	  no	  dispute	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  conferred	  a	  certain	  economic	  advantage	  on	  RES-­‐E	  producers,	  “since	  it	  guarantees	  them,	  with	  no	  risk,	  higher	  profits	  than	  they	  would	  make	  in	  its	  absence.”266	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  measure	  also	  distorted	  competition	  and	  affected	  intra-­‐Union	  trade	  was	  not	  touched	  upon.	  Neither	  did	  the	  submitted	  observations	  argue	  that	  these	  constituting	  elements	  were	  lacking.	  Under	  these	  circumstances	  the	  opinion	  by	  AG	  is	  highly	  indicative	  of	  the	  state	  of	  law.	  In	  his	  view,	  correctly	  in	  my	  opinion:	  	  	   There	  can	  indeed	  be	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  elevated	  minimum	  price	  for	  electricity	  produced	  form	  renewable	  sources	  combined	  with	  purchase	  obligation	  confers	  a	  considerable	  and	  specific	  economic	  advantage	  on	  producers	  of	  that	  type	  of	  electricity,	  thereby	  distorts	  competition	  between	  the	  different	  categories	  of	  producers	  and	  ultimately	  affects	  trade	  in	  electricity	  between	  Member	  States.267	  	  	  
3.1.2.2 Granted	  by	  a	  state	  or	  through	  state	  resources	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  contested	  issue	  is	  whether	  the	  advantage	  provided	  by	  the	  FIT	  law	  is	  “granted	  by	  a	  Member	  State	  or	  through	  State	  resources”	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  article	  107(1)	  TFEU.	  The	  doctrinal	  question	  underlying	  the	  dispute	  is	  whether	  the	  phrase	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  broad	  or	  in	  a	  narrow	  sense.	  Put	  differently,	  whether	  financing	  through	  state	  resources	  is	  a	  constitutive	  element	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  state	  aid.	  In	  AG’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  case	  law	  it	  certainly	  is.	  	  In	  a	  first	  step	  the	  ECJ	  stated	  that	  its	  case	  law	  showed	  that	  only	  advantages	  granted	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  through	  State	  resources	  were	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  aid.	  In	  this	  regard	  ECJ	  refuted	  the	  argument	  pursued	  by	  supporters	  of	  an	  expansive	  interpretation	  according	  to	  which	  “aid	  granted	  trough	  State	  resources”	  cover	  measures	  financed	  through	  public	  funds	  whilst	  “aid	  granted	  by	  a	  Member	  State”	  cover	  all	  remaining	  measures	  which	  are	  not	  financed	  through	  state	  resources.268	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  distinction	  made	  in	  the	  provision	  did	  not:	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  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  para	  54.	  	  267	  AG	  opinion	  para	  112	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	  	  268	  AG	  opinion	  para	  109,	  134,	  153	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	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[S]ignify	  that	  all	  advantages	  granted	  by	  a	  State,	  whether	  financed	  through	  State	  resources	  or	  not,	  constitute	  aid	  but	  is	  intended	  merely	  to	  bring	  within	  that	  definition	  both	  advantages	  which	  are	  granted	  directly	  by	  the	  State	  and	  those	  granted	  by	  a	  public	  or	  private	  body	  designated	  or	  established	  by	  the	  State.269	  	  	  This	  statement	  is	  followed	  by	  extensive	  references	  to	  Van	  Tiggele,	  Sloman	  
Neptun,	  Kirsammer-­‐Hack,	  Viscido,	  Ecotrade	  and	  Piaggio.	  	  The	  first	  case	  concerned	  a	  measure	  fixing	  minimum	  retail	  prices	  for	  gin	  and	  the	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  such	  a	  measure,	  “with	  the	  objective	  of	  favouring	  distributors	  of	  a	  product	  at	  the	  exclusive	  expense	  of	  consumers”,	  could	  not	  constitute	  an	  aid	  since	  it	  was	  not	  granted,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  through	  state	  resources.270	  The	  second	  case	  concerned	  a	  German	  international	  ship	  register	  which	  enabled	  certain	  shipping	  undertakings	  under	  German	  flag	  to	  subject	  seafarers	  of	  certain	  countries	  to	  less	  favourable	  working	  conditions	  and	  salaries	  than	  those	  applicable	  to	  German	  nationals.	  The	  ECJ,	  reiterating	  the	  quota	  above,	  found	  that	  the	  legislation	  only	  sought	  to	  alter	  in	  favour	  of	  shipping	  undertakings	  the	  framework	  within	  which	  contractual	  relations	  were	  formed	  between	  said	  undertakings	  and	  their	  employees	  and	  did	  not	  constitute	  an	  additional	  burden	  for	  the	  state	  or	  public	  bodies.271	  The	  potential	  loss	  of	  tax	  revenue	  arising	  from	  such	  a	  measure	  was	  considered	  inherent	  in	  the	  system	  and	  not	  a	  mean	  of	  granting	  a	  certain	  advantage	  to	  the	  undertakings	  concerned.	  Similarly,	  in	  
Kirsammer-­‐Hack	  which	  concerned	  a	  measure	  that	  exempted	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  undertakings	  from	  paying	  compensation	  and	  legal	  expenses	  in	  the	  event	  of	  unjustified	  dismissals,	  the	  ECJ	  reiterated	  the	  previous	  quote	  and	  found	  that	  no	  transfer	  of	  state	  resources	  were	  conferred	  upon	  the	  exempted	  undertakings.272	  Likewise,	  in	  Viscido	  the	  ECJ	  adhered	  to	  the	  quote	  and	  found	  that	  the	  non-­‐application	  of	  a	  generally	  applicable	  labour	  legislation	  concerning	  fixed-­‐term	  employment	  contracts	  to	  a	  single	  undertaking	  did	  not	  involve	  a	  transfer	  of	  state	  resources.273	  The	  quote	  was	  also	  reiterated	  in	  Ecotrade	  and	  Piaggion	  concerning	  an	  Italian	  law	  which	  by	  way	  of	  derogation	  from	  ordinary	  insolvency	  rules	  allowed	  certain	  undertakings	  to	  be	  placed	  under	  extraordinary	  administration	  and	  to	  be	  granted	  special	  protection	  from	  execution	  where	  it	  was	  highly	  likely	  that	  state	  or	  public	  bodies	  –	  hence	  state	  resources	  –	  would	  be	  among	  the	  principal	  creditors.	  In	  these	  cases,	  however,	  the	  ECJ	  did	  not	  establish	  that	  the	  measure	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid	  but	  left	  this	  assessment	  to	  the	  national	  court.	  According	  to	  inter	  alia	  the	  Commission,	  PreussenElektra	  and	  Schleswag,	  the	  case	  at	  hand	  should	  be	  distinguished	  from	  Van	  Tiggele	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  fixing	  of	  minimum	  prices	  the	  financial	  burden	  of	  which	  was	  borne	  by	  competitors	  to	  RES-­‐E	  producers.274	  Also,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  facts	  assessed	  in	  the	  three	  labour	  law	  related	  cases,	  PreussenElektra	  and	  the	  Commission	  held	  that	  the	  measure	  in	  the	  instant	  case	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  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  para	  58.	  	  270	  Case	  82/77	  Van	  Tiggele	  para	  24-­‐25.	  See	  also	  AG	  opinion	  para	  118	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  
PreussenElektra,	  Hanchner,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:61.	  	  271	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐72/91	  to	  C-­‐73/91	  Sloman	  Neptun	  para	  19,	  21.	  See	  also	  AG	  opinion	  para	  127	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  as	  well	  as	  Kuhn	  2001:366,	  Hanchner	  2012:61,	  66,	  84,	  90,	  331,	  338.	  	  272	  Case	  C-­‐189/91	  Kirsammer-­‐Hack	  para	  16-­‐17.	  	  273	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐52/97	  to	  C-­‐54/97	  Viscido	  para	  13-­‐14.	  	  274	  AG	  opinion	  para	  119,	  148	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	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obliged	  competitors	  to	  transfer	  money	  directly	  to	  the	  aided	  undertakings.275	  However,	  the	  Commission	  invoked	  the	  two	  last	  cases	  -­‐	  Ecotrade	  and	  Piaggion	  –	  as	  authority	  for	  classifying	  the	  FIT	  law	  in	  question	  as	  state	  aid.	  Relying	  on	  data	  showing	  that	  the	  German	  state	  and/or	  public	  authorities	  owned	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  undertakings	  that	  operated	  both	  as	  TSOs	  and	  conventional	  electricity	  producers	  as	  well	  as	  DSOs,	  the	  Commission	  held	  that	  since	  the	  FIT	  law	  did	  not	  differentiate	  between	  publicly	  and	  privately	  owned	  undertakings	  state	  resources	  in	  effect	  financed	  the	  measure.	  I	  will	  call	  this	  argument	  the	  second	  best	  one.	  To	  what	  extent	  these	  arguments	  were	  considered	  by	  the	  ECJ	  will	  be	  seen	  below.	  Sufficient	  to	  note	  at	  this	  juncture	  is	  that	  according	  to	  one	  commentator	  all	  five	  cases	  (Ecotrade	  and	  Piaggio	  treated	  as	  one)	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  ECJ	  is	  representative	  of	  its	  “long-­‐standing	  concern	  that	  certain	  legitimate	  policy	  choices	  should	  not	  be	  caught	  by	  the	  State	  aid	  prohibition.”276	  	  In	  a	  second	  step,	  turning	  to	  the	  instant	  FIT	  scheme,	  the	  ECJ	  stated	  that	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  did	  not	  involve	  any	  direct	  or	  indirect	  transfer	  of	  state	  resources	  to	  RES-­‐E	  producers.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  financial	  burden	  arising	  from	  the	  purchase	  for	  DSOs	  as	  between	  them	  and	  other	  private	  undertakings	  could	  not	  constitute	  a	  direct	  or	  indirect	  transfer	  of	  state	  resources	  either.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations,	  the	  court	  preliminary	  concluded	  that	  “the	  fact	  that	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  is	  imposed	  by	  statute	  and	  confers	  an	  undeniable	  advantage	  on	  certain	  undertakings”	  was	  not	  capable	  of	  conferring	  upon	  it	  the	  character	  of	  state	  aid	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  article	  107(1)	  TFEU.	  Obviously,	  the	  court	  does	  not	  distinguish	  between	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  transfer	  resources	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  transferred	  resources	  are	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  state	  resources.	  The	  FIT	  scheme	  undoubtedly	  transfer	  resources	  and	  these	  are	  made	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  fixed	  (and	  higher)	  minimum	  price	  and	  the	  lower	  market	  value.	  The	  question	  that	  the	  ECJ	  arguably	  should	  have	  examined,	  either	  directly	  or	  upon	  a	  finding	  that	  resources	  are	  transferred,	  is	  whether	  the	  resources	  constitute	  state	  resources.277	  In	  AG’s	  view	  the	  sums	  transferred	  under	  the	  FIT	  scheme:	  	  	  [N]ever	  are	  and	  never	  will	  be	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  the	  German	  authorities.	  No	  public	  authority	  enjoys	  at	  any	  moment	  any	  rights	  with	  regard	  to	  those	  sums.	  In	  fact	  they	  never	  leave	  the	  private	  sphere.278	  	  	  Since	  the	  ECJ	  did	  not	  handle	  this	  question	  one	  cannot	  assume	  that	  it	  shared	  AG’s	  view,	  at	  least	  not	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  judgement.	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  statement,	  albeit	  formally	  correct,	  disregard	  the	  economic	  effects	  of	  such	  an	  approach.	  AG’s	  view	  was	  a	  response	  to	  the	  argument	  put	  forth	  by	  inter	  alia	  the	  Commission	  who	  claimed	  that	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  converted	  private	  resources	  into	  state	  resources.	  More	  specifically,	  by	  requiring	  TSO’s	  to	  pay	  money	  to	  DSO’s	  without	  receiving	  anything	  in	  return,	  the	  measure	  approximated	  parafiscal	  charges279	  used	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  275	  AG	  opinion	  para	  149	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	  276	  Jaeger	  2012:3.	  	  	  277	  See	  for	  instance	  Heidenham	  2009:39.	  	  278	  Ag	  opinion	  para	  166	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	  279	  Charges/duties/levies	  are	  parafiscal	  if	  the	  allocation	  of	  their	  return,	  in	  contrast	  to	  taxes,	  are	  predetermined.	  The	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  is	  however	  not	  defined	  by	  the	  courts.	  See	  Heidenhain	  2009:31.	  See	  also	  Hanchner,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:130	  on	  the	  relationship	  with	  indirect	  taxation.	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finance	  aid	  measures.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  scheme	  was	  thus	  considered	  analogous	  to	  the	  ones	  yielded	  by	  taxation	  insofar	  that	  resources	  were	  withdrawn	  from	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  committed	  to	  a	  public	  interest	  objective.	  In	  my	  opinion	  this	  was	  the	  best	  argument	  put	  forward	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  classifying	  the	  measure	  as	  state	  aid.	  In	  AG’s	  view	  the	  decisive	  component	  was	  whether	  the	  state	  exercised	  control	  over	  the	  resources	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  parafiscal	  charges,	  the	  money	  became	  the	  property	  of	  the	  state	  before	  it	  was	  redistributed,	  which	  were	  not	  the	  case	  here.	  The	  problem	  with	  such	  a	  view	  is	  that	  it	  presupposes	  administrative	  action	  on	  part	  of	  the	  state	  or	  bodies	  attributed	  to	  it	  and	  can	  arguably	  easily	  by	  circumvented	  by	  establishing	  legislation,	  such	  as	  the	  FIT	  law	  in	  question,	  which	  canalises	  resources	  towards	  a	  predefined	  public	  interest	  without	  having	  the	  state	  involved	  in	  anything	  but	  adopting	  the	  legislation.	  Accordingly,	  there	  is	  a	  very	  fine	  –	  if	  not	  purely	  formalistic	  –	  line	  between	  minimum	  price	  systems	  accompanied	  by	  a	  purchase	  obligation	  and	  parafiscal	  charges.280	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  ECJ	  omitted	  to	  examine	  the	  second	  best	  argument	  put	  forward	  (mentioned	  above)	  i.e.	  the	  measure	  was	  partially	  or	  wholly	  financed	  by	  publicly	  owned	  undertakings	  and	  hence	  amounted	  to	  state	  resources.	  The	  AG	  was	  uncertain	  as	  to	  the	  proper	  interpretation	  of	  the	  judgements	  in	  Ecotrade	  and	  
Piaggio,	  the	  final	  assessment	  of	  which	  ECJ	  left	  it	  to	  the	  national	  court,	  but	  stated	  that	  if	  they	  nonetheless	  served	  as	  authority	  for	  the	  argument	  pursued,	  they	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  one	  main	  qualification,	  namely	  that	  state/public	  undertakings	  should	  be	  among	  the	  chief	  creditors/financers	  of	  the	  aided	  undertaking(s).	  In	  this	  regard	  he	  relied	  on	  the	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  German	  government	  stating	  that	  only	  two	  of	  eight	  –	  in	  contrast	  to	  six	  of	  nine,	  as	  submitted	  by	  the	  Commission	  –	  of	  the	  undertakings	  operating	  as	  both	  (grey	  electricity)	  producers	  and	  TSOs	  were	  controlled	  by	  the	  state.	  No	  data	  was	  available	  for	  the	  ownership	  structures	  of	  the	  distribution	  undertakings	  but	  they	  were,	  according	  to	  Germany,	  subject	  to	  rapid	  changes	  with	  a	  clear	  tendency	  towards	  private	  ownership.	  Together	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  PreussenElektra	  was	  privately	  held	  and	  also	  held	  the	  majority	  share	  of	  Schleswag,	  the	  AG	  concluded	  that	  the	  qualification	  was	  not	  met.	  The	  outcome	  is	  however	  not	  evident.	  Firstly,	  two	  of	  eight	  undertakings	  controlled	  by	  the	  state	  may	  nonetheless	  be	  sufficient	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  state	  are	  among	  the	  chief	  creditors/financers	  of	  the	  aided	  undertakings.	  Ecotrade	  and	  Piaggio	  do	  not	  in	  my	  view	  establish	  a	  firm	  quantitative	  criterion	  in	  this	  regard.	  Secondly,	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  data	  were	  available	  on	  the	  ownership	  structures	  of	  the	  distributors	  who	  inevitably	  would	  have	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  up	  to	  the	  5	  %	  threshold	  is	  a	  rather	  good	  argument	  for	  leaving	  the	  final	  assessment	  to	  the	  national	  court,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  concluding	  definitely	  on	  this	  issue	  and	  leave	  it	  open	  for	  reconsideration.	  Thirdly,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  concrete	  application	  of	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  did	  not	  formally	  involve	  undertakings	  controlled	  by	  the	  state/public	  bodies,	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  in	  general	  was	  partially	  financed	  by	  undertakings	  controlled	  by	  the	  state.	  I	  submit	  that	  the	  ECJ,	  by	  neither	  examining	  whether	  the	  resources	  transferred	  constituted	  state	  resources	  nor	  expressly	  limiting	  or	  considering	  the	  economical	  effects	  of	  such	  an	  approach,	  employed	  a	  lenient	  approach	  toward	  the	  RES-­‐E	  scheme	  in	  question.	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   In	  a	  third	  step	  the	  ECJ	  considered	  the	  two	  remaining	  arguments	  in	  favour	  of	  classifying	  the	  measure	  as	  state	  aid.	  The	  first	  argument	  held	  that	  the	  FIT-­‐scheme	  negatively	  affected	  the	  economic	  results	  of	  the	  undertakings	  subject	  to	  the	  purchase	  and	  compensation	  obligation	  and	  hence	  entailed	  a	  corresponding	  loss	  in	  tax	  revenue	  for	  the	  state.	  Such	  a	  consequence	  was	  however	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  inherent	  feature	  of	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  and	  could	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  conferral	  of	  an	  advantage	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  state.	  Although	  the	  first	  argument	  is	  weak	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  the	  second	  one	  is	  even	  weaker	  and	  arguably	  illustrates	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  repercussions	  of	  not	  classifying	  the	  scheme	  as	  state	  aid.	  Under	  the	  second	  argument	  the	  Commission	  held	  that	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  articles	  107-­‐108	  TFEU	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  interpret	  state	  aid	  so	  as	  to	  include	  measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect	  which,	  like	  the	  FIT-­‐scheme	  in	  question,	  was	  decided	  upon	  by	  the	  state	  but	  financed	  by	  private	  undertakings.	  To	  this	  end,	  it	  submitted	  by	  analogy	  case	  law	  on	  article	  101	  TFEU	  (an	  antitrust	  provision)	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  article	  10	  EC,	  now	  contained	  in	  article	  4(3)	  second	  and	  third	  subparagraph	  TEU.	  The	  ECJ,	  having	  noted	  that	  article	  101	  TFEU	  concern	  only	  the	  conduct	  of	  undertakings	  whilst	  article	  107	  TFEU	  refer	  directly	  to	  measures	  undertaken	  by	  the	  member	  states,	  briefly	  stated	  that	  article	  4(3)	  TEU	  could	  not	  be	  used	  to	  extent	  the	  scope	  of	  article	  107	  TFEU	  to	  conduct	  by	  state	  that	  does	  not	  fall	  within	  it.	  	  	   In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  and	  the	  allocating	  mechanism	  prescribed	  by	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  did	  not	  amount	  to	  state	  aid.	  	  	  
3.1.3 Preliminary	  assessment	  	  The	  lenient	  approach	  on	  behalf	  of	  ECJ	  effectively	  implies	  that	  as	  long	  as	  the	  state	  and/or	  public	  authorities/undertakings	  are	  not	  administratively	  involved	  in	  directing	  the	  advantages	  and	  its	  financial	  burden	  among	  certain	  undertakings,	  the	  support	  scheme	  will	  prevail	  and	  not	  amount	  to	  state	  aid.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  elsewhere	  that	  the	  PreussenElektra	  judgement	  did	  not	  deal	  with	  the	  potentially	  wider	  meaning	  of	  whether	  aid	  was	  granted	  “through	  State	  resources	  
in	  any	  form	  whatsoever”	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  article	  107(1)	  TFEU	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  left	  aside	  the	  potential	  application	  of	  private	  funds	  under	  state	  control.281	  Apart	  from	  presupposing	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  state	  control,	  the	  suggestion	  seems	  to	  misunderstand	  ECJ’s	  reasoning	  and	  possibly	  conflate	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  financing	  through	  state	  resources	  is	  a	  constituting	  element	  of	  aid,	  which	  the	  court	  certainly	  held,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  omitted	  to	  examine	  whether	  the	  resources	  constituted	  state	  resources.	  Also,	  supporters	  of	  an	  extensive	  interpretation	  invoked	  the	  element	  “in	  any	  form	  whatsoever”,282	  whilst	  the	  ECJ	  as	  well	  as	  AG	  clearly	  opted	  for	  a	  narrow	  approach.	  Therefore,	  private	  funds	  arising	  from	  legislation	  and	  whose	  apportioning	  and	  administration	  is	  voluntarily	  (for	  practically	  reasons	  or	  the	  like)	  taken	  care	  of	  by	  private	  undertakings	  operating	  in	  that	  market	  will	  not	  following	  PreussenElektra	  amount	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  Hanchner,	  Ottervanger	  and	  Slot	  2012:61f.	  See	  also	  p.	  65	  where	  the	  authors	  wrongly	  state	  that	  the	  ECJ	  did	  not	  examine	  whether	  the	  measure	  “constituted	  an	  additional	  charge	  for	  the	  German	  state	  –	  in	  the	  form	  of	  tax	  revenue	  foregone.”	  	  282	  Ag	  opinion	  para	  137	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra.	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to	  state	  aid.	  To	  what	  extent	  the	  precedent	  established	  in	  PreussenElektra	  is	  relevant	  for	  subsequent	  and	  updated	  FIT	  schemes	  will	  be	  seen	  below.	  	  
	  
3.2 Vent	  de	  Colère:	  FIT	  scheme	  	  
3.2.1 Background	  and	  measure	  	  This	  case	  concerns	  a	  FIT	  scheme	  comprising	  a	  purchase	  obligation	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  from	  wind	  power	  at	  prices	  higher	  than	  the	  market	  price	  for	  electricity.	  The	  undertakings	  subject	  to	  the	  obligation	  are	  the	  distributors	  operating	  the	  network	  to	  which	  the	  RES-­‐E	  production	  installations	  are	  connected	  (i.e.	  DSOs,	  possibly	  also	  TSOs).	  As	  such	  it	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  scheme	  assessed	  in	  PreussenElektra.	  However,	  whilst	  the	  pricing	  method	  was	  predetermined	  in	  law	  in	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  price	  calculating	  procedure	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  was	  laid	  down	  by	  orders	  of	  the	  French	  Minister	  for	  Economy	  and	  Minister	  of	  Energy	  after	  consultation	  with	  the	  Higher	  Council	  of	  Energy	  and	  the	  French	  energy	  regulator	  (CRE).	  Eligible	  additional	  costs	  arising	  from	  the	  purchase	  obligation,	  determined	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Energy,	  was	  offset	  by	  a	  Public	  long-­‐term	  investment	  group	  (CDC)	  who	  maintained	  for	  that	  purpose	  a	  specific	  account.	  The	  compensation	  paid	  for	  distributors	  was	  passed	  on	  to	  final	  consumers	  who	  were	  obliged	  to	  pay	  to	  the	  mentioned	  account	  and	  faced	  an	  administrative	  penalty	  in	  case	  of	  non-­‐compliance.	  The	  amount	  of	  charge	  was	  set	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  quantity	  of	  electricity	  consumed	  and	  to	  cover	  other	  expenses,	  such	  as	  the	  management	  costs	  of	  CDC.	  Several	  individuals	  brought	  action	  and	  claimed	  that	  this	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid.	  The	  question	  asked	  by	  the	  referring	  court	  was	  basically	  whether	  the	  mechanism	  for	  offsetting	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid.	  	  	  
3.2.2 Notion	  of	  aid	  	  
3.2.2.1 Other	  conditions	  than	  state	  resources	  	  The	  ECJ	  initially	  stated	  that	  all	  four	  conditions	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  to	  amount	  to	  state	  aid	  but	  that	  the	  question	  referred	  by	  the	  national	  court	  only	  concerned	  one	  of	  them.	  The	  national	  court	  indeed	  considered	  that	  three	  of	  the	  conditions	  –	  advantage	  liable	  to	  affect	  intra-­‐Union	  trade	  and	  impact	  on	  competition	  –	  were	  met.283	  Accordingly,	  an	  affirmative	  answer	  on	  part	  of	  the	  ECJ	  would	  in	  effect	  imply	  that	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  would	  be	  classified	  as	  state	  aid.	  In	  my	  opinion	  AG’s	  opinion	  in	  PreussenElektra	  is	  equally	  applicable	  to	  the	  facts	  at	  hand,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  increased	  amount	  of	  RES-­‐E	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  developments	  at	  the	  grid	  level	  enabling	  to	  a	  larger	  degree	  cross-­‐border	  trade	  of	  RES-­‐E.	  	  
3.2.2.2 Granted	  by	  a	  state	  or	  through	  state	  resources	  	  Having	  identified	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  the	  measure	  in	  order	  to	  constitute	  state	  aid	  must	  be	  granted	  directly/indirectly	  through	  state	  resources	  and	  attributable	  to	  the	  state,	  the	  ECJ	  found	  that	  the	  offset	  mechanism	  was	  clearly	  established	  by	  law	  and	  therefore	  fulfilled	  the	  latter	  criterion.	  The	  court	  then	  turned	  to	  the	  first	  criterion	  and	  noted	  that	  the	  sums	  intended	  for	  the	  offsetting	  mechanism	  were	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collected	  from	  all	  final	  electricity	  consumers	  in	  France	  and	  entrusted	  CDC,	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  charge	  imposed	  in	  this	  regard	  was	  determined	  annually	  by	  the	  Minister	  for	  Energy	  by	  order	  on	  a	  proposal	  from	  CRE	  and	  that	  an	  administrative	  penalty	  was	  imposed	  in	  the	  event	  of	  failure	  to	  pay	  the	  charge.	  Account	  was	  also	  taken	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  but	  relied	  on	  by	  the	  French	  state	  at	  the	  hearing,	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  would	  ultimately	  be	  covered	  in	  full	  by	  the	  French	  state	  if	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  charges	  collected	  was	  not	  sufficient	  and	  that	  the	  obliged	  undertakings	  retained	  the	  charges	  to	  the	  extent	  their	  additional	  costs	  were	  not	  covered	  to	  the	  (highly	  contradicting)	  effect	  that	  these	  funds	  was	  not	  channelled	  through	  the	  account	  of	  CDC.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  it	  is	  firmly	  established	  that	  (at	  least)	  aid	  granted	  through	  a	  public	  or	  private	  body	  appointed	  or	  established	  by	  the	  state	  to	  administer	  the	  aid	  falls	  within	  the	  prohibition	  scope	  (i.e.	  a	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  the	  second	  limb).	  This	  criterion	  was	  interpreted	  in	  Italy	  v	  Commission	  concerning	  legislation	  that	  reduced	  the	  social	  charges	  on	  undertaking	  in	  the	  Italian	  textile	  industry	  but	  where	  the	  lost	  state	  revenue	  was	  offset	  by	  contributions	  by	  employers	  to	  an	  unemployment	  insurance	  fund.	  In	  that	  case	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  since	  the	  funds	  were	  financed	  through	  compulsory	  contributions	  imposed	  by	  state	  legislation	  and	  managed	  and	  apportioned	  by	  its	  provisions,	  they	  must	  nevertheless	  be	  regarded	  as	  state	  resources	  even	  if	  institutions	  distinct	  from	  public	  authorities	  administered	  them.284	  The	  ECJ	  referred	  both	  to	  this	  case	  and	  the	  aforementioned	  criterion.	  Accordingly,	  the	  court	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  could	  have	  simply	  pointed	  out	  that	  at	  least	  some	  –	  or,	  according	  to	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  law,	  all	  –	  of	  the	  charges	  were	  channelized	  through	  the	  account	  by	  CDC	  and	  concluded	  that	  this	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid.	  However,	  the	  ECJ	  spent	  quite	  a	  lot	  paragraphs	  to	  establish	  that	  the	  sums	  managed	  by	  CDC	  remained	  under	  public	  control.	  ECJ	  thus	  noted,	  in	  essence,	  that	  CDC	  was	  acting	  as	  an	  intermediary	  in	  the	  management	  of	  those	  funds,	  that	  it	  was	  a	  public	  law	  corporation	  whose	  key	  personnel	  were	  appointed	  by	  governmental	  and	  other	  public	  institutions,	  that	  it	  provided	  several	  services	  for	  CDR	  without	  making	  any	  profits	  from	  its	  activity	  and	  that	  its	  managements	  costs	  were	  financed	  by	  the	  charges	  levied	  on	  final	  consumers.	  Therefore,	  the	  ECJ	  concluded,	  the	  sums	  managed	  must	  be	  regarded	  as	  remaining	  under	  public	  control.	  As	  such	  the	  reasoning	  and	  its	  outcome	  is	  anything	  but	  surprising.	  	  	   However,	  the	  ECJ	  then	  added	  that	  all	  those	  factors	  –	  the	  role	  of	  CDC	  –	  distinguished	  the	  instant	  case	  from	  PreussenElektra	  where	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  at	  fixed	  minimum	  prices	  did	  not	  amount	  to	  any	  direct/indirect	  transfer	  of	  state	  resources.	  It	  also	  referred	  to	  the	  judgement	  in	  Essent	  Netwerk	  
Noord	  who	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  private	  undertakings	  in	  PreussenElektra	  had	  not	  been	  appointed	  by	  the	  state	  to	  manage	  a	  state	  resource	  but	  were	  bound	  by	  an	  purchase	  obligation	  by	  means	  of	  their	  own	  financial	  resources.	  Therefore,	  the	  court	  proceeded	  and	  formally	  clarified	  one	  of	  the	  omitted	  issues	  in	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  funds	  involved	  in	  PreussenElektra	  could	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  state	  resources	  since	  they	  were	  not	  at	  any	  time	  under	  public	  control	  and	  there	  was	  no	  offsetting	  mechanism	  such	  as	  that	  in	  the	  instant	  case.	  Accordingly,	  the	  offsetting	  mechanism	  arising	  from	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  and	  financed	  by	  all	  final	  consumers	  in	  the	  French	  territory	  amounted	  to	  an	  intervention	  through	  state	  resources	  and	  ultimately	  state	  aid.	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   Two	  aspects	  should	  be	  noted	  here.	  Firstly,	  the	  ECJ	  validates	  the	  approach	  in	  PreussenElektra.	  The	  formal	  clarification	  that	  the	  funds	  involved	  there	  did	  not	  amount	  to	  state	  resource	  does	  in	  fact	  only	  subtract	  a	  formal	  component	  from	  its	  favourable	  approach,	  since	  the	  same	  result	  would	  have	  been	  achieved	  by	  the	  remaining	  skeleton	  which	  disregarded	  the	  economic	  effects	  of	  the	  outcome.	  	  Secondly,	  the	  means	  employed	  by	  the	  ECJ	  to	  distinguish	  the	  instant	  case	  from	  
PreussenElektra	  clearly	  departs	  from	  AG’s	  view.	  According	  to	  him:	  	  	   [T]he	  primary	  factor	  distinguishing	  the	  present	  case	  from	  the	  mechanism	  examined	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  PreussenElektra	  is	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  financing	  the	  obligation	  to	  purchase	  electricity	  from	  wind	  power	  at	  a	  price	  higher	  than	  the	  market	  price	  applies	  to	  all	  consumers	  of	  electricity	  in	  France,	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  they	  purchase	  green	  energy	  or	  not,	  knowing	  that,	  in	  the	  liberalised	  electricity	  market,	  the	  achievement	  of	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  objectives	  of	  the	  Union,	  competition	  exists	  between	  the	  producers	  and	  the	  suppliers	  of	  energy.	  While	  conceding	  that,	  physically,	  electricity	  from	  different	  sources	  are	  mixed	  together	  in	  the	  distribution	  network,	  I	  note	  that,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  mechanism	  in	  the	  main	  proceedings,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  the	  suppliers	  to	  differentiate,	  for	  tariff	  purposes,	  between	  the	  different	  categories	  of	  consumers,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  consumers	  to	  opt	  for	  or	  against	  purchasing	  renewable	  energy.285	  	  	  The	  AG’s	  view	  warrants	  several	  comments.	  Firstly,	  he	  seems	  to	  take	  into	  account	  a	  policy	  reason	  that	  is	  far	  from	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  settle	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  funds	  at	  stake	  amount	  to	  state	  resources.	  Secondly,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  resources	  financing	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  in	  
PreussenElektra	  ultimately	  were	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  final	  consumers,	  remained	  unanswered	  in	  those	  proceedings	  and	  the	  question	  was	  neither	  expressly	  considered	  by	  the	  ECJ.	  Nothing	  in	  that	  scheme	  explicitly	  precluded	  TSOs/DSOs	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  to	  the	  next	  level	  in	  the	  supply	  chain:	  DSOs	  and	  final	  consumers,	  respectively.	  Rather,	  assuming	  that	  AG’s	  view	  in	  that	  case	  was	  correct,	  the	  obstacles	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  were	  based	  on	  the	  refusals	  by	  the	  authorities	  in	  the	  region	  where	  Schleswig	  operated	  to	  authorise	  higher	  tariffs.286	  Therefore,	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  286	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  AG	  	  -­‐	  in	  the	  opinion	  para	  86	  in	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  –	  seem	  to	  contradict	  himself	  or	  at	  least	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  answer	  on	  the	  possibility	  to	  actually	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  to	  final	  consumers:	  “The	  refusals	  by	  the	  authorities	  of	  the	  Land	  Schleswag-­‐Holstein	  to	  authorise	  higher	  tariffs	  for	  electricity	  supplied	  to	  final	  consumers,	  which	  were	  invoked	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  that	  there	  were	  legal	  impediments	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  supplementary	  costs,	  seem	  to	  be	  based	  on	  other	  reasons	  and	  do	  not	  imply	  that	  those	  authorities	  failed	  to	  recognize	  those	  supplementary	  costs	  as	  legitimate.	  Moreover,	  it	  appears	  from	  replies	  to	  another	  written	  question	  put	  by	  the	  Court	  that	  the	  SreEG	  1998	  [the	  FIT	  law],	  by	  allowing	  the	  supplementary	  costs	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  calculating	  tariffs,	  does	  allow	  network	  operators	  affected	  by	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  supplementary	  costs	  to	  competitors	  who	  want	  to	  deliver	  electricity	  through	  the	  network	  in	  question.	  That	  in	  turn	  enables	  the	  network	  operators	  to	  pass	  on	  supplementary	  costs	  to	  final	  consumers	  without	  having	  to	  fear	  competition	  from	  suppliers	  not	  subject	  to	  obligations	  of	  the	  StrEG	  1998.”	  Firstly,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  authorities	  refuses	  to	  authorise	  higher	  tariffs	  but	  nevertheless	  consider	  the	  additional	  costs	  of	  RES-­‐E	  as	  “legitimate”	  does	  not	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  actually	  eligible	  to	  include	  in	  the	  tariff.	  Secondly,	  the	  possibility	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  to	  competitors	  is	  theoretically	  sound	  but	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  why	  these,	  under	  circumstances	  where	  grey	  electricity	  are	  cheaper,	  would	  deliberate	  the	  purchase	  of	  RES-­‐E.	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assuming	  that	  authorities	  in	  other	  regions	  de	  facto	  allowed	  the	  passing	  on	  of	  costs	  to	  final	  consumers	  or	  at	  least	  that	  such	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  was	  envisaged	  by	  the	  German	  legislator,	  the	  AG	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  seems	  to	  draw	  the	  wrong	  conclusion.	  Thirdly,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  AG’s	  view	  would	  have	  prevailed	  and	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  judgement	  it	  could	  be	  read	  so	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  that	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  to	  the	  consumers	  without	  there	  being	  a	  choice	  for	  the	  latter	  to	  refuse	  the	  additional	  cost/RES-­‐E,	  would	  -­‐	  for	  some	  additional	  reason	  or	  another	  –	  amount	  to	  state	  aid.	  This	  would	  then	  potentially	  comprise	  all	  RES-­‐E	  schemes.	  Thus,	  the	  fact	  that	  ECJ	  distinguished	  the	  instant	  case	  from	  PreussenElektra	  on	  other	  grounds	  than	  the	  AG	  enhances	  state	  discretion.	  	  	  	  
3.2.3 Preliminary	  assessment	  	  The	  outcome	  of	  Vent	  de	  Colere	  undoubtedly	  constraints	  state	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  FIT	  schemes	  where	  the	  state	  and	  public	  bodies	  are	  deeply	  involved	  in	  apportioning	  and	  channelizing	  the	  financial	  means.	  The	  judgement	  is	  therefore	  anything	  but	  surprising.	  The	  only	  surprising	  element	  is	  that	  the	  French	  state,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  considerably	  favourable	  scope	  provided	  by	  PreussenElektra,	  succeeded	  to	  construct	  a	  FIT	  scheme	  that	  so	  blatantly	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid	  and	  brought	  it	  before	  ECJ.287	  At	  the	  very	  same	  time,	  the	  outcome	  seemingly	  enhance	  state	  discretion	  in	  that	  it	  expressly	  validates	  the	  favourable	  approach	  in	  
PreussenElektra	  and,	  in	  particular,	  also	  disregards	  AG’s	  opinion	  on	  how	  the	  financial	  burden	  is	  passed	  on	  to	  final	  consumers.	  	  	  
3.3 Commission’s	  decisional	  practice	  and	  soft	  law	  	  By	  virtue	  of	  being	  the	  final	  arbitrator	  of	  EU	  law	  the	  judgements	  of	  the	  ECJ	  (and	  partly	  the	  General	  Court288)	  exert	  a	  decisive	  influence.	  However,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  state	  aid	  control	  its	  role	  is	  generally	  confined	  to	  interpret	  the	  notion	  of	  aid	  in	  cases	  brought	  before	  it	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  review	  whether	  in	  particular	  the	  Commission	  has	  manifestly	  transgressed	  its	  powers.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  states	  principal	  choice	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design,	  the	  Commission	  has	  at	  the	  outset	  monopoly	  of	  the	  ex	  ante	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  control	  and	  monitoring	  of	  state	  aid289	  and	  enjoys	  in	  this	  regard	  considerable	  discretion.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  granted	  the	  Commission	  a	  broad	  scope	  of	  discretion	  concerning,	  first,	  whether	  a	  measure	  amounts	  to	  state	  aid	  whenever	  the	  assessment	  is	  based	  on	  technically	  or	  economically	  complicated	  considerations,	  and,	  second,	  whether	  the	  aid	  measure	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  under	  article	  107(3)(c)	  TFEU	  and	  as	  elaborated	  by	  inter	  alia	  guidelines.	  The	  most	  prominent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  287	  The	  procedural	  background	  is	  that	  France	  omitted	  to	  notify	  the	  scheme	  to	  the	  Commission	  which,	  in	  view	  of	  ECJ’s	  judgement,	  means	  that	  it	  runs	  the	  highly	  inconvenient	  risk	  of	  being	  obliged	  to	  recover	  the	  illegal	  aid.	  This	  would	  not	  necessarily	  have	  been	  the	  case	  if	  the	  measure	  would	  have	  been	  notified	  diligently,	  even	  if	  it	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid.	  	  	  288	  Over	  the	  years	  a	  clear	  rift	  have	  been	  visible	  between	  the	  ECJ	  and	  the	  General	  Court	  in	  the	  context	  of	  state	  aid	  law,	  downplaying	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  latter	  in	  contentious	  cases.	  See	  for	  instance	  Biondi	  2013.	  	  289	  See	  for	  instance	  Heidenhain	  2009:575.	  Until	  2014,	  operating	  aid	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  general	  block	  exemption	  regime.	  The	  changes	  does	  however	  not	  affect	  substantial	  state	  discretion,	  but	  rather	  its	  procedural	  aspects.	  See	  footnote	  311.	  	  
	   67	  
Commission	  defeats	  relates	  however	  to	  the	  first	  aspect	  of	  which	  perhaps	  the	  most	  notable	  case	  is	  the	  judgement	  in	  PreussenElektra.290	  	  	   Having	  these	  aspects	  in	  mind,	  the	  following	  discussion	  will	  present	  and	  analyse	  Commission’s	  decisional	  practice	  and	  its	  preconditions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  The	  purpose	  is	  both	  to	  clarify	  whether	  these	  schemes	  may	  amount	  to	  state	  aid	  and	  to	  illustrate	  how	  the	  compatibility	  regime	  is	  functioning	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  delimitating	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  regard.	  Generally,	  it	  is	  quite	  uncommon	  that	  the	  Commission	  adopt	  negative	  decisions,	  and	  this	  is	  especially	  true	  for	  the	  individual	  decisions	  in	  respect	  of	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  below.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  low	  rate	  of	  negative	  Commission	  decisions,	  rather	  than	  signifying	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  the	  aid	  control	  regime,	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  states’	  anticipation	  of	  Commission	  control	  and	  consequently	  their	  framing	  of	  aid	  measures	  in	  a	  way	  that	  fits	  the	  criteria	  defined	  in	  soft	  law.	  In	  particular,	  the	  less	  precise	  the	  Commission’s	  soft	  law	  is	  on	  compatible	  aid,	  the	  easier	  it	  becomes	  for	  states	  to	  justify	  distortive	  aid	  on	  this	  imprecise	  basis.291	  Thus,	  if	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  amount	  to	  aid	  measures,	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  will	  ultimately	  depend	  on	  the	  (im)precision	  of	  the	  compatibility	  criteria	  laid	  down	  in	  soft	  law.	  In	  order	  to	  illustrate	  such	  a	  turn	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  precision	  and	  hence	  state	  discretion,	  a	  comparison	  is	  necessary	  between	  the	  newly	  adopted	  EEAG	  and	  the	  previous	  EAG.	  Since	  the	  concept	  of	  aid	  is	  objective	  and	  not	  subject	  to	  shifting	  compatibility	  criteria,	  the	  following	  discussion	  contains	  two	  parts.	  	  The	  first	  part	  comprises	  four	  individual	  decisions	  concerning	  all	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  and	  deals	  accordingly	  with	  whether	  they	  amount	  to	  aid	  and,	  if	  so,	  whether	  they	  may	  be	  considered	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  under	  2008	  EAG.	  When	  necessary	  to	  illustrate	  the	  broader	  picture,	  the	  assessment	  of	  whether	  the	  measure	  amounts	  to	  aid	  will	  be	  contrasted	  with	  other	  decisions	  concerning	  the	  same	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme.	  The	  second	  part	  presents	  the	  new	  EEAG	  and	  illustrate	  briefly	  its	  application	  in	  one	  of	  the	  few	  decisions	  that	  had	  been	  taken	  under	  it.	  	  
3.3.1 Commission’s	  decisions	  under	  EAG	  	  In	  comparison	  to	  the	  2001	  EAG,	  the	  2008	  EAG	  went	  much	  further	  in	  recognizing	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  aid	  and	  climate	  change.292	  Also,	  the	  2008	  EAG	  continued	  the	  trend	  evident	  in	  the	  previous	  EAG	  of	  extending	  the	  scope	  of	  aid	  considered	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  pursuant	  to	  article	  107(3)(c)	  TFEU.293	  The	  compatibility	  framework	  basically	  consists	  of	  two	  steps.	  The	  first	  step	  comprises	  general	  assessment	  criteria	  such	  as	  whether	  the	  aid	  measure	  is	  aimed	  at	  a	  well	  defined	  objective	  of	  common	  interest,	  whether	  it	  is	  well	  designed	  to	  deliver	  to	  objective	  (i.e.	  appropriate,	  proportional,	  incentivizing	  effect)	  and	  whether	  the	  distortions	  of	  competition	  is	  limited.294	  The	  second	  step	  comprises	  the	  specific	  criteria	  on	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes,	  which	  are	  classified	  as	  operating	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  Blauberger	  2008:9,	  17f.	  See	  also	  de	  Cecco	  2013:45	  according	  to	  which	  the	  Commission	  enjoys	  more	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  whether	  the	  measure	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market.	  See	  also	  Heidenhain	  2009:755	  according	  to	  which	  this	  issue	  is	  less	  clearcut	  than	  the	  discretion	  enjoyed	  under	  article	  107(3)	  TFEU.	  	  291	  Blauberger	  2008:17,	  23.	  292	  See	  for	  instance	  Kaur	  2009:283.	  	  293	  Maca	  2009:20,	  Blauberger	  2008:15.	  	  294	  EAG	  point	  16.	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aid.295	  TGC	  schemes	  and	  tenders	  (not	  necessarily	  TENFIT)	  are	  considered	  as	  market	  based	  mechanisms	  that	  allow	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  to	  benefit	  indirectly	  from	  guaranteed	  demand	  for	  their	  energy.	  Where	  such	  a	  mechanism	  constitute	  state	  aid,	  it	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  authorised	  for	  a	  period	  of	  10	  years	  provided	  that	  the	  member	  state	  show	  that	  it	  is	  1)	  essential	  to	  ensure	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  RES	  technology	  concerned,	  2)	  does	  not	  result	  in	  overcompensation	  and	  3)	  does	  not	  dissuade	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  from	  becoming	  more	  competitive.	  Other	  support	  schemes,	  such	  as	  FIP	  and	  FIT	  which	  compensates	  directly	  for	  the	  difference	  between	  production	  costs	  and	  market,	  are	  allowed	  until	  the	  generation	  plant	  has	  been	  fully	  depreciated	  according	  to	  normal	  accounting	  rules	  but	  allow	  a	  normal	  return	  on	  capital.	  The	  requirements	  are,	  first,	  that	  any	  investment	  aid	  is	  deducted	  from	  the	  amount	  of	  operating	  aid	  and,	  second,	  that	  the	  state	  submits	  specific	  information	  on	  the	  mechanism	  and	  in	  particular	  how	  the	  amount	  of	  aid	  is	  calculated.296	  How	  this	  criterion	  is	  practised,	  and	  to	  which	  of	  the	  categories	  TENFIT	  belongs,	  will	  bee	  seen	  below.	  	  	  
3.3.1.1 Romanian	  TGC	  scheme	  	  
3.3.1.1.1 Notion	  of	  aid	  	  This	  TGC	  scheme297	  contained	  all	  the	  basic	  elements:	  the	  issuance	  of	  certificates	  for	  eligible	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  –	  1	  certificate/MWh,	  subsequently	  subject	  to	  RES-­‐E	  technology	  differentiation	  –	  and	  a	  quota	  obligation	  on	  electricity	  suppliers.	  It	  also	  contained	  a	  price	  limitation	  setting	  a	  lower	  and	  higher	  threshold	  within	  which	  the	  certificates	  could	  be	  traded.	  The	  certificates	  that	  grant	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  an	  additional	  income	  could	  be	  sold	  on	  a	  centralised	  green	  certificate	  market	  and/or	  on	  the	  bilateral	  contract	  market.	  A	  penalty	  was	  imposed	  in	  the	  event	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  quota	  obligation,	  collected	  by	  a	  TSO	  and	  subsequently	  transferred	  to	  an	  Environmental	  fund	  and	  then	  granted	  by	  the	  authorities	  to	  certain	  undertakings	  involved	  in	  RES	  production	  (this	  was	  made	  under	  the	  de	  minimis	  aid	  rules,	  and	  does	  not	  raise	  any	  questions	  regarding	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  scheme	  as	  such).	  	   The	  Commission	  found	  that	  the	  additional	  income	  caused	  by	  the	  quota	  obligation	  resulted	  in	  an	  advantage	  that	  strengthened	  the	  position	  of	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  competitors	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  therefore	  had	  potentially	  distorting	  effects	  on	  competition	  and	  also	  was	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  intra-­‐Union	  trade.	  Turning	  to	  the	  intricate	  issue	  regarding	  state	  resources,	  the	  Commission	  found	  that	  the	  issuance	  of	  certificates	  to	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  was	  likely	  to	  constitute	  state	  resources.	  The	  Commission	  sought	  in	  this	  regard	  to	  substantiate	  its	  claim	  by	  way	  of	  analogy	  with	  a	  previous	  decision	  regarding	  tradable	  emission	  credits	  under	  a	  NOx	  trading	  scheme.298	  Under	  its	  decisional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  295	  EAG	  point	  20:	  ”operating	  benefits	  means,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  calculating	  eligible	  costs,	  in	  particular	  cost	  savings	  or	  additional	  ancillary	  production	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  extra	  investment	  for	  environmental	  protection	  and,	  where	  applicable,	  benefits	  accruing	  from	  other	  support	  measures	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  constitute	  State	  aid	  (operating	  aid	  granted	  for	  the	  same	  eligible	  costs,	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs	  or	  other	  support	  measures).”	  296	  EAG	  point	  109-­‐110.	  	  297	  SA.	  33134,	  public	  version.	  	  298	  Case	  N	  35/2003.	  This	  decision	  was	  subsequently	  annulled	  by	  the	  General	  Court	  (previously	  CFI)	  in	  Case	  T-­‐233/04	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  scheme	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  selective	  measure.	  This	  judgement	  was	  however	  annulled	  by	  the	  ECJ	  in	  Case	  C-­‐279/08	  P	  Commission	  v	  Netherlands	  on	  the	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practise	  the	  Commission	  had	  established	  a	  distinction	  according	  to	  which	  permits/credits	  was	  classified	  as	  either	  1)	  intangible	  assets	  representing	  a	  market	  value	  which	  the	  authorities/state	  could	  have	  sold/auctioned,	  leading	  to	  foregone	  revenues,	  or	  2)	  authorised	  proof	  of	  a	  certain	  production	  that	  could	  not	  be	  sold/auctioned,	  hence	  not	  leading	  to	  foregone	  revenues	  for	  the	  state.	  Having	  basically	  found	  that	  the	  permits	  did	  not	  solely	  serve	  as	  authorised	  proof	  and	  that	  the	  authorities	  had	  an	  option	  to	  sell/auction	  the	  permits,	  the	  Commission	  concluded	  that	  the	  trading	  scheme	  involved	  state	  resources	  and	  hence	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid.	  In	  the	  instant	  case,	  however,	  the	  Commission	  noted	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  emission	  permits	  that	  the	  State	  could	  sell	  itself	  on	  the	  market,	  and	  the	  green	  certificates,	  which	  was	  deemed	  to	  constitute	  proof	  of	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  RES-­‐E	  produced.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Commission	  continued:	  	   [T]he	  fact	  remains	  that	  the	  State	  provides	  certain	  undertakings	  with	  an	  asset,	  which	  has	  a	  monetary	  value,	  and	  that	  asset	  originates	  with	  the	  State	  	  which	  has	  created	  it.	  This	  is	  further	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  undertakings	  not	  having	  purchased	  the	  necessary	  number	  of	  certificates	  on	  the	  market	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  penalty	  –	  hence,	  the	  certificates	  created	  by	  the	  State	  serve	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  payment	  of	  a	  fine	  which	  would	  constitute	  State	  resources.299	  	  One	  could	  at	  first	  sight	  be	  induced	  to	  think	  that	  the	  monetary	  value	  ascribed	  to	  the	  certificates	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Romanian	  TGC	  scheme	  contains	  a	  lower	  and	  upper	  price	  limitation	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  certificate	  inevitably	  will	  be	  a	  bearer	  of	  the	  monetary	  value	  within	  this	  range.	  However,	  in	  a	  footnote	  to	  the	  first	  sentence	  the	  Commission	  explains	  that	  this	  is	  only	  an	  additional	  reason	  for	  not	  viewing	  certificates	  as	  only	  proof	  of	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  that	  solely	  acquire	  value	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  undertakings	  subject	  to	  certificate	  trading.	  This	  is	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  decisional	  practise	  in	  comparison	  with,	  for	  instance,	  the	  assessment	  of	  a	  Swedish	  TGC	  scheme	  and	  a	  Belgian	  TGC	  scheme	  a	  decade	  ago	  where	  the	  Commission	  found	  that	  the	  offering	  of	  certificates	  for	  free	  to	  the	  produces	  did	  “not	  constitute	  loss	  of	  State	  resources,	  since	  the	  certificates	  are	  merely	  a	  proof	  that	  the	  green	  electricity	  has	  been	  produced”	  and	  the	  resources	  was	  neither	  taken	  from	  the	  state	  budget.300	  No	  statements	  were	  made	  in	  this	  regard	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  certificates	  constituted	  assets	  or	  monetary	  value	  in	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  state	  and	  therefore	  amounted	  to	  state	  resources	  the	  free	  offering	  of	  which	  amounted	  to	  loss	  of	  state	  revenue.	  The	  shift	  in	  the	  decisional	  practice	  may	  perhaps	  be	  attributable	  to	  a	  legal	  discourse	  in	  which	  green	  certificates	  are	  sought	  analogised	  to	  tradable	  permits.	  In	  the	  judgement	  concerning	  the	  latter,	  the	  ECJ	  –	  in	  upholding	  the	  judgement	  of	  the	  General	  Court	  –	  explicitly	  tied	  the	  issuance	  of	  allowances	  considered	  as	  assets	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  by	  not	  selling/auctioning	  these,	  the	  state	  concerned	  had	  foregone	  state	  resources.301	  Additionally,	  the	  General	  Court	  explicitly	  rejected	  the	  attempts	  to	  analogize	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  basis	  that	  the	  General	  Court	  erred	  in	  law	  when	  assessing	  the	  selectivity	  criteria.	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  original	  decision	  by	  the	  Commission	  was	  essentially	  upheld.	  See	  also	  de	  Sadeeler	  2014:446f	  and	  Weishaar	  2012:98f.	  299	  SA.	  33134,	  public	  version,	  para	  54.	  	  300	  N	  789/2002,	  public	  version,	  page	  7	  and	  N	  550/2000	  respectively,	  the	  latter	  via	  Case	  T-­‐233/04	  para	  76.	  301	  Case	  C-­‐279/08	  P	  Commission	  v	  Netherlands	  para	  102,	  107.	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between	  green	  certificate	  and	  the	  tradable	  permit	  scheme.302	  Also	  that	  scheme	  contained	  an	  administrative	  fee	  in	  case	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  but	  nothing	  in	  the	  judgement	  suggest	  that	  it	  alone	  would	  be	  sufficient	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  classifying	  the	  measure	  as	  state	  aid.	  Moreover,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  selling/auctioning	  of	  permits	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  design	  options	  in	  emissions	  trading	  schemes,	  but	  not	  contemplated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  TGC	  scheme,	  make	  the	  use	  of	  analogies	  difficult.	  	  Accordingly,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  stance	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  TGC-­‐scheme	  would	  be	  upheld	  by	  the	  ECJ.	  	  	  
3.3.1.1.2 Compatibility	  	  Arguably	  aware	  of	  the	  difficulties	  to	  classify	  TGC	  scheme	  as	  state	  aid	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  precedent	  on	  this	  matter,	  the	  Commission	  held	  that	  it	  was	  not	  necessary	  in	  the	  present	  case	  to	  take	  a	  definitive	  position	  in	  this	  regard,	  because	  even	  if	  state	  aid	  was	  involved,	  the	  measure	  was	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  according	  to	  article	  107(3)(c)	  TFEU	  and	  the	  former	  applicable	  2008	  EAG.	  	  	   	  As	  previously	  mentioned	  the	  authorisation	  of	  a	  TGC	  scheme	  amounting	  to	  state	  aid	  was	  possible	  provided	  that	  the	  state	  can	  show	  that	  the	  support	  scheme	  1)	  is	  essential	  to	  support	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  RES	  concerned,	  2)	  does	  not	  in	  the	  aggregate	  result	  in	  overcompensation	  and	  3)	  does	  not	  dissuade	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  from	  becoming	  more	  competitive.	  The	  first	  condition	  was	  considered	  fulfilled	  since	  the	  levelised	  production	  costs	  exceeded	  the	  market	  price	  of	  electricity	  and	  the	  support	  appeared	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  mandatory	  target	  Romania	  had	  been	  ascribed	  under	  RED	  2009.	  Based	  inter	  alia	  on	  long-­‐term	  estimations	  of	  the	  production	  costs	  and	  a	  commitment	  of	  the	  Romanian	  authorities	  to	  adapt	  the	  notified	  measure	  in	  time	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  overcompensation,	  the	  Commission	  considered	  the	  second	  condition	  met	  as	  well.	  The	  third	  condition	  was	  easily	  met,	  not	  least	  since	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  was	  considered	  to	  provide	  an	  incentive	  for	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  to	  increase	  efficiency	  of	  their	  production.	  Also	  the	  general	  incentive	  criterion	  was	  considered	  met,	  since	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  notified	  aid,	  there	  would	  insufficient	  incentive	  to	  undertake	  or	  carry	  on	  such	  RES-­‐E	  production.	  The	  Commission	  thus	  concluded	  that	  the	  TGC	  scheme	  was	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  accordance	  with	  article	  107(3)(c)	  TFEU.	  	  	  
3.3.1.2 Finnish	  FIP	  scheme	  	  
3.3.1.2.1 Notion	  of	  aid	  	  Under	  this	  FIP	  scheme,303	  concerning	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  from	  wind	  and	  biogas,	  the	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  obtained	  an	  additional	  source	  of	  income	  on	  top	  of	  that	  received	  from	  the	  conventional	  sale	  of	  the	  RES-­‐E	  at	  the	  market	  in	  competition	  with	  other	  market	  participants.	  This	  income	  was	  guaranteed	  and	  covered	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  market	  price	  and	  the	  production	  costs.	  The	  support	  element	  was	  paid	  out	  from	  the	  Finnish	  state	  budget.	  	  	   The	  Commission	  found	  that	  the	  notified	  FIP	  scheme	  allowed	  the	  aided	  undertakings	  to	  be	  relieved,	  by	  means	  of	  state	  resources	  transferred	  directly	  from	  the	  state	  budget,	  of	  a	  part	  of	  the	  costs	  which	  they	  would	  normally	  have	  to	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bear	  themselves.	  This	  strengthened	  their	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  competitors	  in	  EU	  and	  was	  therefore	  considered	  to	  have	  potentially	  distorting	  effects	  the	  competition.	  Since	  the	  RES-­‐E	  produced	  might	  be	  subject	  to	  intra-­‐Union	  trade,	  the	  advantage	  was	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  trade	  in	  this	  regard.	  Thus,	  the	  measure	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  article	  107(1)	  TFEU.	  This	  assertion	  is	  anything	  but	  surprising.	  A	  nearly	  identical	  outcome	  was	  reached	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  British	  FIP-­‐mechanism	  where,	  though,	  the	  top-­‐up	  payment	  was	  provided	  by	  a	  state	  owned	  company.304	  	  	  
3.3.1.2.2 Compatibility	  	  As	  previously	  mentioned	  the	  only	  specific	  requirements	  in	  this	  regard	  is,	  first,	  that	  any	  investment	  aid	  is	  deducted	  from	  the	  production	  costs	  when	  determining	  the	  amount	  of	  operating	  aid,	  and,	  second,	  that	  the	  state	  concerned	  submits	  a	  detailed	  calculation	  method	  concerning	  the	  amount	  of	  aid.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  submitted	  information	  by	  the	  Finnish	  authorities,	  the	  Commission	  concluded	  that	  both	  conditions	  were	  met	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  a	  normal	  return	  of	  capital	  (or	  more	  specifically	  the	  absence	  of	  overcompensation).	  Also	  the	  general	  incentive	  criterion	  was	  considered	  met,	  since	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  notified	  aid,	  there	  would	  be	  insufficient	  incentive	  to	  undertake	  or	  carry	  on	  such	  RES-­‐E	  production.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  overcompensation	  in	  time	  the	  Finnish	  authorities	  committed	  themselves	  to	  monitor	  the	  production	  costs	  on	  a	  yearly	  basis	  and	  adapt	  the	  aid	  when	  necessary.	  The	  measure	  was	  considered	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  	  
3.3.1.3 Dutch	  TENFIT	  scheme	  	  As	  previously	  mentioned	  TENFIT	  schemes	  are	  constituted	  by	  an	  initial	  bidding/tendering-­‐mechanism	  but	  the	  actual	  support	  is	  provided	  by	  a	  scheme	  design	  under	  the	  REFIT	  scheme	  family:	  FIT	  or	  FIP.	  In	  the	  decisional	  practice	  of	  the	  Commission,	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  initial	  bidding	  mechanism	  is	  subordinated	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  underlying	  support	  mechanism	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  classifying	  both	  whether	  aid	  is	  granted	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  article	  107(3)(c)	  TFEU	  and	  the	  guidelines.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  hardly	  considered.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  in	  the	  context	  of	  assessing	  the	  concept	  of	  aid	  but	  may	  have	  a	  role	  in	  the	  compatibility	  assessment,	  not	  least	  since	  the	  compatibility	  criteria	  in	  the	  2008	  Guidelines	  are	  slightly	  different,	  at	  least	  formally.	  However,	  as	  seen	  above	  in	  the	  context	  of	  TGC	  and	  FIT,	  the	  difference	  is	  anything	  but	  clear.	  	  	   A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  a	  Dutch	  FIP	  scheme	  who	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid	  but	  was	  considered	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  2002	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market.	  Netherlands	  sought	  approval	  2007	  for	  basically	  the	  same	  scheme	  that	  now,	  though,	  introduced	  a	  tender	  procedure	  for	  larger	  generation	  plants	  “where	  there	  is	  more	  competition	  between	  the	  different	  projects.”305	  Considering	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  scheme	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid,	  the	  Commission	  referred	  to	  its	  previous	  assessment	  in	  2002.	  The	  initial	  bidding	  mechanism	  was	  also	  totally	  disregarded	  in	  the	  compatibility	  assessment	  undertaken	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  2007.	  This	  approach	  was	  duplicated	  in	  2012	  when	  Netherlands	  sought	  (and	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obtained)	  approval	  for	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  its	  scheme	  which	  contained	  the	  very	  same	  tender	  mechanism.306	  	  	  
3.3.1.4 Austrian	  FIT	  scheme	  
3.3.1.4.1 Notion	  of	  aid	  Under	  this	  FIT	  scheme307	  a	  Green	  Electricity	  Clearing	  &	  Settlement	  Company	  (OeMAG)	  was	  obliged	  to	  purchase	  RES-­‐E	  from	  eligible	  producers	  (e.g	  wind,	  photovoltaic,	  hydro)	  at	  a	  guaranteed	  minimum	  price.	  For	  certain	  types	  of	  RES	  technologies,	  an	  additional	  bonus	  could	  be	  paid	  on	  top	  to	  the	  normal	  minimum	  prices.	  The	  minimum	  price	  aimed	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  production	  costs	  for	  RES-­‐E	  and	  the	  market	  price	  for	  electricity.	  OeMAG	  was	  monitored	  by	  inter	  alia	  a	  ministry	  of	  the	  Austrian	  state	  and	  had	  the	  responsibility	  to	  amongst	  other	  allocate	  the	  physical	  flow	  of	  RES-­‐E	  to	  distributors	  as	  well	  as	  to	  monitor,	  collect	  and	  transfer	  the	  cash	  flows	  in	  this	  regard.308	  Two	  types	  of	  charges	  recovered	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  purchase	  obligation	  on	  part	  of	  OeMAG.	  Firstly,	  via	  a	  fixed	  lump	  sum	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  electricity	  consumers	  which	  varied	  according	  to	  the	  grid	  level	  to	  which	  the	  consumers	  were	  connected.	  Secondly,	  via	  a	  charge	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  all	  Austrian	  electricity	  consumers	  connected	  to	  the	  grid	  the	  amount	  of	  which	  was	  determined	  on	  a	  yearly	  basis	  by	  a	  Minister	  of	  the	  state.	  	   The	  Commission	  found	  that	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  conferred	  an	  advantage	  on	  RES-­‐E	  producers,	  that	  the	  measure	  was	  selective	  and	  that	  the	  said	  producers	  were	  active	  on	  electricity	  markets	  where	  intra-­‐Union	  trade	  took	  place.	  It	  omitted	  to	  mention	  whether	  competition	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  distorted	  or	  whether	  the	  trade	  was	  affected	  but	  these	  conditions	  must	  be	  assumed	  fulfilled.	  Since	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  was	  adopted	  by	  law	  it	  was	  attributed	  to	  the	  state.	  As	  regard	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  scheme	  amounted	  to	  state	  resources	  it	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  this	  decision	  was	  taken	  prior	  to	  ECJ’s	  judgement	  in	  Vent	  De	  Colère.	  Accordingly,	  the	  Commission	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  another	  arguments	  concerning	  the	  funding	  of	  FIT	  schemes,	  albeit	  the	  principal	  question	  –	  notwithstanding	  the	  industrial	  market	  context	  –	  could	  be	  resolved	  by	  reference	  to	  for	  instance	  Italy	  v	  Commission	  (mentioned	  above,	  in	  the	  assessing	  of	  Vent	  de	  Colère).	  The	  Commission	  referred	  to	  the	  judgement	  in	  Essent	  Netwerk	  which	  concerned	  the	  recovering	  of	  stranded	  costs	  (i.e.	  non-­‐market	  compatible	  costs)	  in	  the	  electricity	  sector	  and	  where	  the	  legislation	  designated	  a	  company	  for	  that	  purpose.309	  Since	  the	  legislation	  imposed	  the	  surcharges	  for	  the	  recovering	  on	  private	  entities,	  designated	  and	  strictly	  monitored	  a	  company	  to	  collect	  these	  resources	  which	  it	  could	  not	  use	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  does	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  but	  from	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  presentations	  by	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  It	  should	  perhaps	  be	  mentioned	  that	  the	  additional	  costs	  accruing	  from	  RES-­‐E	  production	  very	  well	  may	  be	  categorized	  as	  stranded	  costs,	  as	  for	  instance	  noted	  by	  Cameron	  2002:24	  para	  1.43.	  See	  also	  the	  general	  definition	  in	  Mortensen	  2008:389	  footnote	  2.	  The	  relevant	  question	  here	  however	  is	  not	  how	  the	  costs	  are	  classified	  but	  whether	  their	  recovering	  amount	  to	  state	  resources	  in	  view	  of	  the	  legislation	  in	  question,	  and	  Vent	  de	  Colère	  has	  resolved	  this	  in	  the	  context	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  	  
	   73	  
for	  purposes	  other	  than	  those	  provided	  by	  the	  law,	  the	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  they	  amounted	  to	  state	  resources.310	  Applying	  the	  very	  same	  reasoning	  on	  the	  Austrian	  FIT	  scheme	  and	  the	  role	  of	  OeMAG	  in	  it,	  the	  Commission	  found	  that	  the	  measure	  amounted	  to	  state	  resources	  and	  hence	  constituted	  state	  aid.	  This	  conclusion	  fits	  perfectly	  well	  with	  the	  judgement	  in	  Vent	  de	  Colère.	  	  
3.3.1.4.2 Compatibility	  	  In	  view	  of	  the	  detailed	  calculation	  method	  and	  other	  information	  submitted	  by	  the	  Austrian	  authorities,	  the	  Commission	  found	  that	  the	  aid	  did	  not	  result	  in	  overcompensation,	  neither	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  productions	  costs	  nor	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  aid	  (i.e.	  avoiding	  cumulation).	  Duplicating	  the	  formula	  employed	  in	  the	  other	  decisions	  above,	  the	  aid	  was	  considered	  to	  provide	  an	  incentive	  effect.	  	  	  
3.3.2 EEAG	  2014-­‐2020	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  quite	  vague	  2008	  Guidelines	  under	  which	  all	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  could	  be	  and	  also	  was	  considered	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market,	  the	  new	  EEAG311	  provides	  a	  significantly	  different	  and	  more	  prescriptive	  approach.	  	  	   As	  to	  the	  general	  conditions	  for	  aid	  in	  the	  context	  of	  energy	  from	  RES,	  the	  new	  Guidelines	  maintain	  the	  previous	  requirements	  on	  a	  well-­‐defined	  objective,	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  aid,	  incentive	  effect	  etc.312	  Furthermore,	  the	  Commission	  notes	  that	  the	  national	  implementation	  of	  the	  targets	  set	  by	  RED	  2009	  not	  always	  result	  in	  the	  most	  efficient	  market	  outcome	  and	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  therefore,	  state	  aid	  can	  be	  an	  appropriate	  instrument.	  Although	  the	  EEAG	  apply	  up	  to	  2020	  (coinciding	  with	  the	  expiry	  of	  RED	  2009),	  it	  should	  nonetheless	  prepare	  ground	  for	  achieving	  the	  objectives	  set	  in	  the	  2030	  framework.	  The	  RES	  target	  for	  2030	  has	  subsequently	  been	  set	  to	  at	  least	  27%	  for	  the	  EU.313	  	  Significantly,	  under	  the	  intermediate	  period,	  the	  Commission	  expects	  that	  established	  (not	  defined)	  RES	  will	  become	  grid-­‐competitive,	  implying	  especially	  that	  aid	  should	  be	  phased	  out	  in	  a	  digressive	  way.	  The	  new	  EEAG	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  that	  objective	  and	  will	  ensure	  cost-­‐effective	  delivery	  through	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms.314	  	  	   The	  shift	  towards	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms	  is	  highly	  significant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  specific	  criteria	  on	  operating	  aid	  for	  RES-­‐E	  production.	  In	  order	  to	  incentivise	  the	  market	  integration	  of	  RES-­‐E,	  a	  general	  rule	  comprising	  three	  cumulative	  conditions	  will	  be	  applied	  from	  1	  January	  2016	  to	  all	  new	  RES-­‐E	  schemes.	  The	  first	  requirement	  is	  that	  aid	  is	  granted	  as	  a	  premium	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  market	  price	  (top	  up)	  whereby	  the	  generators	  sell	  its	  electricity	  directly	  in	  the	  market.	  The	  second	  requirement	  is	  that	  beneficiaries	  are	  subject	  to	  balancing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310	  Case	  C-­‐206/06	  Essent	  Netwerk	  para	  66,	  68-­‐69.	  	  311	  It	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  if	  a	  non-­‐TGC-­‐scheme	  fulfil	  one	  or	  several	  of	  the	  criteria	  under	  the	  new	  EEAG,	  it	  may	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  be	  exempted	  from	  the	  notifying	  procedure	  under	  article	  108(3)	  TFEU	  and	  automatically	  be	  considered	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market.	  See	  Commission	  Regulation	  No	  651/2014,	  notably	  articles	  42-­‐43.	  This,	  however,	  concerns	  procedural	  aspects	  of	  state	  discretion	  and	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  question	  of	  which	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  the	  state	  can	  adopt.	  312	  EEAG	  section	  3.1.	  	  313	  European	  Council	  2014:7.	  314	  EEAG	  point	  107-­‐108.	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responsibilities	  (i.e.	  ensure	  that	  electricity	  supply	  always	  meets	  demand	  at	  any	  given	  time),	  unless	  no	  liquid	  intra-­‐day	  market	  exists.	  The	  third	  requirement	  is	  that	  measures	  are	  put	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  that	  generators	  have	  no	  incentive	  to	  generate	  RES-­‐E	  under	  negative	  prices.	  All	  in	  all,	  this	  is	  an	  elevation	  of	  FIP	  schemes	  and	  a	  clear	  signal	  that	  FIT	  schemes	  are	  to	  be	  phased	  out.	  Although	  balancing	  requirements	  is	  a	  system	  stability	  issue	  common	  to	  all	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  most	  relevant	  –	  as	  is	  the	  third	  requirement	  –	  in	  the	  context	  of	  FIT	  schemes	  which	  typically	  do	  not	  provide	  incentives	  to	  stop	  generating	  electricity	  during	  periods	  of	  low	  demand.315	  However,	  the	  general	  rule	  will	  not	  apply	  to	  installations	  the	  electricity	  capacity	  of	  which	  is	  less	  than	  500	  kW	  or	  demonstration	  projects,	  except	  for	  RES-­‐E	  from	  wind	  energy	  whose	  capacity	  exceed	  3	  MW.	  In	  these	  cases,	  albeit	  not	  specified,	  one	  must	  assume	  that	  FIT	  schemes	  are	  possible	  to	  employ.	  The	  narrow	  scope	  of	  this	  exception	  is	  perhaps	  best	  illustrated	  by	  the	  definition	  of	  demonstration	  projects	  which	  are	  projects	  “demonstrating	  a	  technology	  as	  a	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  in	  the	  Union	  and	  representing	  a	  significant	  innovation	  that	  goes	  well	  beyond	  the	  state	  of	  art.”316	  Even	  though	  this	  is	  a	  qualitative	  criterion,	  the	  quantitative	  criterion	  establishing	  the	  500	  kW	  threshold	  will	  in	  effect	  only	  be	  applicable	  to	  very	  small	  installations.	  Given	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  this	  exception,	  states	  ability	  to	  adopt	  FIT	  schemes	  on	  a	  wider	  basis	  is	  highly	  constrained.	  	  	   Moreover,	  in	  a	  transitional	  phase	  covering	  2015	  and	  2016,	  aid	  for	  at	  least	  5%	  of	  the	  planned	  new	  electricity	  capacity	  should	  be	  granted	  in	  a	  competitive	  bidding317	  process	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  clear,	  transparent	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory	  criteria.	  However,	  from	  1	  January	  2017	  all	  aid	  must	  be	  granted	  through	  such	  a	  competitive	  bidding	  process	  which	  in	  effect	  means	  that	  TENFIT	  scheme	  based	  on	  a	  FIP	  support	  mechanism	  will	  be	  required.	  If	  such	  a	  bidding	  process	  is	  open	  to	  all	  RES-­‐E	  producers	  (i.e.	  technology	  neutral),	  the	  Commission	  will	  presume	  that	  the	  aid	  is	  proportionate	  and	  does	  not	  distort	  competition	  to	  an	  extent	  contrary	  to	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  Exemptions	  from	  competitive	  bidding	  is	  basically	  provided	  for	  1)	  states	  that	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  higher	  support	  levels	  (e.g.	  avoid	  strategic	  bidding),	  result	  in	  low	  project	  realisation	  rates	  (e.g.	  avoid	  underbidding)	  or	  that	  only	  one	  or	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  projects/sites	  could	  be	  eligible,	  as	  well	  as	  2)	  installations	  of	  small	  capacity	  or	  demonstration	  projects.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  bidding	  mechanism,	  the	  general	  rules	  prescribing	  a	  FIP	  scheme	  apply.	  Additionally,	  the	  competitive	  bidding	  process	  can	  be	  limited	  to	  certain	  RES-­‐E	  technologies	  where	  the	  opposite	  would	  lead	  to	  suboptimal	  results,	  such	  as	  the	  need	  to	  achieve	  diversification	  of	  supply	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  longer-­‐term	  potential	  of	  a	  new	  and	  innovative	  RES-­‐E	  technology.	  	  	   TGC	  schemes	  are	  also	  allowed.	  The	  compatibility	  criteria	  established	  under	  2008	  Guidelines	  remains,	  namely	  that	  the	  state	  provide	  sufficient	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  315	  See	  for	  instance	  Held	  et	  al	  2014:28f.	  See	  also	  point	  137	  of	  the	  EEAG	  which	  refers	  back	  to	  this	  condition,	  ”when	  technically	  possible”,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  TGC-­‐schemes.	  	  316	  EEAG	  point	  45.	  	  317	  EEAG	  point	  43	  defines	  competitive	  bidding	  process	  as	  a	  non-­‐discriminatory	  bidding	  process	  that	  provides	  for	  the	  participation	  of	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  undertakings	  and	  where	  the	  aid	  is	  granted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  either	  the	  initial	  bid	  submitted	  or	  a	  clearing	  price.	  In	  addition,	  the	  budget	  or	  volume	  related	  to	  the	  bidding	  process	  is	  a	  binding	  constraint	  leading	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  not	  all	  bidders	  can	  receive	  add.	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evidence	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  such	  support	  1)	  is	  essential	  to	  ensure	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  RES	  concerned,	  2)	  does	  not	  in	  the	  aggregate	  result	  in	  overcompensation	  and	  3)	  does	  not	  dissuade	  producers	  from	  becoming	  more	  competitive.	  The	  main	  difference	  between	  the	  previous	  guidelines	  is	  that	  no	  differentiation	  in	  support	  levels	  is	  allowed,	  unless	  the	  state	  demonstrates	  the	  need	  for	  this	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  exemption	  grounds	  applicable	  to	  competitive	  bidding	  processes	  above.	  Accordingly,	  the	  Romanian	  TGC	  scheme	  presented	  above	  which	  differentiated	  among	  RES-­‐E	  technology,	  is	  not	  permissible	  under	  the	  new	  Guidelines	  unless	  the	  state	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  is	  needed.	  	  	   Although	  the	  main	  requirement	  that	  aid	  should	  be	  granted	  through	  FIP-­‐schemes	  and	  subsequently	  TENFIT	  schemes	  will	  apply	  from	  1	  January	  2016	  and	  1	  January	  2017	  respectively,	  the	  EEAG	  arguably	  already	  exert	  significant	  influence	  to	  that	  effect.	  Firstly,	  states	  decision	  to	  adopt	  a	  certain	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  is	  highly	  strategic,	  taking	  into	  account	  especially	  the	  status	  and	  future	  development	  of	  grey	  energy	  supply	  as	  well	  as	  the	  estimated	  need	  of	  electricity	  for	  domestic	  industries.	  Accordingly,	  signalled	  changes	  coming	  into	  effect	  within	  a	  one	  or	  two-­‐year	  time	  frame	  will	  affect	  states	  current	  decisions.	  	  Secondly,	  even	  though	  the	  previous	  controlled	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  has	  been	  approved	  for	  either	  a	  10	  year	  period	  or	  until	  the	  plant	  has	  depreciated,	  any	  modification	  or	  alteration	  of	  such	  a	  scheme	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  article	  108(3)	  TFEU	  will	  have	  to	  be	  notified	  to	  the	  Commission	  whereby	  it	  will	  apply	  the	  Guidelines	  that	  are	  applicable	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  assessment	  –	  EEAG	  that	  is.	  	  	   The	  shift	  towards	  the	  phasing	  out	  FIT	  schemes	  and	  the	  relative	  insignificance	  of	  the	  prescribed	  time	  frames	  is	  illustrated	  in	  an	  individual	  decision	  concerning	  a	  German	  FIP	  scheme	  that	  nevertheless	  provided	  for	  FIT-­‐mechanism	  for	  small-­‐scale	  installations	  and	  also	  as	  a	  last	  resource	  clause	  to	  be	  used	  in	  exceptional	  situations.318	  Having	  found	  that	  both	  mechanisms	  amounted	  to	  state	  aid	  but	  fulfilled	  the	  general	  compatibility	  criteria,	  the	  Commission	  turned	  to	  the	  specific	  compatibility	  criteria	  and	  assessed	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  FIP-­‐scheme	  in	  light	  of	  the	  accompanying	  FIT-­‐mechanism.	  The	  part	  of	  the	  FIT	  mechanism	  that	  concerned	  small	  installations	  fulfilled	  the	  thresholds	  under	  EEAG	  and	  was	  considered	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market.	  The	  other	  part	  of	  the	  FIT-­‐mechanism	  was	  designed	  as	  a	  security	  net	  where	  the	  intermediary	  (who	  would	  sell	  RES-­‐E	  on	  the	  market)	  became	  insolvent;	  a	  situation	  Germany	  considered	  extremely	  rare.	  Considering	  that	  it	  entailed	  a	  20%	  reduction	  of	  the	  guaranteed	  price	  and	  thus	  did	  not	  incentivize	  producers	  to	  rely	  on	  it,	  the	  Commission	  found	  that	  it	  was	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  for	  the	  period	  up	  to	  31	  December	  2016.	  This	  illustrates	  that	  FIT	  schemes,	  even	  when	  employed	  as	  exceptional	  and	  largely	  theoretical	  last	  resource	  mechanisms,	  are	  gradually	  phased	  out.	  	   	   	  	  	  
3.4 Overall	  assessment	  	  
3.4.1 The	  doctrinal	  and	  empirical	  question:	  generality	  	  The	  fact	  that	  PreussenElektra	  settled	  a	  key	  doctrinal	  issue	  in	  state	  aid	  law	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  insufficient	  for	  the	  increasingly	  complex	  and	  state	  intervening	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  To	  the	  extent	  ECJ’s	  approach	  in	  that	  case	  could	  be	  explained	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by	  its	  recognition	  of	  RES-­‐E	  support	  as	  a	  legitimate	  objective,	  the	  limits	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  was	  seen	  in	  Vent	  De	  Colère.	  If	  the	  FIT	  scheme	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  would	  have	  been	  classified	  as	  something	  else	  than	  state	  aid,	  the	  notion	  state	  aid	  would	  have	  been	  deconstructed	  beyond	  recognition.	  To	  the	  extent	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  consider	  “good”	  policy	  objectives	  as	  such	  under	  article	  107(1)	  TFEU	  at	  all,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  difficult	  to	  discern	  a	  favourable	  approach	  on	  part	  of	  ECJ	  in	  the	  context	  of	  classifying	  RES-­‐E	  support	  measures.	  	  Admittedly,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  exhaustively	  conclude	  on	  whether	  a	  principal	  REFIT	  scheme	  will	  amount	  to	  state	  aid	  or	  not.	  An	  assertion	  in	  this	  respect	  will	  ultimately	  depend	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  evaluation	  of	  the	  particular	  scheme	  in	  question.	  Theoretically,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  envisage	  and	  construct	  FIT	  schemes	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  employed	  in	  PreussenElektra,	  solely	  based	  on	  statuary	  purchase	  obligations	  and	  minimum	  prices.	  Together	  with	  the	  possibility	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  to	  final	  consumers,	  as	  indirectly	  allowed	  by	  ECJ	  in	  Vent	  De	  
Colère	  by	  not	  falling	  back	  on	  AG’s	  opinion	  in	  this	  regard,	  one	  could	  conclude	  that	  FIT	  schemes	  in	  principle	  can	  escape	  the	  state	  aid	  prohibition.	  The	  latter	  feature	  can	  also	  theoretically	  be	  constructed	  so	  as	  to	  fund	  FIP	  schemes	  without	  indirect/direct	  state	  involvement	  (apart	  from	  adopting	  the	  law).	  In	  practice,	  however,	  such	  “simple”	  solutions	  has	  increasingly	  been	  abandoned	  and	  replaced	  by	  entities	  designated	  by	  law	  to	  channelize	  and	  collect	  the	  resources	  funding	  the	  schemes.	  	  This	  is	  seen	  in	  Vent	  De	  Colére	  and	  especially	  in	  Commission’s	  decisional	  practice.	  After	  all,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  envisage	  a	  private	  undertaking	  that	  voluntarily	  collects	  and	  channelize	  resources	  necessary	  for	  the	  scheme	  without	  being	  mandated	  by	  the	  state.	  In	  such	  cases,	  characterizing	  FIP	  schemes	  and	  updated	  FIT	  schemes,	  the	  measures	  amounts	  to	  state	  aid.	  According	  to	  the	  description	  of	  the	  financing	  mechanisms	  of	  REFIT	  and	  ultimately	  TENFIT	  schemes	  in	  the	  introductory	  chapter,	  these	  were	  (and	  is)	  financed	  either	  directly	  by	  governmental	  resources	  or,	  and	  to	  significantly	  higher	  degree,	  by	  way	  of	  passing	  on	  the	  costs	  to	  the	  consumer	  base.	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  measure	  will	  amount	  to	  state	  aid.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  governmental	  resources	  may	  be	  directly	  involved	  as	  an	  intermediary	  fund	  scheme	  before	  the	  additional	  costs	  are	  finally	  passed	  on.	  This	  will	  clearly	  amount	  to	  state	  aid,	  as	  seen	  by	  Vent	  
De	  Colére.	  However,	  even	  if	  the	  passing	  on	  of	  the	  additional	  costs	  does	  not	  rely	  directly	  on	  intermediary	  governmental	  resources,	  the	  scheme	  may	  nevertheless	  constitute	  aid.	  The	  description	  in	  the	  introductory	  chapter	  stated	  that	  a	  TSO	  is	  typically	  designated	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  aggregating	  and	  administrating	  the	  additional	  costs	  involved.	  Irrespective	  of	  whether	  the	  relevant	  entity	  is	  a	  TSO	  or	  another	  actor,	  the	  key	  term	  here	  is	  designated.	  If	  this	  designation	  is	  instituted	  by	  an	  obligation	  imposed	  by	  law	  or,	  broadly	  speaking,	  a	  governmental/public	  decision,	  the	  scheme	  in	  question	  will	  amount	  to	  state	  aid,	  since	  the	  state	  will	  be	  deemed	  to	  exercise	  control	  of	  the	  resources	  involved.	  The	  issue	  of	  whether	  a	  TSO	  or	  the	  like	  may	  be	  designated	  on	  a	  voluntarily	  basis,	  for	  instance	  by	  market	  operators	  due	  to	  practical	  reasons	  arising	  from	  the	  market	  conditions,	  have	  above	  been	  assumed	  to	  be	  difficult	  to	  establish	  in	  practice.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  doubtful	  whether	  states	  would	  be	  able	  to	  rely	  on	  such	  “loose”	  constructions	  the	  proper	  functioning	  and	  foreseeability	  of	  which	  would	  be	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  market	  operators	  and	  their	  goodwill.	  Even	  if	  this	  was	  possibly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  
PreussenElektra,	  the	  judgement	  is	  anything	  but	  clear	  on	  the	  crucial	  issue	  of	  how	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the	  resources	  was	  channelized	  in	  general.	  Summing	  up,	  FIT	  and	  FIP	  schemes	  will	  in	  general	  amount	  to	  state	  aid.	  	  	  	  Since	  the	  deciding	  factor	  is	  whether	  the	  funds	  involved	  are	  “granted	  by	  a	  State	  or	  through	  State	  resources,”	  the	  incorporation	  of	  an	  initial	  tendering	  procedure	  in	  any	  of	  those	  schemes	  –	  hence	  TENFIT	  –	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  assessment.	  This	  is	  clearly	  seen	  in	  Commission’s	  decisional	  practice	  and	  nothing	  suggests	  that	  the	  Union	  courts	  would	  not	  uphold	  such	  an	  approach.	  After	  all,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  the	  mere	  administration	  of	  the	  tendering	  procedure	  amount	  to	  state	  aid	  when	  the	  underlying	  FIP	  or	  FIT	  mechanism	  does	  not	  constitute	  state	  resources.	  Accordingly,	  the	  assessment	  of	  whether	  a	  TENFIT	  scheme	  amount	  to	  state	  aid	  will	  ultimately	  rest	  on	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  underlying	  mechanism.	  	  	  In	  respect	  of	  TGC	  schemes	  the	  recent	  shift	  on	  part	  the	  Commission	  is	  significant.	  Its	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  previous	  stance	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  certificates	  now	  are	  (non-­‐definitely)	  considered	  as	  state	  resources	  is	  not	  convincing.	  The	  reasoning	  underlying	  its	  position	  is	  uncertain	  and	  is	  possibly	  inferred	  from	  case	  law	  on	  tradable	  emission	  permits.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  General	  Court	  explicitly	  rejected	  such	  an	  analogy	  whilst	  the	  ECJ	  explicitly	  tied	  the	  outcome	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  permits	  could	  have	  been	  sold/auctioned	  by	  the	  state.	  The	  auctioning/selling	  of	  such	  permits	  is	  however	  a	  common	  design	  option	  for	  tradable	  permit	  schemes,	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  TGC	  schemes.	  Moreover,	  the	  broad	  discretion	  the	  Commission	  is	  entitled	  to	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  aid	  presumes	  that	  the	  decision	  is	  based	  on	  a	  complex	  technical	  or	  economic	  assessment.319	  The	  unclear	  basis	  for	  Commission’s	  classification	  together	  with	  said	  case	  law	  clearly	  indicates	  that	  it	  would	  have	  difficulties	  on	  this	  matter	  if	  it	  were	  brought	  before	  the	  Union	  courts.	  However,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  court	  clarification	  and	  especially	  states	  willingness	  to	  bring	  this	  matter	  before	  them,	  the	  classification	  of	  TGC	  schemes	  as	  state	  resources	  will	  prevail.	  	  	   In	  summary,	  REFIT	  and	  TENFIT	  schemes	  in	  general	  amount	  to	  state	  aid,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  for	  TGC	  schemes.	  However,	  in	  Commission’s	  decisional	  practice	  all	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  currently	  amount	  to	  state	  aid.	  	  	  
3.4.2 Compatibility:	  positive	  integration	  and	  energy	  rights	  	  Until	  recently,	  the	  effects	  for	  states	  of	  having	  its	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  classified	  as	  state	  aid	  was	  that	  it	  fell	  within	  Commission’s	  regulatory	  net	  largely	  characterized	  by	  procedural	  obligations,	  such	  as	  the	  submission	  of	  relevant	  information	  and	  monitoring	  obligations.	  Indeed,	  the	  common	  factor	  characterizing	  the	  compatibility	  assessment	  of	  all	  principal	  support	  schemes	  under	  2008	  EAG	  was	  the	  requirement	  to	  illustrate	  the	  absence	  of	  overcompensation.	  This	  is	  a	  quite	  general	  and	  vague	  criterion,	  largely	  consisting	  of	  economical	  assumptions	  and	  estimations	  on	  future	  market	  developments	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  information	  submitted.	  Assuming	  that	  states	  have	  the	  best	  knowledge	  of	  the	  (national)	  market	  conditions	  and	  market	  behaviour	  underpinning	  their	  support	  schemes,	  they	  will	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  gather	  and	  in	  particular	  frame	  such	  information	  so	  as	  to	  fulfil	  the	  general	  criterion	  established	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  Commission.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  imprecision	  of	  2008	  enabled	  state	  discretion.	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   However,	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  EEAG,	  the	  general	  and	  non-­‐prescriptive	  compatibility	  criteria	  were	  replaced	  with	  a	  much	  more	  precise	  and	  prescriptive	  criteria.	  Under	  the	  new	  compatibility	  regime,	  FIT	  schemes	  are	  gradually	  phased	  out	  in	  favour	  of	  TENFIT	  schemes	  based	  on	  FIP	  mechanisms.	  TGC	  schemes	  are	  still	  largely	  assessed	  under	  the	  old	  criteria	  but	  must	  now	  be	  technologically	  neutral.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  strict	  the	  Commission	  will	  apply	  these	  new	  criteria	  from	  2016	  and	  2017	  respectively,	  but	  nothing	  –	  neither	  the	  wording	  of	  its	  soft	  law	  nor	  the	  individual	  decision	  regarding	  the	  German	  FIT-­‐mechanism	  applicable	  in	  extraordinary	  circumstances	  –	  suggest	  that	  states	  will	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  freely	  choose	  between	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes.	  Thus,	  within	  two	  years,	  states	  will	  primarily	  be	  able	  to	  decide	  between	  a	  TGC	  scheme	  and	  a	  TENFIT	  scheme	  with	  a	  FIP	  funding	  mechanism.	  FIP	  schemes	  as	  such	  may	  be	  employed,	  provided	  that	  the	  states	  demonstrate	  their	  viability.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  exceptions	  for	  adopting	  FIT	  schemes	  are	  highly	  limited.	  Although	  nothing	  in	  the	  EEAG	  precludes	  the	  systematic	  and	  large-­‐scale	  usage	  of	  the	  exception,	  in	  particular	  a	  wide	  scale	  deployment	  of	  small	  scale	  installations	  not	  exceeding	  the	  threshold	  alone	  but	  nevertheless	  produce	  considerable	  amount	  of	  RES-­‐E	  in	  the	  aggregate,	  states	  will	  likely	  refrain	  from	  such	  usage	  since	  it	  would	  entail	  considerable	  investment	  (aid)	  costs	  in	  the	  aggregate.	  The	  conclusion,	  accordingly,	  is	  that	  state	  discretion	  under	  state	  aid	  law	  is	  constrained	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  TGC	  schemes	  and	  TENFIT	  schemes	  underpinned	  by	  a	  FIP	  mechanism	  gradually	  are	  the	  two	  principal	  support	  scheme	  designs	  primarily	  available	  for	  states.	  	  	   By	  positively	  defining	  the	  substantive	  criteria	  that	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  to	  be	  considered	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  significantly	  constraining	  state	  discretion	  in	  this	  regard,	  the	  new	  prescriptive	  EEAG	  amounts	  to	  positive	  integration	  or	  harmonisation.	  Basically,	  whilst	  negative	  integration	  is	  characterised	  by	  the	  removal	  of	  national	  barriers	  to	  trade	  at	  EU	  level,	  positive	  integration/harmonisation	  refers	  to	  positively	  defined	  criteria’s	  harmonizing	  different	  national	  regulations	  into	  a	  common	  EU	  standard.320	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  for	  instance	  the	  RED	  directives	  adopted	  by	  national	  governments,	  the	  harmonisation	  in	  question	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  supranational	  actor	  and	  hence	  imposed	  from	  above.321	  Additionally,	  the	  new	  prescriptive	  approach	  likely	  intervene	  in	  all	  the	  three	  energy	  rights	  to	  which	  states	  are	  entitled	  pursuant	  to	  article	  194(2)	  TFEU,	  namely	  the	  right	  to	  “determine	  the	  conditions	  for	  exploiting	  its	  energy	  resources,	  its	  choice	  between	  different	  energy	  sources	  and	  the	  general	  structure	  of	  its	  energy	  supply.”322	  Assuming	  that	  RES	  constitutes	  indigenous	  energy	  resources,323	  the	  constraints	  on	  state	  discretion	  in	  the	  context	  discussed	  likely	  intervenes	  in	  states	  first	  energy	  right,	  namely	  the	  right	  to	  determine	  the	  conditions	  for	  exploiting	  its	  energy	  resources.	  In	  particular,	  given	  that	  FIT	  schemes	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  particularly	  useful	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  immature	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  320	  See	  for	  instance	  Padros	  and	  Cocciolo	  2010:35,	  Stone	  Sweet	  2010:18,	  Scharpf	  1999:45.	  	  321	  Blauberger	  2008.	  	  322	  See	  for	  instance	  Tews	  2014:12f	  for	  a	  similar	  though	  unspecified	  suggestion.	  	  323	  AG	  opinion	  para	  109	  in	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	  See	  also	  Fouquet	  2013:16.	  Compare	  however	  Delvaux	  2013:259	  and	  345,	  para	  739	  and	  983	  respectively,	  suggesting	  that	  only	  energy	  resources	  that	  are	  important	  to	  all	  states	  are	  included	  in	  the	  first	  energy	  right,	  such	  as	  oil,	  natural	  gas	  and	  uranium.	  However,	  given	  that	  uranium	  is	  heavily	  relied	  on	  by	  some	  countries	  but	  not	  by	  others,	  the	  very	  same	  proportion	  in	  respect	  of	  RES	  will	  be	  equally	  important	  to	  all	  countries.	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  that	  not	  necessarily	  are	  small	  scale	  installations	  nor	  demonstration	  projects,	  the	  constraints	  on	  choosing	  such	  schemes	  will	  inevitably	  affect	  the	  second	  energy	  right,	  namely	  states	  unilateral	  choice	  between	  different	  energy	  sources.	  The	  same	  argument	  is	  equally	  applicable	  to	  the	  third	  energy	  right,	  since	  it	  comprises	  states	  right	  to	  decide	  its	  energy	  mix.325	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  energy	  rights	  contained	  in	  the	  energy	  provision	  (article	  194)	  and	  the	  environmental	  provision	  (article	  192),	  subject	  to	  a	  threshold,	  is	  not	  settled.	  Accordingly,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  adopting	  secondary	  legislation,	  the	  practical	  application	  of	  the	  energy	  rights	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  threshold	  criterion;	  that	  is,	  that	  their	  subject	  matter	  shall	  be	  affected	  significantly.	  To	  what	  extent	  this	  is	  the	  case	  here	  can	  certainly	  be	  discussed	  and	  would	  ultimately	  require	  an	  empirical	  assessment	  upon	  a	  quantification	  of	  the	  threshold.	  However,	  since	  the	  immediate	  context	  do	  not	  concern	  the	  adoption	  of	  secondary	  legislation,	  I	  consider	  it	  safe	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  outcome	  at	  face	  value	  intervene	  in	  at	  least	  two	  of	  the	  energy	  rights	  enshrined	  in	  article	  194(2)	  TFEU.	  	  	   In	  summary,	  the	  constrains	  on	  state	  discretion	  in	  respect	  of	  principal	  support	  scheme	  design	  is	  mandated	  by	  positive	  integration	  from	  above	  and	  intervenes	  in	  states	  energy	  rights.	  	  
4 Assessment:	  legitimacy	  and	  trinity	  	  	  The	  outcome	  is	  twofold	  and	  follows	  the	  internal	  market	  regimes.	  At	  the	  one	  hand,	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  granted	  member	  states	  considerable	  discretion	  as	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  principal	  RES-­‐E	  support	  scheme	  design.	  At	  the	  other	  hand,	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime,	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  discretion	  is	  increasingly	  constrained	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  FIT	  schemes	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  FIP	  schemes	  are	  phased	  out	  in	  favour	  of	  TENFIT	  schemes	  based	  on	  FIP	  mechanisms	  and	  TGC	  schemes.	  	  From	  a	  state-­‐perspective,	  the	  outcome	  is	  unsatisfying	  insofar	  that	  an	  exceptional	  two-­‐tier	  justification	  under	  the	  first	  regime	  is	  of	  little	  help	  when	  state	  discretion	  is	  increasingly	  constrained	  under	  the	  latter.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  however,	  the	  outcome	  raises	  legitimacy	  concerns,	  which	  in	  the	  context	  of	  especially	  EU	  law	  –	  it	  is	  argued	  –	  may	  substantiate	  legal	  arguments.	  Prior	  to	  the	  judgement	  in	  Ålands	  vindkraft,	  one	  commentator	  for	  instance	  suggested	  that	  if	  the	  ECJ	  followed	  AG’s	  opinion	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  national	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  would	  have	  to	  support	  foreign	  RES-­‐E	  production,	  the	  domestic	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  national	  support	  scheme	  in	  question	  would	  be	  in	  danger.326	  Similarly,	  following	  the	  consultation	  phase	  on	  the	  new	  EEAG	  where	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  Commission	  attempted	  to	  intervene	  in	  national	  energy	  mix	  issues,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  was	  questioned.327	  Both	  allegations	  illustrate	  that	  legitimacy	  of	  European	  decision-­‐making	  is	  not	  a	  purely	  academic328	  concern,	  since	  they	  may	  either	  alone	  or	  in	  the	  extension	  underpin	  legal	  arguments.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  allegations	  suffer	  from	  a	  non-­‐precise	  or	  at	  least	  a	  narrow	  concept	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  324	  See	  for	  instance	  OECD	  2011:134	  Ragwitz	  2012:19,	  del	  Rio	  and	  Artigiues	  2014:294.	  	  325	  Delvaux	  2013:345	  para	  985.	  326	  von	  Unger	  2014:116.	  	  327	  Thieffry	  2014:290.	  	  328	  Compare	  Scharpf	  1999:12.	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of	  legitimacy.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  essay,	  therefore,	  I	  will	  discuss	  whether	  the	  outcome	  may	  be	  considered	  legitimate,	  both	  from	  a	  input	  and	  a	  output	  conceptualisation	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  energy	  trinity.	  It	  must	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  given	  the	  amount	  and	  breadth	  of	  aspects	  that	  possibly	  can	  affect	  a	  legitimacy	  assessment,	  the	  following	  discussion	  will	  inevitably	  and	  at	  least	  formally	  be	  incomplete.	  The	  purpose	  is	  nevertheless	  to	  tentatively	  point	  out	  the	  central	  and	  substantial	  argumentative	  threads	  that	  in	  any	  event	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  view	  of	  the	  outcome,	  and	  conclude	  thereon.	  	  
4.1 Input	  legitimacy	  The	  two	  legitimacy	  concerns	  raised	  above	  clearly	  relates	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  input	  legitimacy.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  this	  concept	  is	  based	  on	  whether	  the	  outcome	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  members	  of	  a	  given	  community,	  as	  expressed	  by	  participation	  and/or	  consensus.329	  The	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Council,	  composed	  of	  representatives	  of	  the	  Union’s	  citizens	  and	  the	  relevant	  ministry	  of	  each	  state	  respectively,330	  adopted	  both	  RED’s.	  Accordingly,	  the	  prescribed	  minimum	  harmonisation	  and	  the	  unconstrained	  state	  discretion	  arising	  from	  both	  RED’s	  originate	  from	  the	  will	  of	  the	  states	  concerned.	  This	  is	  equally	  true	  for	  the	  unilateral	  adoption	  of	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  preceding	  EU	  secondary	  legislation	  to	  that	  effect,	  such	  as	  Germanys	  FIT	  scheme	  assessed	  in	  PreussenElektra.	  Consequently,	  the	  outcome	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU	  may	  be	  considered	  legitimate	  insofar	  that	  those	  preferences	  were	  upheld	  and	  justified,	  in	  spite	  of	  being	  outright	  discriminatory.	  This	  would	  not	  have	  been	  the	  case	  if	  the	  AG’s	  opinion	  in	  Essent	  Belgium	  and	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  had	  been	  upheld.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  input	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  outcome	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  is	  rather	  weak.	  The	  outcome	  not	  only	  constrains	  state	  discretion	  trough	  a	  positively	  defined	  criteria	  by	  a	  supranational	  actor	  not	  subject	  to	  domestic	  accountability,	  but	  also	  intervenes	  in	  states	  energy	  rights.	  Under	  the	  treaty	  provisions	  on	  competence,	  such	  a	  result	  would	  at	  most	  be	  possible	  to	  achieve	  by	  way	  of	  unanimity	  under	  the	  special	  legislative	  procedure.	  Additionally,	  as	  a	  device	  for	  input	  legitimacy331	  and	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  highly	  significant	  in	  renewable	  energy	  matters,	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  would	  have	  to	  be	  complied	  with.	  Accordingly,	  the	  outcome	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  illegitimate,	  at	  least	  from	  an	  input	  perspective.	  	  
4.2 Output	  legitimacy	  	   	  Under	  this	  concept	  the	  decisive	  factor	  is	  whether	  the	  common	  welfare	  of	  a	  given	  constituency	  is	  effectively	  promoted,	  and	  legitimacy	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  capacity	  to	  solve	  problems	  requiring	  collective	  solutions.332	  Also,	  in	  contrast	  to	  input	  related	  criteria,	  output	  legitimacy	  relies	  more	  on	  representation	  than	  direct	  participation.	  Accordingly,	  this	  legitimacy	  depends	  on	  institutional	  mechanisms	  that	  can	  balance	  two	  potentially	  conflicting	  purposes:	  hinder	  the	  abuse	  of	  public	  power	  and	  at	  the	  same	  facilitate	  effective	  problem	  solving.333	  These	  aspects	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  329	  Scharpf	  1999:6f.	  	  330	  Articles	  14(2)	  and	  16(2)	  TFEU.	  	  331	  See	  for	  instance	  Eriksen	  and	  Fossum	  2004:452.	  	  332	  Scharpf	  1999:	  6,	  11.	  333	  Scharpf	  1999:13.	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procedural	  and	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  guidance	  on	  whether	  a	  given	  outcome	  may	  be	  considered	  legitimate	  on	  substantial	  grounds	  i.e.	  what	  the	  potentially	  solved	  problem	  is	  constituted	  of.	  Rather,	  they	  seek	  to	  ascertain	  that	  the	  substantial	  outcome	  is	  reached	  by	  procedurally	  fair	  means.	  In	  the	  following	  these	  two	  procedural	  aspects	  will	  be	  shortly	  assessed.	  Additionally,	  the	  substantive	  outcome	  will	  be	  analysed	  from	  a	  trinity	  perspective.	  	  	  
4.2.1 Procedural	  criteria	  	  	  Considering	  the	  outcome	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  it	  must	  first	  be	  recalled	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  exclusive	  competence	  in	  this	  area	  of	  law.334	  In	  particular,	  the	  Commission	  has	  exclusive	  competence	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  compatibility	  assessment.335	  In	  this	  connection	  it	  must	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  three	  rounds	  of	  public	  consultation	  in	  which	  inter	  alia	  member	  states	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  submitted	  their	  opinions	  preceded	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  EEAG.336	  Even	  though	  such	  participation	  hardly	  replaces	  legislative	  competence,	  it	  nevertheless	  approximates	  input	  legitimacy	  but	  from	  an	  output	  representation	  criteria.	  	  Several	  arguments	  can	  be	  advanced	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  issuance	  and	  application	  of	  soft	  law	  (e.g.	  guidelines,	  communications,	  notices)	  in	  general	  enables	  effective	  problem	  solving.337	  Firstly,	  such	  a	  usage	  is	  a	  common	  feature	  for	  public	  authorities	  in	  all	  legal	  systems,	  including	  the	  EU.	  It	  is	  of	  particular	  importance	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  Commission	  is	  dealing	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  cases,	  notably	  in	  the	  context	  of	  state	  aid.338	  The	  use	  of	  soft	  law	  enables	  the	  administration	  to	  cope	  with	  an	  increasing	  workload339	  and	  enables	  in	  that	  way	  an	  effective	  problem	  solving.	  Secondly,	  a	  strict	  and	  consistent	  enforcement	  of	  soft	  law	  facilitate	  transparency,	  legal	  security	  and	  credibility,340	  which	  are	  constituting	  elements	  of	  output	  legitimacy.	  The	  precision	  in	  EEAG	  is	  considerable,	  both	  in	  itself	  and	  especially	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  previous	  EAG.	  Even	  though	  it	  remains	  to	  bee	  seen	  how	  the	  Commission	  will	  apply	  the	  EEAG,	  nothing	  currently	  suggests	  that	  it	  will	  be	  anything	  but	  strict	  and	  consistent.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  by	  binding	  itself	  to	  its	  soft	  law	  and	  thereby	  decreasing	  its	  exposure	  to	  political	  pressure,341	  the	  Commission	  has	  very	  good	  reasons	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  consistent	  and	  strict	  application.	  This	  is	  particularly	  so	  in	  the	  context	  of	  EEAG	  whose	  intervention	  in	  states	  energy	  rights	  may	  be	  criticized	  on	  basis	  of	  input	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  334	  Article	  3(1)(b)	  TFEU.	  See	  also	  Rusche	  2013:105f.	  	  335	  See	  for	  instance	  Regulation	  734/2013	  recital	  2.	  	  336	  See	  for	  instance	  Breuvart	  and	  Jestaedt	  2014.	  	  337	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  elsewhere	  that	  the	  use	  of	  informal	  rule	  making,	  including	  the	  issuance	  and	  application	  of	  guidelines,	  is	  not	  unproblematic	  because	  the	  amount	  of	  instruments	  employed	  by	  the	  Commission	  can	  be	  confusing	  for	  users	  of	  the	  system.	  See	  for	  instance	  Craig	  2008:1086	  footnote	  81	  to	  that	  effect.	  Even	  though	  this	  may	  be	  true	  at	  a	  general	  level,	  especially	  for	  undertakings	  operating	  in	  several	  industries	  and	  at	  different	  markets,	  this	  is	  hardly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  context	  of	  RES-­‐E	  production.	  The	  EEAG	  as	  such	  is	  anything	  but	  confusing.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  the	  precise	  wording	  of	  the	  EEAG	  is	  one	  of	  the	  distinguishing	  factors	  in	  comparison	  with	  previous	  guidelines.	  Moreover,	  even	  if	  interrelated	  regimes	  concerning	  e.g.	  environmental	  taxes	  and	  tradable	  emission	  permits	  may	  raise	  concerns	  about	  the	  precise	  effects	  in	  the	  aggregate	  on	  the	  energy	  sector,	  such	  concerns	  is	  arguably	  inherent	  in	  all	  legislative	  processes	  and	  business	  strategies	  of	  undertakings	  concerned.	  Also,	  the	  precision	  in	  guidelines,	  as	  well	  its	  substantial	  features	  discussed	  below,	  mitigates	  this	  aspect.	  338	  Craig	  2006:641f.	  	  339	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1086.	  340	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1086.	  	  341	  Blauberger	  2008:6,	  12f.	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legitimacy.	  	  It	  is	  in	  my	  view	  obvious	  that	  the	  EEAG	  enables	  effective	  problem	  solving.	  	  	   The	  assessment	  is	  seemingly	  more	  complicated	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  Commission	  has	  abused	  its	  powers	  in	  adopting	  EEAG	  and	  applying	  it	  on	  individual	  decisions.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  Commission	  enjoys	  considerable	  discretion	  as	  to	  whether	  aid	  is	  compatible	  with	  article	  107(3)	  TFEU.342	  ECJ	  has	  consistently	  held	  that	  the	  Commission	  may	  adopt	  guidelines	  or	  policies	  as	  to	  how	  it	  will	  exercise	  its	  discretion	  under	  article	  107(3)	  TFEU,	  provided	  that	  they	  do	  not	  derogate	  from	  treaty	  provisions.343	  Thus	  the	  EEAG	  cannot	  prescribe	  compatibility	  conditions	  that	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  primary	  law.	  However,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  analysed	  compatibility	  constraints	  on	  state	  discretion	  provided	  by	  the	  EEAG,	  this	  condition	  becomes	  a	  self-­‐referential	  exercise	  since	  other	  treaty	  provisions	  does	  not	  regulate	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  in	  this	  particular	  regard	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	  whether	  a	  scheme	  (considered	  as	  aid)	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  cannot	  be	  based	  on	  other	  grounds	  than	  the	  mentioned	  article	  the	  interpretation	  of	  which	  is	  in	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  Commission.344	  The	  only	  practical	  example	  conceivable	  is	  where	  countries	  employing	  technologically	  differentiated	  TGC	  schemes,	  such	  as	  the	  Romanian	  above,	  objects	  to	  the	  prescribed	  criteria	  on	  technologically	  neutral	  certificates	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  certificates	  do	  not	  amount	  to	  state	  aid	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	  that	  the	  EEAG,	  accordingly,	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  primary	  law	  in	  this	  regard.	  This	  is	  surely	  relevant	  for	  countries	  employing	  technologically	  differentiated	  TGC	  schemes	  but	  concerns	  the	  question	  of	  how	  a	  principal	  support	  scheme	  is	  designed	  and	  not	  which	  of	  them	  a	  state	  may	  choose.	  It	  should	  perhaps	  be	  mentioned	  that	  the	  intervention	  by	  EEAG	  in	  states	  energy	  rights	  under	  the	  treaty	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  derogation	  from	  primary	  law,	  since	  these	  rights	  are	  only	  applicable	  in	  legislating	  matters.	  In	  summary,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  contend	  that	  the	  constraints	  provided	  by	  EEAG	  in	  respect	  of	  principal	  support	  scheme	  design	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  primary	  law.	  	  	   The	  Commission	  is	  subject	  too	  far	  more	  substantial	  constraints	  in	  its	  decisional	  practice	  regarding	  the	  compatibility	  assessment	  than	  in	  adopting	  the	  soft	  law	  under	  which	  the	  individual	  decisions	  are	  taken.	  Since	  this	  issue	  will	  have	  to	  be	  assessed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  and	  goes	  well	  beyond	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  outcome	  rendered	  by	  inter	  alia	  the	  EEAG	  may	  be	  considered	  legitimate,	  I	  will	  only	  point	  out	  one	  aspect	  that	  reinforce	  one	  of	  the	  arguments	  presented	  above.	  According	  to	  settled	  case	  law	  it	  is	  for	  the	  EU	  courts	  to	  verify	  whether	  the	  Commission,	  in	  adopting	  its	  decision,	  comply	  with	  its	  own	  Guidelines.345	  This	  is	  an	  additional	  reason	  for	  the	  Commission	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  strict	  and	  consistent	  application	  of	  the	  EEAG,	  which	  in	  turn	  increase	  legal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  342	  See	  for	  instance	  Hanchner	  2012:59	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  	  343	  See	  for	  instance	  Quigley	  2009:section	  7.2	  footnote	  34	  and	  Craig	  and	  de	  Burca	  2008:1087	  footnote	  75	  and	  the	  case	  law	  cited.	  	  344	  An	  illustrative	  example	  of	  the	  opposite	  situation	  is	  that	  the	  Commission	  in	  EEAG	  point	  122	  consider	  that	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  ”should	  in	  principle”	  be	  open	  to	  RES-­‐E	  production	  in	  other	  states	  i.e.	  not	  containing	  the	  territorial	  limitations	  assessed	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU.	  The	  cases	  on	  this	  issue	  –	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  and	  Essent	  Belgium	  –	  were	  pending	  before	  the	  ECJ	  at	  the	  time	  EEAG	  was	  issued.	  The	  outcome	  of	  these	  cases	  clearly	  illustrate	  one	  aspect	  that	  the	  Commission	  must	  comply	  with	  i.e.	  it	  cannot	  approve	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  these	  do	  not	  contain	  territorial	  limitations	  since	  these	  are	  allowed	  under	  other	  treaty	  provisions.	  	  345	  See	  for	  instance	  Case	  T-­‐27/02	  Kronofrance	  v	  Commission	  para	  79.	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certainty	  and	  ultimately	  enable	  effective	  problem	  solving.	  Overall	  there	  are	  in	  my	  view	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  outcome	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  fulfil	  the	  procedural	  output	  legitimacy	  criteria.	  	  	  	   The	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  outcome	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU	  comes	  up	  with	  output	  legitimacy	  is	  in	  effect	  a	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  facilitates	  effective	  problem	  solving,	  since	  the	  ECJ	  hardly	  can	  be	  accused	  for	  having	  transgressed	  its	  competence	  in	  this	  regard.	  Two	  aspects	  related	  to	  consistency	  and	  legal	  certainty	  are	  important	  here.	  As	  previously	  mentioned	  both	  RED’s	  provides	  for	  minimum	  harmonisation	  in	  respect	  of	  how	  the	  national	  targets	  set	  are	  to	  be	  achieved.	  Even	  if	  recitals	  to	  both	  RED’s	  more	  or	  less	  recognize	  the	  need	  for	  territorial	  limitations,346	  this	  issue	  is	  not	  exhaustively	  regulated.	  It	  is	  in	  essence	  for	  the	  states	  to	  decide	  on	  this	  matter	  as	  long	  as	  the	  prescribed	  procedural	  obligations	  and/or	  the	  targets	  are	  met.347	  Consequently,	  trade	  distortions	  arising	  from	  territorial	  limitations	  shall	  solely	  be	  assessed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  primary	  law.	  The	  ECJ	  surely	  assess	  these	  limitations	  under	  primary	  law	  but	  justify	  these	  measures	  by	  reference	  to	  inter	  alia	  the	  absence	  of	  exhaustive	  harmonisation.348	  Effectively,	  the	  ECJ	  sidesteps	  a	  rule	  of	  higher	  rank	  by	  way	  of	  reference	  to	  a	  rule	  of	  lower	  rank	  and	  the	  established	  practise	  that	  trade	  distortions	  arising	  from	  minimum	  harmonisation	  shall	  be	  assessed	  under	  primary	  law.349	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  inconsistency	  in	  this	  regard	  does	  not	  facilitate	  effective	  problem	  solving,	  since	  the	  ECJ	  in	  effect	  disapply	  an	  established	  interpretation	  technique	  in	  this	  area	  of	  law.	  	  	  	   Secondly,	  the	  two-­‐justification	  track	  employed	  in	  these	  three	  cases	  raises	  legal	  certainty	  concerns.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  discriminatory	  measures	  pursuing	  environmental	  protection	  aims	  may	  be	  justified	  constitutes	  a	  long	  standing	  but	  not	  yet	  settled	  issue	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU.350	  Suggestions	  has	  been	  made	  that	  ECJ’s	  inconsistent	  approach	  in	  environmental	  protection	  cases	  is	  based	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  realist	  and	  a	  formalist	  jurisprudence,	  without	  however	  recognizing	  that	  legal	  certainty	  is	  at	  risk	  or	  that	  “the	  court	  is	  acting	  unjustly	  or	  without	  principle”	  but	  rather	  that	  “a	  new	  theory	  that	  can	  explain	  this	  apparent	  contradiction	  should	  be	  developed.”351	  This	  reasoning	  suffers	  in	  my	  opinion	  from	  a	  serious	  drawback,	  since	  the	  ECJ,	  by	  not	  formally	  clarifying	  its	  principal	  position	  on	  these	  matters,	  clearly	  communicate	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  principle	  other	  than	  resolving	  the	  issues	  before	  it	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  Developing	  a	  theory	  on	  this	  inconsistent	  basis	  will	  hardly	  amount	  to	  one	  (consistent)	  theory,	  but	  rather	  several	  theories,	  whereby	  the	  outcome	  in	  terms	  of	  legal	  uncertainty	  impede	  effective	  problem	  solving.	  The	  exceptional	  two-­‐tier	  justification	  approach	  first	  provided	  by	  PreussenElektra	  added	  an	  extra	  layer	  of	  confusion	  and	  legal	  uncertainty	  for	  economic	  operators	  and	  national	  courts.352	  Although	  this	  exceptional	  approach	  in	  the	  immediate	  context	  of	  RES-­‐E	  production	  has	  been	  upheld	  in	  the	  subsequent	  cases	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  and	  Essent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  346	  RED	  2001	  recital	  14	  and	  RED	  2009	  recital	  25.	  347	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  indirect	  enforcement	  techniques	  in	  respect	  of	  both	  REDs,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  first	  one	  being	  solely	  indicative,	  see	  Truby	  2013:699ff	  and	  Peeters	  2014:49.	  	  348	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft	  para	  92	  and	  94,	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  
Belgium	  para	  97.	  	  349	  For	  a	  general	  discussion	  on	  the	  latter	  point,	  see	  Oliver	  2012:238f,	  484f.	  	  350	  See	  for	  instance	  Jacobs	  2006.	  351	  Engle	  2008:129.	  	  352	  See	  for	  instance	  Johnston	  et	  al	  2008:132,	  Jacobs	  2006:192ff.	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Belgium,	  the	  ECJ	  has	  nevertheless	  abstained	  from	  clarifying	  whether	  the	  departure	  from	  the	  general	  principle	  can	  be	  relied	  on	  principally.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  three	  cases	  on	  territorial	  limitations	  of	  RES-­‐E	  schemes	  do	  not	  provide	  authority	  sufficient	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  said	  schemes	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  are	  allowed.	  The	  point	  is	  rather	  that	  the	  underlying	  doctrinal	  and	  more	  general	  question	  –	  which	  the	  ECJ	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  clarify	  –	  remains	  unanswered	  and,	  accordingly,	  that	  it	  does	  not	  in	  general	  enable	  effective	  problem	  solving.	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  outcome	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU	  may	  be	  questioned	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  output	  legitimacy	  criteria.	  	  
4.2.2 Substantial	  criteria:	  delivering	  the	  trinity	  	  Having	  assessed	  the	  procedural	  output	  legitimacy	  criteria,	  the	  remaining	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  substantive	  outcome	  under	  both	  regimes	  effectively	  promotes	  the	  common	  welfare	  of	  EU’s	  constituency.	  The	  common	  welfare	  in	  this	  context	  shall	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  objectives	  pertaining	  to	  the	  energy	  trinity.	  Are	  these	  effectively	  promoted	  by	  the	  contradicting	  outcome?	  	  	   The	  rationale	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  Commission	  is	  based	  on	  the	  prognosis	  that	  established	  RES	  will	  become	  grid-­‐competitive	  during	  the	  intermediate	  period	  between	  2020	  and	  2030,	  which	  in	  its	  view	  implies	  that	  subsidies	  should	  be	  phased	  out	  in	  a	  degressive	  way.	  Grid-­‐competitiveness	  or	  grid	  parity	  is	  basically	  reached	  when	  RES-­‐E	  costs	  the	  same	  or	  less	  as	  the	  (conventional)	  electricity	  on	  the	  national	  market	  including	  costs	  of	  construction,	  operation	  etc.353	  The	  EEAG	  is	  considered	  consistent	  with	  this	  objective	  and	  “will	  ensure	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  cost-­‐effective	  delivery	  through	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms.”354	  The	  key	  terms	  here	  are	  established	  RES	  and	  cost	  efficiency.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  there	  is	  a	  common	  perception	  that	  FIT	  schemes	  are	  appropriate	  instruments	  for	  immature	  technologies	  which	  is	  roughly	  equivalent	  to	  the	  most	  non-­‐competitive	  technologies.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  those	  schemes	  decreases	  the	  market	  risk,	  provides	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  investor	  confidence	  and,	  accordingly,	  supress	  the	  non-­‐competitive	  element	  of	  immature	  technologies.	  This,	  however,	  take	  place	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  cost	  efficiency	  in	  developing	  RES-­‐E	  in	  general,	  since	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  subsidies	  vested	  into	  mature	  RES	  technologies	  produces	  more	  electricity	  in	  the	  aggregate.	  Accordingly,	  and	  roughly	  amounting	  to	  a	  tautology,	  there	  is	  a	  compelling	  case	  for	  considering	  cost	  efficiency	  by	  way	  of	  promoting	  the	  most	  mature	  technologies	  as	  an	  effective	  mean	  to	  deliver	  more	  RES-­‐E	  in	  the	  aggregate.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  that	  all	  national	  legislators	  and	  policy	  makers	  prioritize	  this	  criterion	  in	  their	  decision-­‐making,	  at	  least	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  promoting	  the	  most	  mature	  technologies.	  	   Cost	  efficiency	  concerns	  were	  also	  raised	  during	  the	  assessment	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU,	  though	  indirectly.	  AG’s	  adherence	  to	  “prudent	  and	  rational	  utilisation	  of	  natural	  resources”355	  contained	  in	  article	  191(1)	  TFEU	  and	  call	  for	  “reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  renewable	  energy	  by	  permitting	  a	  more	  rational	  location	  of	  production”356	  is	  in	  effect	  a	  cost	  efficiency	  criterion	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  deterritorialised	  environmental	  protection.	  The	  compelling	  case	  for	  cost	  efficiency	  in	  the	  context	  of	  state	  aid	  is	  in	  my	  opinion	  even	  stronger	  under	  articles	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  353	  See	  for	  instance	  Ydersbond	  and	  Sveen	  2014.	  	  354	  EEAG	  point	  108,	  my	  emphasis.	  	  355	  AG	  opinion	  para	  109	  in	  Case	  C-­‐573/12	  Ålands	  vindkraft.	  356	  AG	  opinion	  para	  110	  in	  Cases	  C-­‐204/12	  to	  C-­‐208/12	  Essent	  Belgium.	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34-­‐36	  TFEU.	  On	  the	  assumption	  that	  RES-­‐E	  support	  schemes	  would	  have	  to	  set	  a	  cap	  for	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  support	  given	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  RES	  target	  the	  country	  in	  question	  aims	  to	  achieve,	  a	  prohibition	  of	  territorial	  limitations	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  absolutely	  most	  mature	  technologies	  within	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole	  instead	  of	  within	  each	  member	  state.	  In	  fact,	  a	  deterritorialized	  cost	  efficiency	  approach	  could	  very	  well	  lead	  to	  an	  outcome	  in	  which	  states	  heavily	  depending	  on	  immature	  technologies	  would	  end	  up	  with	  nearly	  no	  domestic	  RES-­‐E	  production	  at	  all.	  The	  problems	  ECJ	  associates	  with	  this	  approach	  (or	  at	  least	  the	  arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  AG)	  in	  terms	  of	  potentially	  declining	  investor	  confidence,	  an	  (im)proper	  functioning	  of	  the	  support	  schemes	  and	  states	  (in)ability	  to	  control	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  schemes	  are	  hardly	  eternal,	  since	  states	  as	  well	  as	  businesses	  inevitably	  adjust	  to	  new	  market	  conditions;	  in	  this	  case	  from	  a	  mainly	  national	  RES-­‐E	  market	  to	  an	  European	  market	  in	  which	  they	  already	  are	  present.	  Also,	  the	  assumption	  underlying	  the	  reasoning	  presumes	  that	  states	  will	  adjust	  their	  schemes	  in	  order	  to	  control	  their	  costs.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  is	  an	  outcome	  the	  majority	  of	  member	  states	  will	  oppose,	  and	  the	  ECJ	  has	  granted	  them	  authority	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  exhaustive	  harmonisation.	  	   From	  the	  trinity	  perspective	  employed	  by	  the	  Commission,	  the	  discussed	  cost	  efficiency	  criterion	  represent	  a	  triple-­‐win	  solution	  in	  terms	  of	  1)	  sustainability,	  since	  it	  enable	  higher	  and/or	  easier	  met	  RES	  targets,	  2)	  security	  of	  supply,	  since	  it	  would	  decrease	  the	  electricity	  prices	  and	  thus	  approximate	  affordability,	  3)	  competitiveness,	  since	  it	  inter	  alia	  pushes	  for	  the	  integration	  of	  RES-­‐E	  into	  the	  conventional	  electricity	  market.	  One	  can	  indeed	  argue	  that	  the	  output	  legitimacy	  in	  this	  intertwined	  area	  of	  internal	  market/energy/climate	  change	  policy	  ultimately	  depend	  upon	  the	  deliverance	  of	  the	  trinity.	  Such	  an	  assertion	  simultaneously	  displays	  the	  weakness	  of	  solely	  relying	  on	  input	  legitimacy.	  Recalling	  that	  states	  energy	  rights	  cuts	  through	  the	  legal	  bases	  for	  secondary	  legislation	  in	  energy	  and	  environmental	  matters,	  the	  adoption	  of	  cost	  efficiency	  criteria	  in	  the	  context	  of	  RES-­‐E	  production	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  territorial	  limitations	  are	  waived	  and/or	  the	  use	  of	  certain	  support	  schemes	  is	  restricted	  would	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  significant	  support	  by	  the	  member	  states.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  sufficient	  support,	  there	  will	  be	  considerable	  gap	  between	  the	  policy	  objectives	  and	  the	  legal	  means	  to	  achieve	  them.	  Surely,	  such	  a	  tension	  between	  collective	  action	  and	  sovereignty	  concerns,	  between	  policy	  and	  law,	  is	  hardly	  new	  and	  characterises	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  European	  decision-­‐making.	  Nevertheless,	  given	  the	  gravity	  of	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  and	  its	  intimate	  or	  glocalized	  interrelationship	  with	  energy	  matters	  as	  well	  as	  EU’s	  alleged	  international	  leadership	  under	  the	  former,	  the	  sole	  reliance	  on	  state	  support	  in	  legislative	  matters	  is	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  effectively	  promoting	  the	  trinity.	  Under	  such	  circumstances	  I	  consider	  it	  perfectly	  reasonable	  for	  the	  Commission,	  who	  “shall	  promote	  the	  general	  interest	  of	  the	  Union,”357	  to	  employ	  a	  cost	  efficiency	  criterion	  under	  the	  compatibility	  assessment	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  FIT	  and	  partly	  FIP	  schemes	  are	  gradually	  phased	  out.	  After	  all,	  the	  EU	  enjoys	  exclusive	  competence	  in	  state	  aid	  matters	  and	  both	  schemes	  generally	  amount	  to	  state	  aid	  which,	  as	  a	  starting	  point,	  is	  prohibited.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  trinity	  would	  be	  easier	  to	  deliver	  on	  a	  non-­‐discriminating	  internal	  market,	  the	  approach	  by	  the	  ECJ	  in	  this	  regard	  impedes	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  effective	  implementation.	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Accordingly,	  considered	  from	  a	  trinity	  perspective	  focusing	  on	  cost	  efficiency,	  the	  outcome	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime	  and	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  more	  and	  less	  legitimate,	  respectively.	  	  
4.3 Conclusion	  	  The	  fact	  that	  state	  discretion	  is	  constrained	  under	  the	  state	  aid	  regime,	  but	  upheld	  under	  articles	  34-­‐36	  TFEU,	  corresponds	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  input	  criteria	  to	  less	  and	  more	  legitimacy,	  respectively.	  However,	  considered	  from	  procedural	  output	  criteria,	  the	  assessment	  is	  altered.	  In	  view	  of	  inter	  alia	  the	  precision	  provided	  by	  the	  EEAG,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  exceptional	  two-­‐tier	  justification	  approach	  employed	  by	  the	  ECJ	  in	  a	  context	  characterized	  by	  legal	  uncertainty,	  the	  outcome	  is	  considered	  as	  more	  and	  less	  legitimate,	  respectively.	  The	  cost	  efficiency	  criterion	  provided	  by	  the	  EEAG	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  FIT	  and	  partly	  FIP	  schemes	  are	  gradually	  phased	  out	  is	  likely	  to	  enable	  a	  more	  effective	  implementation	  of	  the	  policy	  objectives	  pertaining	  to	  the	  trinity.	  This	  illustrates	  a	  potential	  weakness	  of	  input	  legitimacy,	  since	  it	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  formal	  consent	  of	  states	  instead	  of	  the	  benefits	  that	  can	  be	  achieved	  in	  the	  aggregate	  by	  collective	  action	  –	  even	  when	  imposed	  from	  above.	  In	  contrast,	  cost	  efficiency	  is	  decreased	  by	  the	  territorially	  confined	  approach	  employed	  by	  the	  ECJ.	  Thus,	  where	  the	  ECJ	  justifies	  discrimination	  within	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  among	  the	  member	  states	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  a	  cost	  efficient	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  trinity,	  the	  approach	  by	  the	  Commission	  mitigates	  these	  effects	  by	  way	  of	  promoting	  cost	  efficiency	  within	  the	  member	  states.	  How	  does	  this	  add	  up	  then?	  	  In	  the	  best	  of	  both	  worlds,	  the	  glocalised	  features	  of	  the	  trinity	  would	  be	  better	  promoted	  within	  a	  genuine	  or	  non-­‐discriminating	  internal	  market,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  cost	  efficiency.	  Until	  then,	  though,	  I	  consider	  the	  overall	  outcome	  as	  more	  or	  less	  legitimate.	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